Preamble

The House met at Half past Two o'Clock

PRAYERS

[Mr. SPEAKER in the Chair]

Oral Answers to Questions — B.B.C. WEATHER FORECASTS

Mr. G. Williams: asked the Under-Secretary of State for Air whether, in view of the obvious variation in certainty with which a weather forecast can be made, it is possible to indicate, in broad terms, the confidence to be attached to each of the forecasts relayed on behalf of his Department by the British Broadcasting Corporation.

The Under-Secretary of State for Air (Mr. George Ward): The weather forecasts broadcast by the British Broadcasting Corporation are already carefully worded to show the confidence to be attached to each part of the forecast. For example, unless there is a high degree of certainty in the forecast, qualifying words or phrases are used ranging from "probable" or "likely" to "chance of" or "perhaps."
The booklet "Your Weather Service," published by Her Majesty's Stationery Office, gives some information about the preparation of these forecasts, which I think may interest my hon. Friend, and I am, therefore, sending him a copy.

Mr. Williams: While thanking my hon. Friend for sending me a copy of this booklet, may I ask him whether he is aware that these forecasts are very unreliable at times and that the words which are used are also very vague? When we do get a really confident chance of a fine day it would be a very great help to farmers and holidaymakers to know that the forecast did have a No. 1 certainty or whatever one may like to call it.

Mr. Ward: The main difficulty is that each particular factor in the forecast—

wind, temperature, rain or whatever it is—is subject to a different degree of certainty, and it is this difficulty which precludes us from giving the whole group a letter. I should like to point out that our 24-hour forecasts are right about nine times out of ten.

Mr. de Freitas: Can the hon. Gentleman say whether there is still a senior scientific officer employed with the sole duty of carrying out a post mortemon the forecasts of the previous day?

Mr. Ward: I should like notice of that question.

Oral Answers to Questions — U.S. AIRCRAFT, MANSTON (ACCIDENTS)

Air Commodore Harvey: asked the Under-Secretary of State for Air what precautions are being taken by the United States Air Force authorities to avoid aircraft from Manston airfield flying over the three adjacent towns in the immediate vicinity.

Mr. Ward: The situation of Manston airfield and the direction of its main runway, limit what can be done to cut down flying over the nearby towns. For example, Westgate and Ramsgate are less than three miles from the main runway and in an almost direct line with it. My hon. and gallant Friend will, therefore, appreciate that it is often impracticable for aircraft using this runway to avoid passing over these towns. I am, however, in touch with the United States Air Force authorities. It may be possible to reduce the amount of flying over Margate and Broadstairs by adjusting the airfield circuit.

Air Commodore Harvey: While thanking my hon. Friend for that reply, may I ask him to impress upon the American authorities that in view of the number of accidents which have occurred in the vicinity of Manston airfield, the public are really alarmed? Having once been stationed there myself for some years, I know that circuits can be carried out in another direction which would at least avoid the two towns which he has just mentioned.

Mr. Ward: The United States authorities are very anxious to minimise the annoyance, inconvenience and danger to


people living in this area. It is only possible to avoid Broadstairs and Margate either by doing a circuit out to sea or by having a variable circuit which as my hon. and gallant Friend knows has risks attached to it.

Oral Answers to Questions — CIVIL AVIATION

Flying Routes, Scotland

Sir T. Moore: asked the Minister of Civil Aviation whether he is now in a position to define his policy as to the distribution of flying routes in Scotland and the part that private operators will be permitted to play in that policy.

The Minister of Transport and Civil Aviation (Mr. Alan Lennox-Boyd): Discussions with the interested parties are continuing, but there are still a number of outstanding and difficult problems.

Sir T. Moore: While partially thanking my right hon. Friend for his reply, may I ask him not to overlook those pioneers of civil flying in Scotland, Scottish Aviation, Limited, who played such a prominent part in the late war? Will he do everything he can to reward them now for the services that they rendered?

Mr. Lennox-Boyd: I shall be very glad when reputable private firms, such as the firm which my hon. and gallant Friend has mentioned, are in a position to take advantage of the new opportunities open to private flying.

Sir T. Moore: I am obliged.

Mr. Woodburn: Is the Minister aware that this company has already had permission to operate routes? Can he say whether they took advantage of that or is the case that they have never used the permission they have already?

Mr. Lennox-Boyd: As I said, discussions are now proceeding with this and other companies.

Mr. Manuel: Can the Minister tell the House how many routes in Scotland have been allocated to private operators, and the number of routes they have not yet utilised after allocation?

Mr. Lennox-Boyd: As I made plain in my statement on 27th May, it is the intention to treat Scotland as one area, one Kingdom, and, to whomsoever the

right to operate in Scotland is conceded, it would be for Scotland as a whole.

Mr. Manuel: How many routes have been allocated to private operators which have not been utilised and are not providing a service?

Mr. Lennox-Boyd: If the hon. Gentleman means under old associate agreements, I will tell him the exact number if he will put a Question down.

Mr. Beswick: Has a decision yet been come to whether the Government will pay a subsidy to the private operators with whom the right hon. Gentleman is in consultation?

Mr. Lennox-Boyd: I also made that clear on 27th May.

Helicopters

Mr. Nabarro: asked the Minister of Civil Aviation how many helicopters are currently licensed for flight in the United Kingdom, excluding machines used by Her Majesty's Forces; for what purposes such machines are used; who owns them; and whether any are regularly employed for passenger carrying by charter companies or the air corporations.

Mr. Lennox-Boyd: Twenty-five helicopters are on the U.K. Register, of which 11 are operational for purposes of hire and reward. Of these 11 machines, four, owned by Messrs. Pest Control, Limited, are employed in general agricultural use, five, owned by B.E.A., are in use in general experimental work for commercial purposes, etc., and two owned by Messrs. Westlands are available for general commercial usage. None is at present employed for passenger carrying on scheduled services.

Mr. Nabarro: Do not these figures reveal a startling deficiency? Is there no opportunity of speeding developments in this important field of aviation, in view of the extraordinary versatility of the helicopter and its proved capacity for both passenger and mail carrying, cable laying and a wide variety of industrial purposes?

Mr. Lennox-Boyd: I do not think that we have anything to be ashamed of in our helicopter development progress. The United Kingdom has produced the first two-engined helicopter, the Bristol 173,


has much the most commercial experience, has produced the first scheduled passenger services, and has the first certificate for blind flying in helicopters.

Mr. Grimond: Have any experiments at all with the helicopter been carried out among the Scottish Islands; and if not, when does the Minister hope that such experiments may be made?

Mr. Lennox-Boyd: I will certainly look into that.

Sir R. Glyn: Would it be possible to put in the Library of the House a full account of the use made of the helicopter in the United States in connection with transport generally?

Mr. Lennox-Boyd: I will consider that.

Mr. Rankin: Can the Minister say how the operational costs of using a helicopter for civilian purposes compare with those of the ordinary type of machine in use today?

Mr. Lennox-Boyd: That is quite another question.

Mr. Nabarro: asked the Minister of Civil Aviation if he will take steps to study and keep abreast of the rapid development of the helicopter for passenger, mail and freight work in the United States of America, with a view to application of American technique and operational practice in the United Kingdom.

Mr. Lennox-Boyd: American helicopter development work is continuously studied by all those concerned.

Mr. Nabarro: But would my right hon. Friend not agree that there are very large numbers of helicopters in daily use in the United States of America, where they are used continuously, for instance, for mail carrying; and is it not rather a departure from fact in this matter to say that Britain is ahead of the United States of America when we have merely—I do not wish to be disparaging—only 25 machines in use?

Mr. Lennox-Boyd: As I said, I will consider the request of my hon. Friend the Member for Abingdon (Sir R. Glyn) to put information in the Library. I would point out that conditions in this country are quite different from those in America. In this small island we are

concentrating on the development of twin-engined helicopters in the belief, as at present advised, that they are safest for our crowded and closely grouped population. That is the reason for any differences that may exist.

Mr. Ellis Smith: Does the Minister agree that British aircraft manufacturers have proved that they are foremost in the world in aircraft development; and, if so, will he repudiate the inferred reflection which appears in some of these Questions?

Mr. Lennox-Boyd: I quite agree. I think that we are taking the lead, but that is no excuse whatever for complacency.

Mr. Nabarro: asked the Minister of Civil Aviation whether plans or scale models, or both, are now available for examination by Members of Parliament and others showing the converted structure of a London or provincial railways terminus for use as a helicopter station; and whether any continuing investigation f this matter is proposed.

Mr. Lennox-Boyd: It may be possible eventually to use such sites for helicopter operation but practical planning must await more data on the characteristics of twin-engined helicopters. The answer to the first part of the Question is, therefore, "No, Sir."

Passenger Aircraft (Life-Saving Apparatus)

Mr. Beswick: asked the Minister of Civil Aviation what life-saving apparatus must be carried by passenger-carrying aircraft flying over the sea; and if it is obligatory under his regulations to in struct fare-paying passengers on the use of such equipment.

Mr. Lennox-Boyd: The provision of lifebelts is a standard requirement for all flights over the sea. Dinghies must also be carried on flights of more than 90 minutes distance from land. Aircraft with inadequate performance when one engine is inoperative must carry dinghies for flights of more than 30 minutes' distance from land. Instructions in the use of lifebelts must be displayed in the passenger compartments, and a practical demonstration is required for flights of more than 30 minutes' distance from the land.

Mr. Beswick: Without wishing to comment on the recent accident, into which I expect the Minister is making an inquiry, may I ask whether his attention has been called to the statement appearing in the Press that this charter company had decided, as a matter of policy, not to instruct its passengers in the use of this equipment; and can he say what action he is taking about that?

Mr. Lennox-Boyd: This accident—if the hon. Gentleman means the Consul accident—is now being investigated by my Chief Inspector of Accidents, and it would obviously be wrong for me to make any comment at the moment.

Dakota Aircraft (Successor)

Mr. Grimond: asked the Minister of Civil Aviation what steps are being taken to provide an up-to-date successor to the Dakota.

Mr. Lennox-Boyd: The need for the development of such an aircraft, which could also be capable of being used for freight is being actively considered by my Department in conjunction with the Ministry of Supply and the Air Ministry.

Mr. Grimond: Do I understand from that answer that so far there is no prototype and no plan on the drawing board for such a successor, and that it is only now being considered?

Mr. Lennox-Boyd: The matter cannot be dismissed quite so easily as the hon. Gentleman suggests. The number of passengers on routes now being flown by the D.C.3 has very considerably increased in recent years. It may well be that bigger aircraft, 40-seaters, may be needed on these routes, but the inter-Departmental committee is giving very active thought to this, and a great deal of work is being done. We have also had the benefit of the work of Canadairs, in regard to possible Dakota replacement.

Airport Regulations

Mr. Emrys Hughes: asked the Minister of Civil Aviation why he has issued the regulations "Purple Airways" for the guidance of airport authorities.

Mr. Lennox-Boyd: "Purple Airways" are instituted temporarily on specific occasions to provide for the safety of Royal flights on their varied routes.

Mr. Hughes: To what extent does this interfere with normal air traffic?

Mr. Lennox-Boyd: To a negligible extent. I am sure that the whole country will willingly do all that is possible to ensure that the Royal Family, on their many public duties, are given the fullest possible protection in the air.

London Airport (Extension)

Mr. Ayles: asked the Minister of Civil Aviation if he is aware that hard ship is caused to those resident owners of property within the area affected by the proposed extension of London Airport, due to the fact they cannot sell their property if compelled to leave the district; and what steps he is taking to alleviate this hardship.

Mr. Lennox-Boyd: I realise and regret the inconvenience caused to householders by the inevitable uncertainty as to the future, but according to my information there is a good demand for houses in this area as elsewhere. As to any questions of personal hardship, the hon. Member will appreciate that I am bound by existing legislation of general application.

Mr. Ayles: asked the Minister of Civil Aviation on what basis the owners of businesses within the area affected by the proposed extension to London Air port ill be compensated for the loss of such businesses.

Mr. Lennox-Boyd: The owners of businesses whose premises are acquired for the extension of London Airport and who may suffer loss through having to leave these premises will receive compensation in accordance with the provisions of Section 31 of the Civil Aviation Act, 1949.

Mr. Ayles: asked the Minister of Civil Aviation whether, in view of the prolonged anxiety caused to residents and property-owners within the area affected by the proposed extension of London Air port because of the uncertainty of the compensation provisions, he will appoint a committee of inquiry to consider the problems of compensation involved and make recommendations.

Mr.Lennox-Boyd: No, Sir. There is no uncertainty in the existing provisions.

Mr. Ayles: In view of the obvious injustice that is being done to residents and businessmen in this district owing to the depreciation of the value of their houses and businesses, does the Minister not think it right to ask for an inquiry so that there may be some satisfaction on both sides? The Ministry would know that they were doing the right thing by these people and, on the other hand, residents and businessmen might feel that they were getting fair compensation.

Mr. Lennox-Boyd: Many people are disturbed and inconvenienced by essential national developments, and I am very sorry for those affected. In this case we have already stated that in assessing the value of compensation in this area no account will be taken of depreciation in value due to the proximity of the airport. In addition, that Section of the Town and Country Planning Act which, as the hon. Gentleman, may know, applied a notional lease to the value of the compulsorily acquired house, will no longer be operated by the time, if at all, we have to take over the houses.

Mr. Beswick: Is the right hon. Gentleman guaranteeing that there will be no extension of the provisions of that Act?

Mr. Lennox-Boyd: No, I am not guaranteeing it at all. The Act was passed by the late Administration with full knowledge of likely developments, and under that Act my powers in this matter are strictly limited.

Mr. Beswick: As the Minister is not guaranteeing that the Act will not be extended, how can he say there is no uncertainty in the area? Will he look into this matter again, because he is grossly misinformed if he thinks that there is no uncertainty as to the compensation these people will get?

Mr. Lennox-Boyd: I shall be very glad to discuss the matter with the hon. Gentleman, but for a long time the possible development of London Airport has been known in the neighbourhood. I do not think that any further legislative powers will be necessary. Under existing powers I have the right to do certain things and the obligation to do others, and these I shall try scrupulously to discharge.

Mr. Beswick: Can the Minister say with certainty whether these people

will be rehoused within the urban district?

Mr. Lennox-Boyd: I could not give that sort of undertaking in response to question and answer.

Mr. Beswick: But that is one of the matters upon which they want to be reassured.

Mr. Beswick: asked the Minister of Civil Aviation whether, in view of the fact that, if the proposed extension to London Airport is carried out, the area of demolition involved will be greater and the problems of compensation different in size and character from anything the present legislation is intended to cover, he will set up a special committee of inquiry now to consider those problems and make recommendations as to special legislation required to meet possible hardship.

Mr. Lennox-Boyd: No, Sir. I do not agree that the problems of compensation involved in the extension of London Airport are any different in principle from those arising from other development schemes under the existing legislation.

Mr. Beswick: If the Minister receives a deputation of representative people from this area on compensation, will he guarantee to give them a definite answer to any questions that may be put to him?

Mr. Lennox-Boyd: I think I had much better say that I am quite ready to receive a deputation, and that I will hear what their questions are before I give an answer.

Transport Advisory Council

Mr. Beswick: asked the Minister of Civil Aviation if it is proposed to reconstitute the Air Transport Advisory Council; and what qualifications he will require of the members of that reconstituted body.

Mr. Lennox-Boyd: The future work of the Air Transport Advisory Council is expected to be much heavier than in the past, and I am considering some reconstitution of the Council. A further statement will be made shortly.

Mr. Beswick: The Minister has not answered the last part of my Question in


which I asked what qualifications will be required for members of this reconstituted body?

Mr. Lennox-Boyd: The Civil Aviation Act, 1949, as the hon. Members knows, has not been altered, and in that Act requirements are laid down as to the sort of experience that these people must have.

Mr. Ernest Davies: Will the Minister give an assurance that, in any changes made in the responsibilities of this Council, the responsibility of Ministers to the House for their actions will not be in any way diminished?

Mr. Lennox-Boyd: That is certainly so.

Mr. Beswick: The Minister is quite right when he says that I know what are the provisions of that Act, but is he aware that the Act provides for the constitution of a body to act as a consumers' council and not for the purpose for which the right hon. Gentleman intends to reconstitute this body?

Mr. Lennox-Boyd: That is not at all true. This is an Air Transport Advisory Council and it still remains an advisory council, and the responsibility will be the Minister's. If and when we decide to make it into a licensing body with full powers, then legislation will be necessary. No such legislation is now in contemplation.

Oral Answers to Questions — KOREA

Political Developments

Mr. Driberg: asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs if, in the course of his visit to the Far East, the Minister of State will investigate the constitutional and political situation in South Korea; and if he will include in his report to Parliament on this visit a full account of the events leading up to the present situation.

The Minister of State (Mr. Selwyn Lloyd): I did my best to investigate the constitutional and political situation in South Korea during my recent visit to Pusan. I shall certainly cover these matters in the statement which I hope to make to the House next Tuesday.

Mr. Driberg: While offering the right hon. and learned Gentleman congratulations—qualified congratulations, I am

afraid—on his safe return—[HON. MEMBERS: "Oh."]—we had rather hoped that he would bring something better back with him than he has brought—may I ask if he will include in his statement just enough of the post-war background to show that Syngman Rhee, who is now behaving so unconstitutionally and embarrassingly, also assumed power, with American connivance, in a way which prejudiced the decision of the General Assembly of the United Nations?

Mr. Lloyd: I think that the hon. Gentleman might have exercised a qualified reticence on this matter and awaited my statement next week.

Mr. Edelman: asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether, in view of the unconstitutional methods by which the Presidency of Mr. Syngman Rhee has been prolonged, Her Majesty's Government now recognise him as acting-President of South Korea.

Mr. Selwyn Lloyd: It is difficult to pronounce whether, under the constitution of Korea, the President's term expires on 25th July or 15th August. Whichever is the correct date, Mr. Rhee would appear at present to be the lawful President of the Republic of Korea. The hon. Member's Question therefore does not arise.

Mr. Edelman: Is it not the case that the Southern Korean Assembly debated precisely this point that, when the matter was raised, no quorum was present owing to the fact that so many members were either in hiding, or were in prison, or had abstained out of fear? In those circumstances is it not the case that Mr. Rhee has usurped power without constitutional authority from the South Korean Assembly, and is it not time that this farce was stopped?

Mr. Lloyd: I am aware of the exceedingly unsatisfactory methods which have been employed in seeking to solve constitutional problems in South Korea, but I adhere to my answer that at present, certainly until 25th July and possibly until 15th August, Mr. Rhee is the lawful, constitutional President of South Korea. Therefore, the question of recognising him as acting-President does not seem to arise.

Mr. Edelman: Would not the right hon. and learned Gentleman agree that


the methods which he admits have been employed by Mr. Rhee have done a great deal to discredit the cause of the United Nations, which is to uphold the rule of law?

Mr. Lloyd: Certainly. The methods which have been employed have created profound disquiet in many countries, and the President of South Korea has been made aware of that fact.

Mr. Snow: Have Mr. Syngman Rhee's personal prisoners been screened?

Truce Talks

Mr. Hector Hughes: asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs what points of agreement have now been reached in the truce talks taking place in Korea; what points of disagreement are still outstanding; what is being done to resolve them; and what are the prospects of complete agreement being reached at an early date.

Mr. Selwyn Lloyd: No further agreement has been reached since the reply which my right hon. Friend gave the hon. Member for Islington, East (Mr. E. Fletcher) on 9th April. The concessions which the United Nations Command and the Communists respectively have indicated they would be willing to make, over the repair and construction of military airfields after an armistice, and the nomination of nations neutral in the Korean conflict to provide inspection teams, were both made conditional upon agreement over the right of prisoners of war to choose whether or not they wished to be repatriated.
This latter point is now the sole outstanding issue. We are in constant touch with the United States and other interested Governments and are considering every possible method of overcoming this difficulty, subject to maintenance of the principle of voluntary repatriation. I cannot at present give any estimate of whether or when success will attend these efforts.

Mr. Hughes: Does the Minister not agree that this matter has assumed a new urgency in view of the bombing raids of the last two days and the danger of expanding and extending the war; and will he therefore redouble his efforts to see that the few outstanding points are resolved so that the war will not be

widened and will be brought to a speedy termination?

Mr. Lloyd: Without agreeing to the first part of the hon. and learned Gentleman's supplementary question, I agree that this is a matter which is capable of speedy solution, and I certainly hope that it will receive that speedy solution.

Sir T. Moore: Is it possible to resolve this disagreement when the other party to that disagreement is not willing that the agreement should be resolved?

Mr. Lloyd: I agree that it takes two parties to make an agreement.

Mr. A. Henderson: Will the right hon. and learned Gentleman deal with the latest phase of this re-screening problem in his statement on Tuesday?

Mr. Lloyd: Certainly.

Mr. S. Silverman: In view of the United Nations Commander on the spot having made a statement that the bombing raids on the power stations was his attempt to reach, in that way, an agreement which is not impossible at the conference table, are we to understand that the United Nations' method now is to destroy power stations which serve thousands of miles of non-Korean territory as a means of inducing the North Koreans to agree to the screening of prisoners of war on Koje Island?

Mr. Lloyd: It is difficult to debate this matter at this stage. I gather that it will be, in part, debated later in the day, and I am certain that the hon. Gentleman will learn certain matters which will affect his judgment.

Mr. Nicholson: Can my right hon. and learned Friend say, when he refers to being in constant touch with the United States Government, whether this is through the State Department or the United Nations Command?

Mr. Lloyd: Through the State Department.

Prisoners (Screening)

Mr. Driberg: asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs if he will make a statement indicating the legal basis of the screening of prisoners on Koje Island and of the refusal of the United Nations


command to repatriate those prisoners who are stated to be prepared to resist repatriation.

Mr. Selwyn Lloyd: I would refer the hon. Gentleman to the reply given to the hon. Member for Norfolk, South (Mr. Baker) on 23rd June.

Mr. Driberg: Can the right hon. and learned Gentleman just say whether that reply, which I have not got before me, indicates the legal basis of the screening or merely says that he is satisfied that it was legal?

Mr. Lloyd: I suggest that the hon. Gentleman looks at that reply and considers it.

Mr. Stokes: Is the right hon. and learned Gentleman aware that the majority of people of this country would absolutely refuse to agree to any persons being sent back against their will, whatever the law may be?

Mr. Driberg: Will the right hon. and learned Gentleman be just a little more forthcoming about the legality of the screening, since he has on two previous occasions orally avoided answering the question, no doubt inadvertently?

Mr. Lloyd: I have suggested that the hon. Gentleman should look at the reply. He will see the answer there.

Mr. Cocks: asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs how many prisoners in Korea have not yet undergone the process of screening.

Mr. Selwyn Lloyd: Between 4th April and 19th April, it was possible to screen about two-thirds of the total numbers of prisoners of war and civilian internees, that is to say, about 120,000 out of some 170,000. The figure of 70,000 prisoners available for repatriation given to the Communists on 19th April included all prisoners in Communist-dominated compounds where there had been violent resistance to screening.
The screening process is continuing and has been accelerated as a result of General Boatner's re-grouping operation. It is being revealed that the Communist-dominated compounds contain further anti-Communist prisoners who are opposed to repatriation. I cannot give any up-to-date figures of prisoners still awaiting screening, other than to say that they are certainly less than 40,000.

Mr. A. Henderson: Did the original screening cover Chinese prisoners of war as well as North Koreans?

Mr. Lloyd: Yes, it did.

Mr. Hamilton: Could the right hon. and learned Gentleman say what is the average time that has been taken to screen an individual prisoner?

Mr. Lloyd: I have already said that I propose to make a statement on these matters, and this is a matter which I will certainly cover.

Mr. Bing: Does the fact that the Minister of State is answering Questions on these matters mean that he is accepting political responsibility, in part, for what takes place in these camps?

Mr. Lloyd: I am seeking to give information to the House which is within my knowledge.

Mr. Cocks: asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs what precautions have been taken to see that the 100,000 prisoners in Korea who have refused repatriation did not include many whose main motives were that they preferred the superior food and comparative immunity of the prison camps to anything they might expect under the Communist regime, including the hardships and dangers of active service.

Mr. Selwyn Lloyd: I am satisfied from my own personal investigations and from what I saw in the United Nations prisoner of war camps that prisoners who refused repatriation were prompted by genuine fear of political persecution or physical punishment if they returned to China or North Korea.

Mr. Cocks: Has the right hon. and learned Gentleman seen the statement in the American Press that the screening took two minutes for each prisoner, and does he think that that is adequate time to ascertain the motives behind a prisoner's decision?

Mr. Lloyd: The screening process is not a single operation. There were public announcements over the loud speaker apparatus, notices were pinned up to be read and there was an announcement of the Chinese Communist amnesty to all people. There was a process whereby the prisoners were asked to answer individual questions, and I do not


believe that that process, in fact, did take so short a time as two minutes, although, on average, it may have done so because if a person wanted to return and answered "Yes" to a single question no further questions were put to him.

Mr. Stokes: Can the right hon. and learned Gentleman assure the House that adequate precautions are being taken to see that the abominable injustices that followed some of the screening after the last war are being avoided in this case?

Mr. Langford-Holt: Can my right hon. and learned Friend tell the House whether any of these prisoners have applied for political asylum, for which there are many precedents?

Mr. Lloyd: The view of most of the prisoners to whom I spoke was that if they were to return to Communist China they would suffer physical punishment or be put to death, and that seems to constitute a desire for political asylum.

Mr. Cocks: asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs the nationality and numbers of those who have been engaged in the process of screening prisoners in Korea; and whether any Chinese interpreters from Formosa were so employed.

Mr. Selwyn Lloyd: Chinese prisoners were individually and carefully screened by 50 Chinese-speaking American officers and men, who had not previously been employed on Koje Island. No Chinese Nationalist interpreters were used. As there were very few Korean-speaking Americans, North Korean prisoners were interrogated through 150 Koreans, under the supervision of some Korean-speaking American personnel. None of the Korean interpreters were members of the Republic of Korea Army.

Mr. Cocks: Does the Minister not consider that it would have a valuable effect on public opinion if all prisoners were re-screened by a neutral authority?

Mr. Lloyd: That is precisely the suggestion which has been put forward, and I think it would possibly have a valuable effect upon public opinion in view of the misrepresentations which are made in so many quarters; but whether it will assist in arriving at an Armistice is a very different matter.

Mr. I. O. Thomas: Would the right hon. Gentleman say whether any representations were made to have the personnel conducting the screening inquiries representative of more than the American group in Korea and thus give some indication of impartiality?

Mr. Lloyd: As I said, the screening of the Chinese prisoners was conducted by American Army personnel. Because of the necessity fordoing it quickly there was no time to bring in other people. So far as the Koreans are concerned, it was not an American group which was used, but their own people who happened to speak English.

Relief and Reconstruction

Mr. Hector Hughes: asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether in view of the fact that Her Majesty's Government support the United Nations Reconstruction Agency in their efforts to promote relief and reconstruction in Korea and to restore the Korean economy, he will specify the procedure adopted; how far such relief has extended in the towns and countryside, respectively, of Korea; and what are the future plans for its further extension.

Mr. Selwyn Lloyd: While hostilities continue relief is the responsibility of the United Nations Civil Assistance Command, which is a branch of the United Nations Command. It is not at present intended that the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency shall take over full responsibility until after an armistice, but it is making plans and undertaking some special projects in collaboration with the Army.
My latest information is that the railways are now working better than before the Korean war, that the road system has been improved, that electrical power resources have been restored to at least 50 per cent,.of their pre-war strength, and that the health work of the United Nations Command in preventing epidemics has been very effective. Through the United Nations Command considerable quantities of food, fertilizers, building materials, medical supplies and other necessities have been provided.

Mr. Hughes: Does the Minister realise that he has not given me the particulars I asked for in the Question? I asked


him where and when. Does he realise that the United Nations owe a sacred duty to the Koreans to leave Korea not worse but better than they found it? Does he agree that it would be a tragic anomaly if the intervention of the United Nations to save Korea should result in the wrecking of Korea? Will he give me the information for which I asked?

Mr. Lloyd: I thought I had given the hon. and learned Gentleman a rather long answer. I can tell him I have had the opportunity of seeing the Commander of the United Nations Civil Assistance Command, also those responsible for the Reconstruction Agency and members of U.N.C.U.R.K. and I am quite satisfied that those people are doing, and are prepared to do, a very good job of work.

Oral Answers to Questions — JAPAN (BRITISH FORCES)

Mr. T. Reid: asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs how our Forces in the Far East will be paid for after the Japanese Treaty comes into force.

Mr. Elwyn Jones: asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether British military Forces in Japan have parity of rights in that country with American Forces; and what will be the position in this connection on the expiry of 90 days from the date of ratification of the San Francisco Peace Treaty.

Mr. Selwyn Lloyd: A draft Agreement covering jurisdictional and financial arrangements for all Forces under United Nations Command, including both British and United States Forces, has been drawn up with the concurrence of the Commonwealth Governments concerned and of the United States Government and has been put to the Japanese Government.
If agreement is reached, these arrangements will be unaffected by the expiry of the period of 90 days after the date of the coming into force of the Japanese Peace Treaty.

Mr. Reid: Can the Minister say whether the payment for our Forces will be treated in the same way as the payment for American and other Forces?

Mr. Lloyd: This is a matter which will depend on the negotiations which are now in progress.

Oral Answers to Questions — ARAB REFUGEES (RELIEF AND RESETTLEMENT)

Mr. Sorensen: asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs what is the present position of assistance to Arab refugees; how many have been resettled; and how many await resettlement.

Mr. Philips Price: asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs how much money has been spent to date by the United Nations organisation for the relief and settlement of Arab refugees from Palestine; how much of this has been spent on settling those refugees on the land; how many have been so settled; and what are the principal areas of settlement.

The Joint Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Mr. Anthony Nutting): Since January, 1952, when the United Nations authorised a $250 million three-year programme for Arab refugees, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency has negotiated an $11 million programme for the resettlement of some 25,000 refugees in Jordan. Negotiations are also taking place with the Syrian Government.
Meanwhile, the Agency has resettled or provided work for 1,449 refugees, 219 of whom are working on the land in Jordan (others are in the Lebanon, Syria, Libya and Gaza). In addition, the Israel Government has resettled 12,000 and some 100,000 have settled themselves in Jordan. Over 850,000 still await resettlement.
The total expenditure by the Agency on relief and resettlement up to March, 1952, has been $68 million, of which $132,000 have been spent on agricultural resettlement.

Mr. Sorensen: Can the hon. Gentleman say how long it will be before this tragic problem is resolved; how long it will be before these 180,000 refugees are resettled?

Mr. Nutting: I must correct the hon. Gentleman; the number still to be resettled is 850,000. I cannot, alas, say when this problem will be resolved, but I can at least say that the United Nations have now a considerable amount of funds at their disposal, and I am able to assure the hon. Gentleman that a real attack is now being made on the problem with the funds at the disposal of the United Nations.

Mr. Price: Has any difficulty been found in the refugees themselves not wanting to find new places of settlement and hoping that they will be able to go back to their original homes?

Mr. Nutting: There is that problem, but there are other problems connected with the non-fertility of many of the areas in which they are at present settled.

Sir R. Glyn: Can my hon. Friend say
whether the United Nations irrigation scheme with a view to settlement about the Euphrates, which was previously agreed to, is being proceeded with?

Mr. Nutting: I cannot give my hon. Friend an answer to that question offhand, but I can say that water surveys are being undertaken and that considerable attempts are being made to solve these problems, which I have already described as of non-fertility.

Oral Answers to Questions — GERMANY

Allied Soldiers (Illegitimate Children)

Mr. Sorensen: asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs how far the German Contractual Agreement will include arrangements or proposals in respect of financial and judicial aid for the German illegitimate children of Allied soldiers.

Mr. Nutting: The Conventions concluded with the Federal Republic do not include any special arrangements for financial aid for German illegitimate children of Allied soldiers. When, however, the Conventions enter into force, a German woman who has had an illegitimate child by an Allied Service man will be able to bring affiliation proceedings against the alleged father in a German court.

Mr. Sorensen: While thanking the hon. Gentleman for the latter part of his reply, may I ask him whether any proposals about this matter were made in the proceedings leading up to the agreement, particularly as, when Questions were asked some time ago, hope was expressed that this would be considered in the subsequent discussions?

Mr. Nutting: I can tell the hon. Gentleman that the possibility of a German woman seeking affiliation proceed-

ings in a German court arises out of one of the conventions signed in Bonn the other day.

Mr. Sorensen: Is it retrospective?

Mr. Nutting: I should like notice of that question.

Diplomatic Mission, London (Appointment)

Mr. Janner: asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether his attention has been drawn to the proposed appointment to London by the German Federal Republic of Miss Susanne Simonis to look after the welfare of 30,000 German girls and women working in this country; and as Miss Susanne Simonis held a post as a Nazi leader among German women in Japan, whether he will inform the German Federal Republic that such an appointment does not meet with the approval of Her Majesty's Government.

Mr. George Craddock: asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs if he is aware that Frau Simonis, cousin of Herr Ereich von Kordt of the German Foreign Office, who has been appointed to the German Consulate General in London as Women's Labour Officer and who will take over on 16th June, previously held a similar position in Tokyo under the Hitler regime as Frauenshafs-leiterein; and if he will make representations to the West German Government that this official should be withdrawn.

Mr. Nutting: I am aware that Frau Simonis has been appointed to the staff of the German Diplomatic Mission in London. As to her work in Tokyo, I understand that she held no official post in the German Embassy but acted as hostess to her cousin, Dr. Erich Kordt.
I see no reason for making any representation on this matter to the German Federal Government.

Mr. Janner: Is not the hon. Gentleman aware that there is a considerable amount of agitation in Germany about this woman, and that under the Ribben-trop Nazi regime at the Embassy in London we had similar cases of women who were controlling the Germans in this country? Is it not essential that whoever is brought here for this purpose shall have an absolutely clean record?

Mr. Nutting: As the hon. Gentleman has referred to German Embassy employees before the war, perhaps I might say that Frau Simonis was not employed by the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs at any time before the end of the war and that the competent committee of the Bundestag recently cleared her completely of any charges of Nazism after an attack had been made upon her in the German Press.

Mr. S. O. Davies: Is not the hon. Gentleman aware that this person has been rejected for the German Consulates in both Sweden and Italy, and was not the Bonn Government recently compelled, because of a terrific outcry, to sack her from her post as head of the Women's Labour Personnel? Surely he has some information about her.

Mr. Nutting: I have some information about her, and the premise upon which the hon. Gentleman has based his supplementary question is completely untrue. It is not true that Frau Simonis was nominated for an appointment either in Rome or in Stockholm and was refused.

Mr. Craddock: Is it not a fact that there is considerable disquiet about the appointment of this lady? When she was recently appointed as Women's Labour Officer for West Germany, did not the West German Press raise an outcry against the appointment, as a result of which she had to be demoted? I cannot understand why we should attempt to whitewash a Nazi who has been appointed to this post.

Mr. Nutting: It is not a question of my attempting to whitewash a Nazi. This lady has been completely cleared of the charges of Nazi associations by the competent committee of the Bundestag. It is not for me to comment on what the West German Press says. It is for me to satisfy myself about this woman's previous record, and I am satisfied about that record; and, therefore, I see no reason whatsoever to make any representations to the West German Government.

Mr. Bellenger: Is it desirable that the British Parliament should be used to further the purpose of a vendetta in Germany against a lady whose name has

not only been cleared by the Parliament of that country but also commended for her anti-Nazi activities by the particular authority concerned?

Mr. Nutting: I should have thought that any such attempt by any Member of this House would be grossly improper.

Occupation Forces (Cost)

Mr. Donnelly: asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether he can give any estimate of the total cost of British occupation Forces in Germany for the year 1951–52, which will be defrayed by the West German Government.

Mr. Nutting: I would refer the hon. Member to the reply I gave to the hon. Member for Reading, South (Mr. Mikardo) on 11th June.

Mr. Donnelly: Is the hon. Gentleman aware that the total figures for the year for Germany for all the occupation Forces are considerably more than for the year before. In view of that, would he give some information how these costs are distributed among the occupying Powers?

Mr. Nutting: There is a Question on the Order Paper about costs for the future, but the hon. Gentleman concerned is not here to ask it. Perhaps I may tell the hon. Member that from April to October, 1952, the occupation costs of the three zones will be approximately: British, 210 million deutschmarks a month; United States, 270 million: France, 120 million.

Oral Answers to Questions — LIBYA (FINANCIAL AID)

Mr. T. Reid: asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs what British grants-in-aid have been expended on Libya since the end of the war; and what financial commitments Britain has undertaken in respect to future deficits in the Libyan budgets.

Mr. Nutting: From the occupation of the ex-Italian colonies in North Africa by the Allies in 1943 until the end of 1951, the total amount of the grants-in-aid made by Her Majesty's Government to Libya was £8,600,000. This was made up of £5,650,000 to Cyrenaica and £2,950,000 to Tripolitania. From 24th December, 1951, when the independent


Kingdom of Libya came into being, until 31st March, 1952, a grant-in-aid of £110,000 was made.
For the financial year 1952–53 the grant-in-aid amounts to £1,500,000 under the conditions of a temporary Financial Agreement signed on 13th December, 1951.

Mr. Reid: In view of the large sums spent in trying to buttress up this new territory, has any provision been made for its future defence, as it has very great strategic importance? Are the rulers of Libya willing to give any bases or any other help for the protection of their interests and our interests in the Middle East?

Mr. Nutting: The matter is now under discussion. I very much hope that such defence arrangements will be arrived at.

Oral Answers to Questions — CYRENAICA (BRITISH OFFICIALS)

Mr. T. Reid: asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to make a statement about the dismissal of British employees by the Government of Cyrenaica.

Mr. Nutting: Thirty-seven British officials have recently left the service of the Cyrenaican Administration. Of these 31 were serving on two-year contracts which expired on 31st May, 1952; 12 of these were offered, but declined, renewal of their contracts; three were officials who resigned their appointments of their own volition, although their contracts still had some time to run; three had contracts running into 1955, but were given notice by the Government of Cyrenaica. These three appointments were terminated in full accordance with the terms of the contracts, and I understand that compensation has been paid.

Mr. Reid: Can the hon. Gentleman say whether all these dismissals or discharges, or whatever they are called, were just or unjust?

Mr. Nutting: I have no evidence whatsoever to suggest that the Administrations of either Cyrenaica or Tripolitania are doing other than treating their British employees quite fairly. I would draw the hon. Gentleman's attention to the answer which I have just given, which shows that only three British officials

have been dismissed. The rest have either refused or have not taken up any further contract with the Government. After the 37 have been deducted, there still remain some 157 British officials in the employment of the Cyrenaican Government.

Oral Answers to Questions — PERSIAN OIL (SALE)

Mr. A. Henderson: asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs what steps Her Majesty's Government are taking to stop the sale of Abadan oil, pending the final decision of the International Court at The Hague.

Mr. Nutting: I would refer the right hon. and learned Gentleman to the answer I gave the hon. Member for Gloucestershire, West (Mr. Philips Price) on 11th June. The steps which might be taken would, naturally, depend on the circumstances of each case.

Mr. Henderson: Has the hon. Gentleman seen the statement in the "Daily Telegraph" and other newspapers that certain American and Italian oil interests are entering into an arrangement with the Persian Government? If so, will he not agree that so long as the interim judgment of the International Court of Justice remains effective it is the duty of all members of the United Nations, under the Charter, to restrain their nationals from flouting a decision of that Court?

Mr. Nutting: I am most grateful to the right hon. and learned Gentleman for his most helpful supplementary, with which I agree.

Mr. Shinwell: No doubt the hon. Member is in agreement, but what we are concerned about is whether the hon. Gentleman is aware that there is circumstantial evidence that certain American interests are behind this attempt to dispose of Persian oil, in spite of the matter being before the International Court? Would the hon. Gentleman say whether he is aware of these facts—if they are facts? Can we have some information about them?

Mr. Nutting: I agree that there have been some disquieting Press comments to this effect in our newspapers, but Her Majesty's Government have no confirmation whatever that American companies are attempting to dispose of Persian oil.

Mr. Shinwell: If statements appear in the British Press which convey the impression that American business interests are behind the disposal of Persian oil, would it not be wise to have the matter confirmed or denied by the State Department in Washington?

Mr. Nutting: I think the answers which I have given today will help to deny the rumours which have been circulated.

Oral Answers to Questions — WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

Mr. Sorensen: asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs what are the weapons of mass destruction that will be brought before the United Nations Disarmament Commission by the representative of Her Majesty's Government with a view to proposals for their elimination by general agreement.

Mr. Nutting: As my right hon. and learned Friend informed the hon. Gentleman on 19th May, the stage of the Disarmament Commission to investigate measures to eliminate weapons of mass destruction, has still to be reached.

Mr. Sorensen: Surely before that stage there should be some consideration of what are the specific weapons of mass destruction? Could the hon. Gentleman say what are the weapons of mass destruction to be considered by the Commission?

Mr. Nutting: My right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary gave a full answer to that Question and other Questions on 19th May. I can only repeat to the hon. Gentleman that the stage at which the weapons of mass destruction will be considered has not yet been reached. It would, therefore, be a little premature to give the House any facts on that matter.

Oral Answers to Questions — GENEVA CONVENTIONS (RATIFICATION)

Mr. Elwyn Jones: asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether, and hen, it is proposed that the United Kingdom should ratify the 1949 Geneva Conventions relative to the treatment of prisoners of war and to the protection of civilian persons in time of war: and what countries have already ratified these conventions.

Mr. Selwyn Lloyd: Her Majesty's Government intend that the United Kingdom shall ratify these Conventions. Legislation will, however, first be required. I am not yet in a position to say when it will be possible to introduce such legislation.
The following countries have ratified the Conventions: Chile, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, France, Guatemala, the Holy See, India, Israel, Italy, Lebanon, Liechtenstein, Monaco, Norway, Pakistan, Switzerland and Yugoslavia. Jordan and South Africa have acceded to the Conventions.

Mr. Elwyn Jones: In the absence of ratification of these Conventions, can the right hon. and learned Gentleman say to what extent they are binding upon the parties in the Korean fighting?

Mr. Lloyd: That is a different matter from the one on the Order Paper.

Oral Answers to Questions — MINISTRY OF FOOD

Sausage Prices

Mr. F. Willey: asked the Minister of Food why, when the price of meat has been increased on average by 4d. per lb., the price of pork sausages has been increased by 5½d. per lb., beef sausages by 4d. per 1b., pork sausage meat by 6d. per 1b., and beef sausage meat by 4½d. per 1b.

The Minister of Food (Major Lloyd George): Fourpence per 1b. is an average for all types and qualities of carcase meat. The increases in boneless manufacturing beef and pork were 5d. and 5¾d. per 1b. respectively. The new prices for sausages and sausage meat had also to take into account other increased costs of manufacture and distribution.

Mr. Willey: Is the Minister aware that this unwarranted increase has caused considerable indignation, because a beef sausage is not made of beef? Is it not still quite inexplicable that a sausage containing from 50 per cent. to 65 per cent. of meat should have its price increased by a greater amount than meat? How does it come about that sausage meat, which is a sausage without its skin, has increased in price by a greater amount than the sausage?

Major Lloyd George: The best answer I can give the hon. Gentleman is that he


should do a little research into what happened last year, when the same thing had to be done. The price of meat last year was raised, on the average, by 3d. and the price of sausage meat by more than 3d.

Pig Producers, Wadsley Bridge,lb/> (Payment)

Mr. McGhee: asked the Minister of Food what steps are being taken to reduce the long delay in the payments to producers for pigs delivered to the Wadsley Bridge, Sheffield, Centre.

Major Lloyd George: Arrangements have been made by the county chairman of auctioneers concerned to get professional accountants to assist his staff. It is hoped that the work will be up to date by the end of this month.

Subsidised Food Prices

Mrs. Mann: asked the Minister of Food the total increase borne by the con sumer in rationed and unrationed goods during the past seven months; and the total in each category.

Major Lloyd George: During the past seven months the otal increase in the consumer prices of subsidised rationed and unrationed foods is about 1s. 2d. per head per week, on a ration book basis, made up of 8d. on rationed foods and 6d. on unrationed foods. I would add that the figure of 1s. 2d. includes a substantial part of the increase of 1s. 6d. per head estimated as the cost to the consumer of the subsidy adjustments announced by my right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer.

Mrs. Mann: May I ask the right hon. and gallant Gentleman to reply to my Question? I have had a reply in weekly terms, which refers to my Question No. 46. I asked, in Question No. 41, for the total increase. Can I have it?

Major Lloyd George: I do not think that it is a very clear Question. As the hon. Lady has another Question later which asks for the weekly basis, perhaps she would be good enough to wait for that, when I will give her the information she wishes.

Mrs. Mann: I want an answer to Question No. 41. It is most difficult to calculate how much housewives are

having to bear in grocers' extra profits, through decontrol. Is it not the case that the right hon. and gallant Gentleman does not know, and that that is why he cannot reply?

Major Lloyd George: If that was the purpose of the hon. Lady's Question I suggest that my answer gives all the information that is necessary to the housewife, which is that the increase per week is Is. 2d. That, I gather, is what she wants to know.

Food Hygiene Division (Reduction)

Dr. Broughton: asked the Ministerof Food whether any economy in staff has been ade in the Food Hygiene Division of his Department since1st November, 1951.

Major Lloyd George: The staff of the Food Hygiene Division has been reduced by 10 since 1st November, 1951.

Dr. Broughton: Is it not disgraceful that there should be a reduction in staff at a time when legislation is needed and is overdue for improving the standard of hygiene in catering establishments?

Major Lloyd George: Most of the staff who have gone were engaged on two things. One was the overhaul of the byelaws for local authorities. Those have now been accepted by 1,260 out of 1,440 local authorities, so that that work is now unnecessary. Also most, if not all, of the preparatory work in connection with the food and drugs legislation has been completed.

Supplementary Tea Permits

Mr. Lewis: asked the Minister of Food for what quantity of tea supple mentary tea coupons have been received by his Department for the period 23rd March to 4th June; how far this falls short of the 3,570,000 1b. purchased by retailers during that period; and how he explains the discrepancy.

Major Lloyd George: I not clear what coupons the hon. Member has in mind. Supplementary permits are only issued when the trader can show that his sales against coupons and caterers permits are exceeding the quantity provided by his main permit. They are not issued to enable the trader to increase his stocks.

Mr. Lewis: Is the Minister not aware that there was an extraordinary increase in the applications for supplementary permits in the three weeks preceding the increase in price resulting from the dropping of the subsidy, and that there was a build-up of stocks by wholesalers and retailers to enable them to cash in at a higher price when the subsidy came off?

Major Lloyd George: That is exactly the opposite of what happened. The fact is that in the period last year corresponding to that to which the hon. Gentleman refers, 23rd March to 14th June, the tea issue was 40 per cent. higher than this year.

TANGANYIKA (RECONSTITUTION OF COUNCIL)

The Secretary of State for the Colonies (Mr. Oliver Lyttelton): With the permission of the House, I should like to make a statement.
Her Majesty's Government accept the recommendation of the Tanganyika Constitutional Development Committee that the unofficial seats on the Legislative Council should be divided equally between the three main racial groups, that is, Africans, Asians and Europeans. Asian membership should, as far as possible, be representative of all sections and interests of that racial group, which comprises several different communities, but the method of achieving that must await the report of the Special Commissioner, who is at present inquiring into the details for carrying out the Committee's proposals.
Her Majesty's Government also accept the recommendation of the Committee that the official majority in the Council should be retained.
In the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, the reconstituted Legislative Council will depend for its successful working on the experience gained in the operation of the local government bodies also proposed by the Committee. As progress is made in establishing these, changes at the centre will become more practicable. It is hoped that the reconstituted Council may be established within five years, though, like my predecessor, I do not consider that it would be in the interests of Tanganyika that it should be committed to a rigid timetable.
I should make it clear that I regard the reconstitution of the Council in accordance with these proposals as a settlement which is designed to last for a considerable period and until the time comes for the main communities in Tanganyika to consider a different system of representation. In the meantime, the basis of division of representation in the Legislature is not one susceptible of minor alterations.
In addition to announcing acceptance of the principle of equal unofficial representation of the three main racial groups on the Legislative Council, I wish to state clearly the objectives and intentions of Her Majesty's Government in the administration of Tanganyika. First, it is the intention to continue to administer the territory in accordance with the terms of the Trusteeship Agreement until the ultimate goal of self-government has been reached. Her Majesty's Government confidently hope that when that goal has been attained Tanganyika will be within the British Commonwealth. Her Majesty's Government attach importance, in the interests of the inhabitants of Tanganyika, to the maintenance and promotion of British traditions and the British connection with the territory.
Secondly, Her Majesty's Government interpret the Trusteeship Agreement and Article 76 of the United Nations Charter as imposing on the Administering Authority an obligation to provide for the full participation of all sections of the population, irrespective of race or origin, in the progressive development of political institutions and in the economic and social advancement of the territory. Each section of the population must be enabled and encouraged to play its full part in the development of the territory and its institutions in complete confidence that the rights and interests of all communities, both indigenous and immigrant, will be secured and preserved.

Mr. J. Griffiths: Is the Secretary of State aware that this statement of the decision of Her Majesty's Government is welcomed by myself, and that it will, I know, be welcomed in Tanganyika? May I join with him in paying tribute to this Constitutional Development Committee, composed of Europeans, Africans and Asians, who have given a notable example of racial co-operation and a desire to reach full racial equality—an


example which other Colonies elsewhere, I hope, will follow. May I also ask the right hon. Gentleman a question? The Trusteeship Council is involved in this. Have the visiting mission made any pronouncement upon these proposals, approving, welcoming or disapproving them?

Mr. Lyttelton: I think the Trusteeship Council would only have an opportunity of commenting on the report. I have not seen any such comments. The Committee certainly did very good work and, as the House knows, it represented all the un-officials in Tanganyika of whatever race.

Mr. Sorensen: May I ask the right hon. Gentleman whether we are to take it that these proposals have emerged out of consultation with, and with the consent of, each of the three races concerned, and that therefore the proposals now go forward with the consent of those who are now to be included?

Mr. Lyttelton: They go forward on the recommendation of the Committee, which was composed of all the unofficial members, on which Africans, Asians and Europeans were represented, and their findings were unanimous.

Mr. Dugdale: May I be permitted to add my tribute to all who were concerned in the negotiations and to say how much I hope that the example of Tanganyika will be followed by Northern Rhodesia?

Mr. Lyttelton: The precedent is entirely inapplicable, and I do not think we ought to carry the discussion further on that line.

Mr. Alport: May I ask my right hon. Friend whether anything in the decision which he has just announced will make it more difficult or in any way impossible to further the cause of closer union among the three East African territories and whether the closer union of those territories remains the policy of Her Majesty's Government?

Mr. Lyttelton: Prophets are without honour in their own country.

Mr. Fenner Brockway: May I ask the
right hon. Gentleman, while welcoming the increased representation of the African population, whether he can inform the House of the total membership of the Legislative Council now, and how

many African representatives there will be?

Mr. Lyttelton: The representation now is 15 official members and 14 unofficial members, of whom seven are European, three Indian and four African. The new Council will be 21—seven European, seven Asian and seven African.

POST OFFICE STAFF ASSOCIATIONS (GOVERNMENT DECISION)

The Assistant Postmaster-General (Mr. David Gammans): With the permission of the House, I should like to make a statement on the decision of the Government on the report of the Post Office (Departmental Classes) Recognition Committee.
My noble Friend has carefully considered the Report and is very grateful to Lord Terrington and the members of the Committee for their detailed examination of the problems set before them and for the able way in which they have presented all the complicated factors giving rise to these problems. Having carefully followed their arguments, however, and the comments furnished by the staff sides of the Post Office Whitley Councils and by interested staff associations, he is not willing to impose the recommendations of the Report.
As Minister in charge of a Government Department, my noble Friend is most reluctant to become involved in questions on how unions should be organised—indeed he sees real objections to this in principle and serious dangers in practice. It would indeed not be surprising if the trade union movement itself, on mature reflection, came to feel serious misgivings on these points. From the point of view of the Post Office staff as a whole and of the public and trade unions generally, it is most desirable that a dispute of this sort should be settled by the staff themselves and not put to the Minister for decision.
It is not, therefore, proposed to form a final view on the matter in present circumstances. We are convinced that yet further effort should first be made by the staff themselves to reach a settlement, whether on the lines recommended by the Terrington Committee or other-


wise, before we are called upon to consider the matter further. Accordingly, my noble Friend intends to suspend consideration until the early part of next year, in order to give the parties concerned the fullest possible opportunity to settle their own differences. Each have a responsibility not only to their members but to the public service generally, and I would hope that the respective national executive committees would get together with the firm determination to reach a mutually satisfactory arrangement.
It will, of course, be appreciated that if this matter remains unresolved, my noble Friend would need to consider very carefully in the light of all the relevant factors where the public interest lies, but he should by then have the advantage of knowing the outcome of any further discussions that will have taken place between the organisations.
There is one staff association which is in a quite different position from any other, and which my noble Friend proposes to recognise forthwith. This is the Telephone Sales Supervising Officers' Association, which claims to have in membership over 90 per cent. of the staff concerned. No other organisation is recognised or claims recognition for these grades, and the alternative to the recognition of this Association would therefore be to leave them without any recognised representation whatsoever, which would be quite unjustifiable.

Mr. Ness Edwards: I should like to join the hon. Gentleman and his noble Friend in thanking the Terrington Committee for the excellent job that they did with a very difficult question. Equally, I want to say nothing today which would embitter the atmosphere or prevent a sensible settlement of the differences that are involved. I hope that Members on both sides of the House will follow that example. This dispute has been hanging about too long to be played with as a matter of politics.
I should like to put three or four questions to the hon. Gentleman, because his statement was a little imprecise. First, what are the recommendations to which he referred which it is not proposed to impose? The Report does not suggest that any of the conclusions

should be imposed upon any of the unions. Secondly, I take it that, at least until next year, his noble Friend is accepting the recommendation to withhold recognition of all the unions which are in dispute, with the exception of the one about which there is hardly any dispute.
Thirdly, when his noble Friend considers the matter next year, what will be the relevant factors in that consideration? Does he intend to reconsider the question of recognition, which, apparently, he now accepts? Finally, will his noble Friend endeavour to carry on with the parties concerned the negotiations which I started, and which would have come to a successful fruition but for political interference?

Mr. Gammans: I should like, first, to thank the right hon. Gentleman for the general attitude he has taken towards the Report and to the statement, and to say, on behalf of my noble Friend, that we shall welcome the assistance that anybody can give to solve this thorny question on amicable lines.
With regard to the recommendations to which the right hon. Gentleman referred, I do not want to go over them in detail. What I meant by my statement was that my noble Friend at present is not prepared to implement any of the new suggestions made by the Terrington Committee and so to prejudge the issue. The right hon. Gentleman asked whether recognition will be withheld of existing claims, except the one that he specified. The answer to that is, "Yes."
In reply to his question about the relevant factors that my noble Friend will take into account if finally he is called upon to make a decision, one of the factors that my noble Friend will certainly have to take into account is the willingness shown by both sides to try to reach some sort of compromise. I forget the right hon. Gentleman's next question.

Mr. Ness Edwards: It was whether the question of recognition would come up for reconsideration next year.

Mr. Gammans: That is so.

Mr. McCorquodale: While thanking the Minister for his statement, may I ask whether he is aware that Members


in all parts of the House will echo the hope that the unions concerned in this dispute will, in the six months allowed them, come to some friendly arrangement among themselves. If deadlock persists after the end of the year, however, will the Government be prepared to come to some conclusion so as finally to heal this running sore? I hope that the Government will take into active consideration at that time the question of which unions have made genuine efforts to arrive at a settlement.

Mr. Gammans: I thought I had dealt with those points in my reply to the right hon. Member for Caerphilly (Mr. Ness Edwards).

Mr. W. R. Williams: I should like to ask the Minister two or three questions. First, is he aware that workers in the Post Office welcomed the decision of his predecessor to set up an independent committee to try to find a reconciliation of difficulties amongst Post Office staff? Secondly, is he aware that the recommendations of the Terrington Committee received almost full approval from most of the responsible leaders in the Civil Service unions, who formed the view that the implementation of the recommendations would bring stability and harmony into the Post Office and would enable the staff to continue with good will and co-operation, to the advantage of the administration?
Thirdly, may I ask the hon. Gentleman to appeal to his noble Friend not to make more difficulties and not to make the situation more difficult than it has been in the past? I ask him to appeal to his noble Friend to reconsider what I regard as a very unsatisfactory decision, after the setting up of the Committee, not to take advantage of its considered judgment.

Mr. Gammans: I am not quite sure what the hon. Member means by his last remark, or whether he thinks that my noble Friend should make a decision forthwith. That would be quite contrary to the statement I have just made. But I assure the hon. Member and the House generally that no one who has had any

contact with this most thorny question would try to put difficulties in the way. I am aware that the Post Office unions were in favour of setting up the Terrington Committee, but, so far as the recommendations of that Committee are concerned, I think that my original statement covered the point raised by the hon. Member.

Mr. Wade: Am I right in understanding from the hon. Gentleman's statement that for the time being, at any rate, his noble Friend has not discarded the principle underlying the Listowel formula?

Mr. Gammans: Nothing is discarded. The position simply is that we are hoping that in the next few months some amicable agreement between the unions will be reached.

Sir R. Grimston: My hon. Friend will doubtless recall that in the last Parliament a definite line was taken upon this issue. May we understand from the present statement that there is no departure from the principles which were then upheld?

Mr. Gammans: Since that time, the Terrington Committee have sat and have made their Report. It is on the Report of that Committee that the Government have to make a decision.

Mr. Hobson: Can the hon. Gentleman give a categorical assurance that there will be no departure from the present practice with regard to recognition without first making to the House a statement regarding the future?

Mr. Gammans: I think I have given that assurance already. I have assured the hon. Gentleman's right hon. Friend that until this matter is finally settled, there is no question of recognition of any other unions.

BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE

Ordered:
That this day Business other than the Business of Supply may be taken before Ten o'clock.—[The Prime Minister.]

Orders of the Day — SUPPLY

[15TH ALLOTTED DAY]

Considered in Committee.

[Sir CHARLES MACANDREW in the Chair]

CIVIL ESTIMATES AND MINISTRY OF DEFENCE ESTIMATE, 1952–53

Motion made, and Question proposed,
That a further sum, not exceeding £20, be granted to Her Majesty, towards defraying the charges for the following services connected with Korea for the year ending on 31st March, 1953, namely:

Civil Estimates and Ministry of Defence Estimate, 1952-53




£


Class II, Vote I, Foreign Service
…
10


Ministry of Defence
…
10


Total
…
£20

Orders of the Day — KOREAN CAMPAIGN (BOMBING POLICY)

3.49 p.m.

Mr. C R. Attlee: Yesterday in the House we raised the question of the bombing of certain power stations on the Yalu River, and one gathered that this action had come as a surprise to the Government. I think, therefore, that the House of Commons should have an opportunity of discussing this matter, first, as to the actual action of bombing these power stations; second, as to the timing of this operation; and third, as to the degree of consultations by the authorities in the field with the United Kingdom Government.
These stations on the Yalu River, as I understand it, supply North Korea, parts of Siberia and Manchuria. They are recognised as having a rather special position. I remember the Foreign Secretary on 29th November, 1950, referring to them in a debate in which he said:
Near the Chinese frontier in North Korea lie the hydro-electric installations which supply Manchuria and Siberia as well as Korea. A case can be made for some neutral zone in the area… "—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 29th November, 1950; Vol. 481, c. 1177.]
That matter passed on, but there is there a recognition of the rather special position of these stations.
For some time there have been negotiations carried on for an armistice, and this, I believe, is the second anniversary of the outbreak of aggression in Korea. Those negotiations have been conducted with immense patience by the United States representatives in face of a great deal of provocation. The differences have been narrowed down to one point, the question of the prisoners. That point has not yet been surmounted, but we all hope that it may be.
I do not want to discuss that issue today, because I want to deal only with this particular matter. Everybody hopes that the negotiations will succeed. In the meanwhile, warfare has been carried on, but it has been minor warlike operations —attacks by Communist forces, seldom, I think, of the strength of more than a battalion or regiment, a great deal of bombing of communications and airfields —and there has been a strengthening of defences by the United Nations and undoubtedly a very heavy build-up of forces by the Communists, but there have been no major operations.
Therefore, this bombing attack on the Yalu electrical stations, which has been described as the biggest air raid of the war, came to us all as a considerable surprise. It seemed that, if negotiations were proceeding, it was strange to undertake an operation of this kind, and the question arose at once as to how far there had been consultation on this.
I shall deal with the matter of consultation a little later, but it is quite obvious, in the first place, that a raid of these dimensions could not have been mounted at short notice. Lieutenant-General Barcus, according to "The Times," said that there had been superb co-operation between his own command and the Navy and the Marines in carrying out jointly these raids, which had been planned with great care and executed with split-second precision.
We all know from experience in the last war just how long it takes to mount an operation of that kind. Obviously, therefore, it must have been decided before Lord Alexander left Korea, and yet he knew nothing about it. That does seem to me to be very extraordinary. The British Minister of Defence, holding a high office in the Government, visits the scenes of operation and is apparently told nothing of this major operation. He is


also a very distinguished soldier visiting a Command in which British Forces, ground forces, air forces, and naval forces, are engaged. He has met another very distinguished general, who served under his command, and yet, apparently, he has been kept entirely in the dark about this, the biggest single raid of the war. That does seem to me to require some explanation, because it is not much good sending off high-ranking Ministers if they cannot have full and frank discussion and be put in command of all the facts.
I noticed that Lord Alexander said that he thought this raid was right. I think it was rather unfortunate to make a statement of that kind. I am not sure whether he was speaking from a military point of view and saying that, as a military man, he approved it, or whether he was speaking as the Minister of Defence on behalf of the Government. That, of course, is one of the difficulties which are apt to occur in appointments of this nature.
The present air operation seems to me to be something quite different from what has been going on during the months of the armistice negotiations. I have no doubt that a case can be made out for saying that these electrical installations serve military purposes in Korea. There is no doubt about that. There is also no doubt at all that they serve the civilian population in Korea, in Manchuria and in Siberia. There does not seem to have been any overwhelming reason for the attack on them at the present time, because the effect of this attack as far as one could judge, would have far greater effect in the civilian than in the military sphere.
In all discussions on this matter of Korea we have endeavoured—and that has been the policy of both sides of the House and, I think, also of the American administration—to try to confine these operations as far as possible to Korea. There were suggestions made at one time that there should be air raids on the industrial cities of Manchuria with a view to destroying the enemy potential. There have been suggestions for a blockade. But these have all been rejected on the broad lines which have been put forward very fully by numerous speakers—by no one more forcibly than by the Prime Minister—that we do not want to get involved in a major war with China.
Therefore, there is at once the question raised as to why this raid was undertaken. I hope we may have some explanation of that, because it may be— I only put it forward as an hypothesis— that the Americans are saying, "We are tired of these long-drawn-out negotiations. We think, therefore, we should strike hard in the hope of coming to some decision." That is a possible line to take but it is not a line which should be taken without full consultation. It does indeed represent a change of policy and the Prime Minister has assured us that there is no change of policy.
The Prime Minister rather inclined to say yesterday that there was no real occasion for consultation on this matter. I think it is worth while looking a little closely at that, because I think he was quite emphatic, when we were in office, on the need for full consultation.
When, two years ago, this matter was embarked upon, it was agreed that the United States should take responsibility on behalf of the United Nations. May I say that we on this side have never concealed our admiration for the prompt way in which the Americans took up the challenge to the United Nations, and the last thing in the world I should wish from this debate would be any causing of difficulty in Anglo-American relations. That would be playing completely into the hands of those who hate us as much as they hate the Americans.
We agreed to the American command because it would have been quite impossible to conduct operations with a large committee representing the United Nations in charge. Campaigns cannot be run through committees. We all know, too, that the United States have provided the bulk of the forces and have sustained the heaviest casualties. But that has never meant that we had no say in the matter, nor has this ever been claimed by our American friends.
We have had a liaison officer at headquarters; we have had a very able representative with the Chiefs of Staff, first Lord Tedder and now Air Chief Marshal Elliot; and there was a pretty constant exchange of views, partly through the ordinary communications between the military, partly through ordinary diplomatic channels and partly through the meetings of responsible Ministers on either side. For instance.
I, accompanied by the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, had a meeting with President Truman and his advisers in December, 1950, when we had a very exhaustive discussion on all the issues.
Another example of an interchange of views was alluded to in the debate of 26th February last, in which the question was put to us whether, if there were very heavy air attacks on the United Nations troops in Korea, the higher command should be allowed to retaliate on enemy aerodromes—in Manchuria, and we agreed. That was an example of the kind of discussion that takes place. The broad position was that we agreed that the commander in the field must take all requisite decisions on purely military action, but that there should be consultation where political as well as military issues were involved.
That position was very clearly stated by Mr. Bevin in the debate on 29th November, 1950. He said:
It has… been necessary to leave the control of the operations very much in the hands of the United Nations' Commander, provided always that where his plans might involve questions of general policy then there must be appropriate consultation on such matters. I can assure the House that this is in fact what has happened."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 29th November, 1950; Vol. 481, c. 1164.]
As I have stated, we took the line that the war should be confined as far as possible to the immediate theatre, and on 26th February last the Prime Minister said that that was also the policy of the present Government. There is, therefore, no quarrel about that. I claim that there has been here action taken which, while it has its military aspects, also has its political aspects.
The fact is—I think it will be agreed— that the vast majority of people in this country, and I think in the United States of America, are ardently desirous that the armistice talks should succeed, and, as I have previously said, very great patience has been shown on the part of the United Nations, and a great many points have been conceded. The negotiations have come down to a narrow point. Now there is suddenly injected into this an attack on these power stations. It may be said—I do not know—that there is some particular military reason for this, but in actual fact it will cause misery and distress to hundreds of thousands of

civilians who are not in the fighting at all. That is, in fact—I am taking the point of view at the moment of the Chinese— bringing the conditions of total war on those people.
It might be claimed that this will make the Chinese at once more reasonable and make them agree to an armistice. That can be argued, but I think it is a profound mistake in psychology, and it is not the first mistake in psychology that has been made in the course of the whole of these events. I think it will exacerbate; I think it will lessen the chances of an armistice and may lead us dangerously nearer to a general conflagration in the East, and if that happens no one knows where it may stop.
I therefore claim that in a matter of this kind Her Majesty's Government were entitled to have the fullest information. They ought to have been allowed to express an opinion as to whether this was wise. To quote from what the Chancellor of the Exchequer said in a previous debate,
There is a very heavy responsibility upon His Majesty's Government, and the Prime Minister this evening in closing this debate, to reassure our people that things are not running away from them in a direction which the British public does not want."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 30th November, 1950; Vol. 481. c. 1428.]
I think that that is the anxiety in the minds of many people.
I confine myself to the single issue —we shall, I think, before long have a chance of discussing the whole of these matters perhaps in a wider context—but it does bring out what I think we have always been conscious of—the difficulty of conducting operations on behalf of the United Nations in which a number of States make their contribution but in which one State has taken the major responsibility.
That was inevitable as far as action in the field is concerned, Throughout, in my experience, we have had consultation, our views have been put forward and have been treated with respect. Obviously I cannot say whether they have been accepted or not. I think that now the position has been reached in which it would be a great advantage if we could get some closer representation both as regards operations in the field and in the armistice negotiations.
I do not want to develop that point today, but I think that everybody has been disturbed over the matter of the prisoners. I think that there perhaps there might have been a better set-up if there had been closer representation. But I am raising this point today because I want to get a clear statement from the Government as to how much they have been consulted in this matter, and whether they do not think they ought to have been consulted, if they were not; and I want the Government, if they can, to give us the meaning of this action. It seems to us that this action is fraught with the danger of destroying all the work that has been done in the armistice negotiations and perhaps of leading to the extension and exacerbation of a conflict which we all want to see brought to an end.

4.11 p.m.

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Mr. Anthony Eden): I have listened to the statement of the Leader of the Opposition which, if I may say so, was couched in terms of moderation and restraint in which I shall try to follow him in the discussion of a matter which is of real significance to a result we all want to see, the achievement of an armistice in Korea; and also to the close and effective co-operation of Anglo-American forces and thought, upon which the whole peace of the world depends. I shall try as I speak to bear that in mind. I think we should all endeavour, even where we feel that we want to vent criticisms, to remember that if we carry them beyond a certain point they are likely to help others more than they will help the cause in which we in this Committee believe so much.
The right hon. Gentleman made references about which I wish to comment to start with. He paid his tribute, and I was glad to hear it, to the immense patience shown by those who have been conducting the armistice negotiations. This was a well-deserved tribute. I think it is very little understood by the general public what an immense strain it has been attempting to conduct these negotiations under very considerable provocation over this very long period. I should like to pay my tribute, with the right hon. Gentleman, for what has been done in that sphere.
He also referred—and of course it is true—to the difficulty which confronts us

in conducting operations of this kind where one Power is making by far the greater contribution in the military sphere, and where the rest are not made up of just one or two other Powers, but of a large number of other Powers sharing, some of them in a very small scale, in the operation. How is consultation to be made effective? How are all these to be brought into the knowledge of and cooperation in the plans that are made and executed? I shall say something more about that in a moment when I come to deal with the visit of the Minister of Defence and the Minister of State.
So far as Her Majesty's Government are concerned, we welcome the fact that there has been the opportunity for this debate, if only that it can serve to clarify some of the misconceptions, and that it certainly can serve to enable us to make plain where Her Majesty's Government stand on the broad decisions of policy which have been taken in the past. And so I would begin by just giving these three assurances to the Committee from the outset.
So far as Her Majesty's Government are concerned, there has been no change in our policy in respect of the Korean campaign. It is still our purpose to limit the conflict to Korea; and it is still our policy to do everything in our power to attain an armistice on fair and reasonable terms. We have to remember that the war in Korea was not sought by the United Nations. The one wish of the Americans as well as the British, I am sure, is to see it ended; and nobody can be surprised at that when we consider that the United States of America have already had over 100,000 casualties in this fighting.
Let us come to this question of the bombing on 23rd June which was intended, I understand—I now understand —to be a co-ordinated attack on the power plants of North Korea. Five targets were attacked. Four of them, two at the Changjin reservoir and two at Fusen, were nowhere near the Man-churian border. The fifth station which the right hon. Gentleman referred to as on the Yalu, was at Suiho, which is on the Yalu river. This power plant at Suiho provides no less than 40 per cent. of all the hydro-electric power in North Korea.
As I understand it, the United Nations Commander in North Korea referred the


question of the bombing of this station —not the other four, but this station— to Washington, and the operation was approved. Her Majesty's Government were not informed or consulted. I regret this, and I shall deal with this matter in a few moments in the course of the observations I have to make.
The Committee must bear in mind that all these targets—as the right hon. Gentleman himself, I think, said—lay within Korea itself, and are military targets. I do not think that the Committee realises how extensive is the bombing which has been and is being carried out day and night by the Allied air forces in Korea mainly against the airfields, large supply installations and communications. It extends all over North Korea and it is nothing new. It has been going on for months, ever since the talks began.
It is part of a general plan to try to neutralise the immense military advantage which the Communists have gained since the armistice talks began on Mr. Malik's initiative a year ago. The United Nations' air effort is essential—I do not think anybody would dispute this—for the security of the United Nations ground forces, including our own Commonwealth Division. It is the only means we have to neutralise the building up which has been taking place ever since the talks began.
The Committee should bear in mind the extent of that build-up and what it means in the military sense now. In July last year, the Communist forces in the field were estimated at something just over 500,000 men, in considerable disarray—in fact, a beaten army. Today they are not far short of a million men. The reinforcement has consisted largely of building up existing units to full strength, the fresh troops placed in the ranks being overwhelmingly Chinese. Today the enemy strength in armour and artillery has mounted until they are believed to have over 500 tanks and self-propelled guns. They have built up large stocks of all types of supplies, and their air force, which was about 1,000 strong last July, is now about twice that number, and they have about 1,000 jet fighters.
I say all this because the Committee should understand that the Communists

are now in a position to launch a major offensive with very little warning, and to maintain the initial pressure of their attacks for some considerable time. This raid, let me assure the Leader of the Opposition, was not, so far as its size was concerned, unique. There has also been bombing of airfields and communications ever since the armistice talks began right up to the frontier itself. That has had to be right up to the Yalu, because some of the airfields are actually on the Yalu; and the Committee must picture for itself what the Communist build-up would have been if there had not been this air bombardment by day and by night.
The next thing we have to consider is what is the part played in all this buildup by these power stations which have now been attacked, four of them admittedly in Korea, well in Korea, and the fifth on the Yalu river.

Mr. Sydney Silverman: Can the right hon. Gentleman say whether any of these power stations —either the four that are said to be well in Korean territory or the one that is clearly on the border—have ever before been attacked from the air at any time during the two years of operations?

Mr. Eden: I have been trying to check that. What I think it is certainly true to say is that four out of the five were over-run in our advance 18 months ago and were very largely destroyed or knocked about—how much I have no estimate—at that time. As regards the bombing, I have no information——

Mr. David Logan (Liverpool, Scotland Division): Were these power stations strengthening the military position?

Mr. Eden: I intended to deal with that point. It is one which we have to weigh in considering this decision. [Interruption.]I could not hear what the hon. Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. S. Silverman) said. Let us have an argument between ourselves afterwards. Four out of the five lie back behind the frontier and they were over-run in the winter of 1951.
But what has happened during these prolonged armistice negotiations is that all these power stations, however much or little damaged—some much, some little —in 1951, have been reconstructed. Their military importance to Korea for the


fighting hardly needs examination by the Committee. They supply power to the aerodromes and all other forms of activity in North Korea, military and industrial. They provide—and this answers the hon. Member for Liverpool, Scotland (Mr. Logan)—electricity to industry in North Korea which is now engaged in the supply to the enemy forces of war production of all kinds.
When the Committee considers that the enemy admittedly outnumber our forces by a considerable margin and that we are superior only in weapons, hon. Members will see how important a consideration it is whether or not the industrial potential of North Korea shall be freely at the disposal of the Communist forces. As for the value of electricity to the aerodromes, that, of course, is obvious to all hon. Members. It is quite essential to have it for the maintenance of aircraft, for radar defences, for work at night and for a host of other activities. Therefore, I say, dealing with the matter purely from the military angle at this moment, that these power stations are perfectly legitimate military targets. On that I do not think that there can be any challenge whatever.
The only time when I could not follow the right hon. Gentleman was when he said that attacking these power stations was a terrible imposition on the Chinese people. I do not know how many Chinese people have electricity in their houses. I should not think that there are an awful lot. The importance of it from our point of view is that it is the source of power both for industry and for airfields, and also, I understand, for industry and airfields in Manchuria from which the war is carried on at present. When we are considering these power stations——

Mr. T. Driberg: On that argument why not bomb Manchuria?

Mr. Eden: That is exactly what we have not done, and I want the Committee to understand the price we are paying for that restraint.
When we are considering these power stations in Korea which also serve Manchuria, we ought to remember the very heavy handicap which our restraint has placed upon us throughout the latter part of our fighting in Korea. The bases, the installations and practically all the aerodromes which the Chinese use today, and

from which they go up to fight our bombers when they come over, are practically all in Manchuria. None of them is ever bombed by our forces. Fighters, can go up to attempt to intercept our bombers and go down again on the Manchurian aerodromes and, because they are on the Manchurian aerodromes, they are not bombed. They are not touched. It is quite a remarkable effort of restraint. All that has to be put in the scale when we are considering the matter which the Committee is examining today. I ask the Committee to consider this point.

Mr. Arthur Henderson: This point is important. We know that there are 1,000 MiG 15s employed by the Chinese forces. Do I understand the right hon. Gentleman to indicate that practically all these 1,000 MiG fighters are based over the Manchurian border?

Mr. Eden: Yes, Sir. The aerodromes south of the Yalu are largely made uninhabitable by the interdiction bombing which I have described, and the enemy uses these aerodromes over the border which are, therefore, inviolate to our attacks. That is quite a consideration. I would put it to the Committee in this way: it is one thing to respect as we do respect the territory of Manchuria despite the warlike operations and the activity which goes on there, but it is another thing to guarantee a supply of electric power to their territory from stations within the battle area. That is the thought which I should like to leave with the Committee.
Over and above that, the power stations which have been attacked supply between them 40 per cent. of the electric power which is used today in North Korea in support of the Communist war effort. For the moment I am dealing with the military arguments and I repeat that the military arguments for dealing with these stations are doubly strong because the stations supply not only the war effort itself but the stations in Manchuria which are never attacked.

Mr. R. H. S. Crossman: Can the right hon. Gentleman tell us whether he knows why, in view of the overwhelming military importance of these installations, they were left un-bombed for a year and only bombed at a crucial period in the armistice negotiations?

Mr. Eden: I shall deal with that point in a moment or two. What has been happening, and the hon. Gentleman and the Committee must understand this, is that throughout this long armistice talks period not only have the Communists been building up their forces in the field —I am not complaining: I am stating the fact—but at the same time they have increased their war manufacturing capacity by the aid of these electricity plants. At a time when their manufacturing capacity was not so great, that would not count as so important a factor as it is now. Added to that, they have now organised their air defences from what might be called this Tom Tiddler's ground where they are safe to go down and take refuge whenever they want. Those are all considerations which have increased with the passage of time. I have no doubt, though I do not know, that they were in the minds of the Command when the decision was taken.
Another point which I ask hon. Members to observe is that the dams and bridges across the Yalu were not included in these raids. The Leader of the Opposition will know that these dams and bridges are no less legitimate targets than power plants. But where the river which they straddle is the frontier, as in this case, there is clearly a risk involved in attacking them. They have been attacked in the past, though not, of course, since the armistice talks began. This risk does not attach in the same measure to the power plants now in question, which are definitely on this side of the frontier. No target was within 1.000 yards of the frontier.
Another point is on the question of consultation. The Committee knows that the problem of consultation on all matters relating to Korea, which, after all, we inherited and to which the Leader of the Opposition has referred, has been causing us some considerable concern. I must tell the Committee frankly that I think, in a certain measure, it is insoluble from the nature of the extraordinary features in this case which I mentioned earlier— the overwhelmingly greater part of the contribution is from one Power and a number of others are giving smaller contributions of varying sizes.
Some way to improve it we must seek to find, and that, amongst other things, was the object of the visit of my noble

Friend the Minister of Defence and the Minister of State to Tokyo and Korea. The other object of that visit was to seize this welcome opportunity to visit the front itself, and for the Government to hear, on the authority of Field Marshal Lord Alexander himself, what was the military situation. Although I must not anticipate what my noble Friend will have to say, that report, from the point of view of our defences, is extremely reassuring.
I think I am right in saying that a statement will be made on Tuesday next in this House and in another place, when the Cabinet have had time to consider it and the conclusions to which they will come. I have not the least doubt that the visit of my two right hon. Friends has been an outstanding success. [An HON. MEMBER: "It does not look like it."] It has been welcomed both in the United States and in Canada, but we have not yet had the opportunity to consider the suggestions which they have to make. They only arrived at the airport at one o'clock, and I should have thought that it was reasonable to say that we should have an opportunity for a discussion before any statement is made.
In this instance, we were not consulted. Although there was no specific obligation to consult us, I think that it is to be regretted that we were not.

Mr. Ellis Smith: The Ministers were there.

Mr. Eden: I do not know; I think the hon. Gentleman is probably wrong. I do not know; I am only estimating. I think these plans had probably been made for a considerable time. There was always a possibility that this action would be taken and plans for launching an attack made in the lifetime of both Governments in the event of certain eventualities taking place.

Mr. M. Turner-Samuels: Why were not the Ministers told?

Mr. Eden: I am pretty certain that the plans must have been laid. If there had been a sudden enemy attack, they would certainly have bombed the aerodromes, as they had been bombed a great many times before, and there is no dispute about that. As to when the decision was taken, I do not know, but I think myself that it was probably after my right hon. Friends had left that area and were in


Canada, but I do not know. We may know about that later. If this matter had been referred to us, no doubt, this would have been done with all the military arguments which guided the United Nations Command in coming to their decision. Now that the decision has been taken, although we are sorry that we were not consulted, we give our Allies full support in it.
It is said that this action is going to prejudice the conclusion of an armistice, and the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition made certain references to that, to which I take no exception. I do not care myself to try to estimate that at all. I think it is a pretty difficult calculation to make. What is the position now? The armistice talks have now lasted 11 months, and during that time, as the Leader of the Opposition said, the United Nations negotiators have done everything possible on their side to try to bring them to a conclusion. We have made one important concession after another, and I will mention one or two.
For example, we have agreed that the activities of the armistice inspection teams, to which we attach great importance in order to know what is going on after the armistice has been signed, should be limited only to certain points of entry and lines of communication. We have surrendered our previous demand for mutual air inspection. We thought it reasonable to ask that, while the armistice is being signed, there should be certain air inspections by both sides, but we have dropped that demand.
We have agreed that the inspection teams, now limited to the ground, should be provided by neutral nations and not by representatives of the opposing military commands, which was the normal and ordinary request. We have agreed that, after an armistice, a number of airfields in North Korea can be repaired to meet the immediate needs of the civilian population, and that is a major concession bearing in mind the efforts which we have made to try to keep these airfields out of use.
I have a feeling that the Committee has a wrong impression of the actual fighting that is going on in Korea, because the Leader of the Opposition thought that it was quite small. Though he was right in saying that the units used have been of no more than battalion or brigade

strength in the Communist attacks, the fighting has been quite severe. I should not like the Committee to assume that it is only the United Nations who are engaged in these hostilities. Recently, something like 10,000 shells were fired against us on the front in a single day.

Mr. Emrys Hughes: How many napalm bombs?

Mr. Eden: I should say that 10,000 shells in a single day amounts to a considerable bombardment. I seem to remember that at one time on the Somme, when there were 6,000 shells in a day, we thought it was pretty heavy, so that 10,000 in a day is quite a bombardment. That has been happening quite lately, so that it is not at all true that all is serene and at peace except for an occasional allied bomber going out and bombing a power station. That is the position as it is today.
If this bombing—our round-the-clock bombing—is intolerable to the Communists, they really have the remedy in their own hands. An armistice could be concluded tomorrow, on terms which satisfy the honour and the interests of both sides, if the Communists want it.
On the prisoner of war issue, which is the only one outstanding, we have made an entirely fair and reasonable offer. If this had received anything like serious consideration by the other side, progress could have been made before now, and perhaps the United Nations Command would not have found this air action necessary at all. I think we take a heavy responsibility if we refuse to take the steps which the Allied Command think necessary to protect our own men.
While some hon. Members may regret, for understandable reasons, the selection of these targets at this time, we have also got to bear in mind how we should feel if a major attack were to be launched against the United Nations positions and the enemy air support had been organised behind a screen of immunity from attack. How should we feel if such an attack had threatened the defensive position of the Allies, and if the weight of that attack had been greatly increased as a result of our giving immunity to these installations?

Mr. John Paton: Will the right hon. Gentleman clear up one point, which is of very great im-


portance and which many of us are anxious to have cleared up? What circumstances have altered during the last few days which made it necessary to time that attack now?

Mr. Eden: Let me tell the hon. Gentleman. We have not been consulted about this, and, therefore, we have not been presented with the arguments; but I have explained the conditions of the Communist build-up and the significance of the full use of these power plants in building up the enemy's industrial war potential. I said that I do not know the arguments for arriving at that decision, because I said we have not been consulted.

Mr. S. Silverman: The right hon. Gentleman, if he will allow me to say so with great respect, is not really doing himself justice. I think we could all understand him saying, "I cannot answer the question as to what caused the timing of these attacks at this moment, because we were not consulted, and, therefore, I cannot answer." But as, a few minutes ago, the right hon. Gentleman said that, now it has been decided, we support it, he ought to be able to give the Committee some reason why he thinks that is right.

Mr. Logan: Before the right hon. Gentleman replies to my hon. Friend, may I ask him whether the Communists are fighting and have been fighting all along, and what about our own men who are out there?

Mr. Eden: I must say that I think the hon. Member for Nelson and Colne abuses the right of interruption. I always give way in debate whenever I possibly can, but not in order that an hon. Member should immediately start saying, "You are not doing the job well at all." Whether he does or does not think that, is immaterial to me, but it is not the courteous way in which to behave. I wish now to deal with the second part——

Mr. Silverman: Mr. Silvermanrose——

Mr. Eden: I think I might at least be allowed to answer the hon. Gentleman's criticisms before he tries to make some more.

Mr. Silverman: Do it decently.

Mr. Eden: I wonder if the hon. Gentleman ever reads Congreve's "The Way of the World." I think in the last lines of the first act it says:
Where modesty's ill-manners, 'tis but fit
That impudence and malice pass for wit.
Now I come to the second part of the hon. Gentleman's question. He said he could quite well understand that I should say that I could not give the reasons because we were not consulted, but he went on to ask why, the decision having been take, we should back it. The reason is that we are there with our Allies and the decision——

Mr. S. O. Davies (Merthyr Tydvil): Right or wrong.

Mr. Eden: The decision having been taken, I am not going to give ammunition to certain people to try and drive a wedge between us.

Mr. Davies: Right or wrong.

Mr. Eden: Let me sum up again where we stand. It is still our purpose to confine this action to Korea and to seek an armistice. By every means in their power this Government and the Foreign Secretary as an individual are trying to find means to settle this last outstanding problem. I can assure the Committee that there is no topic which takes up more of our days than an endeavour to find our way around this. We are using every means we can, and it may be that we can yet reach a conclusion. I believe the Committee will better help us to get the armistice we seek by showing unity rather than by trying to divide us from our friends and Allies.

4.45 p.m.

Mr. Aneurin Bevan: A great deal of heat has already been introduced into the debate, but I think hon. and right hon. Members in all parts of the Committee will recognise that this discussion this afternoon will be followed with great anxiety all over the country, and probably in many parts of the world, because we do not yet know what calamitous consequences may follow from the action taken in Korea.
We are today, I think, rather more aware of the situation than we were yesterday. The right hon. Gentleman the Foreign Secretary has made the position of the Government perfectly clear, and that position sharply distinguishes the


policy of the Government today from the policy of the recent Labour Government.
There can be no doubt whatever that the policy that has been pursued by the American High Command in Korea is entirely different from the policy which the Labour Government supported in Korea. I want to make that quite clear, and I am entitled to do so because I was a Member of that Government for a long time. [Interruption.]Hon. Members opposite will soon have to answer to their constituents and they will not like the result. Therefore, they might listen now to the arguments they will be faced with then; and they may be able to think of a reply, although I doubt it.
The fact is it was always the position that the Labour Government supported the resistance to the invasion of South Korea because we regarded it as an attempt to change the character of the Government there by armed aggression. Therefore, we supported the action of the American Government in reacting sharply against that invasion. But, since that event took place, we are now aware that the situation was very much more obscure than we thought because a good many commentators have expressed the view that there was quite considerable evidence that military moves had been made by the South Koreans.
Nevertheless, as far as one can gather, the balance is on the side that the overt military act was taken by a North Korean invasion of South Korea. On balance, we held the view that this was an act of aggression which should be resisted if the peace of the world was to be maintained. But from that certain other considerations flow. It was also quite clear that there were certain elements, particularly in the United States of America, who regarded these circumstances as an opportunity for counterrevolutionary action.
That counter-revolutionary action has been taken by the United States of America, simultaneously with the fighting in Korea, by the arming and the training of Chiang Kai-shek's forces in Korea. Let us face the fact. [Interruption.]It is no use hon. Members failing to see the other man's point of view and not listening merely because it is unpopular. I will say it here and in the country that it

is necessary to recognise that while the American Government were associated with us and were, in fact, the dominant partner in resisting an act of aggression in Korea, they were, at the same time, inflaming the situation in the Far East by arming and training Chiang Kai-shek, whose declared intention it was to engage in counter-revolutionary action against the established Government of China. No one could deny that.

Mr. Patrick Maitland: Is not the right hon. Gentleman aware that at the material time in question, namely, when the North Koreans invaded South Korea, the Nationalist Forces in Formosa were paying in gold or dollars for outworn equipment from the last war which America was supplying?

Mr. Bevan: It really is time that we had interruptions not for the purpose merely of continuing the argument but for the purpose of eliciting facts. That fact to which I referred is not disputed. That is what right hon. and hon. Members must face.
That is what we had to face and that was why the late Mr. Ernest Bevin adopted a specific attitude on this matter. He said that it was very difficult for us apparently to reach a clean solution in Korea because the prestige of a large number of Americans was now involved in Chiang Kai-shek and the prestige of a large number of Chinese was involved in getting rid of Chiang Kai-shek and therefore there existed in Korea inflammatory elements that must be contained if the whole thing was not to spread.
We took the view, to which we all subscribed, that the right thing to do in Korea once we reached the contentious Parallel was to let the fighting die away, to try to contain it as far as possible, to allow feeling to be assuaged in the hope that after a time a real armistice would be signed and peace established without loss of face anywhere.
That is the view we took; and indeed it was not only our view, it was the view also of the United Nations. The Foreign Secretary today has been overstating his case. He appeared to be arguing for most of his speech that the bombing of these stations on the Yalu River and near the Yalu River—1,000 yards away—was, in fact, merely an extension or continua-


tion of attacks which had been going on all the time.
But that is not the view of the Pentagon. That is not the view of the American Administration. Yesterday afternoon I quoted in the House statements made by official spokesmen in America. They regard this as a departure, as a new policy. They do not agree with the right hon. Gentleman the Foreign Secretary. It is too disingenuous to argue that the destruction of these power stations was merely a military effort of the same stature as the other military efforts that had been going on.
On the contrary, the American Administration has made it quite clear indeed, and the right hon. Gentleman himself said that with respect to the power station on the Yalu River itself, that the American political Administration was consulted. He said it just now. In point of fact, that consultation established that act as being something more than a mere military extension, and surely hon. Members must not always imagine that because we are asking that we should be consulted in these matters before these decisions are taken that is evidence of an anti-American bias.

Mrs. Freda Corbet: You have not got any of course.

Mr. Bevan: What are you babbling about?

Hon. Members: Oh.

The Chairman: Order. I cannot hear the right hon. Gentleman.

Mr. Bevan: It was not correct to say that we are to be able to influence American policy if at no time in this House are we able to express criticism of what is happening without being accused of anti-American propaganda. It is quite clear that the Foreign Secretary was wrong in arguing that this would be an extension on the same kind of action.
But I want to call his attention to a statement made in 1950 by the United Nations itself.[Interruption.]We know the technique which is indulged in on the benches opposite. We have been in the House of Commons too long not to know it. [An HON. MEMBER: "Too

long."] In 1950, the United Nations passed the following resolution:
Affirms that it is the policy of the United Nations to hold the Chinese frontier with Korea inviolate and fully to protect legitimate Chinese and Korean interests in the frontier zone;
That was the declaration of the United Nations itself. It is in furtherance of that declaration that we are supporting united action in Korea, and yet the right hon. Gentleman today admits that on the frontier zone itself we have destroyed power stations which supply China and Siberia and North Korea. I ask the right hon. Gentleman this question. Does he consider that that action is consistent with the declaration of the United Nations? The United Nations itself laid down that one of the limiting conditions for operations in Korea was that we should not bomb anything on the frontier zone; and yet the action of the Americans has been, in these circumstances, entirely to violate the decision that the United Nations itself made.
I should like to ask the right hon. Gentleman a question about the position of the Minister of Defence. We should like to know whether the Minister of Defence was speaking on behalf of the Government when he declared that he supported the action, because, if so, he was speaking for the Cabinet as a whole. If he was speaking for the Cabinet as a whole then we are to accept it, and we ought to inform the country of the fact, that the bombing of these power stations is supported by the party opposite.
We should know that, because we must remember that we are speaking not only of the bombing that occurred the day before yesterday but the follow-up of bombing yesterday. After we had discussed the matter in the House yesterday afternoon, the bombing nevertheless went on; and while that bombing went on the American Administration received the encouragement of the British Minister of Defence, so that we did not have yesterday what we have had today from the right hon. Gentleman—the statement that he deplored the fact that we were not consulted. Even though we had not been consulted and the raids were going on, a Cabinet Minister declared his support for the action.
Either the Government as a whole must carry the odium for supporting it or Lord Alexander ought to resign. Or is Lord Alexander, because he is a soldier, exempted from the principle of Cabinet responsibility? Is he allowed to say something about a military action as though it has no political significance at all? It is true—and we have been saying this for some time—that an intolerable situation would be created, and here I agree with the Foreign Secretary, if an offensive took place in North Korea and American and British troops were being bombed from bases in Manchuria. It would be very difficult indeed to restrain action to destroy the airfields from which those raids took place if our people were being slaughtered.
In exactly the same way—and this is the gravity of it—it is argued today by the Americans and the right hon. Gentleman that it is intolerable that we should leave these power stations untouched when they are so important a part of the war-making machinery of North Korea under the Chinese. So the logical, military urgency which is behind the attack on the power stations would be the logical, military urgency that would demand an attack on Manchuria.
It is easy to envisage that it would be accompanied by the same emotions on both sides of the House of Commons. We should be angry because our soldiers were being killed. If it is difficult for us to take a dispassionate view of the situation today, how much more difficult would it be if there were a general military offensive and we were being attacked by planes from Manchurian-based airfields? The same logic would apply.
I think that the way to look at this question is that if no political solution is sought a military solution is the only one that is left and, if that is so, a third world war is on our hands, and hon. Members opposite must face that fact. What the army commanders have done in Korea is to say, in effect, "If these politicians would only shut up, if they would only keep their hands off, if they would only leave use alone, we would settle it all right by military action." That is what they have said.
Indeed, the right hon. Gentleman has almost hinted at it. He said that the

Americans have been conscious all the time of the limitations imposed upon them by the fact that they cannot bomb Manchuria. They were conscious of the limitations imposed on them by the United Nations decision not to bomb the power stations on the frontier. That tension became intolerable and soldiers, thinking as soldiers only of military purposes, ordered the bombing.
But this House is responsible for the political consequences of military acts. We cannot escape them and, therefore, we think it is time that the military activities in Korea were put under effective political control. That is why we deplored the fact that the senior representative of the British Government who went out from this country looked at the situation not from the political angle but from the military angle. When the right hon. Gentleman says that he is satisfied that it was a successful visit, and speaks of the influence which our representatives have had on the local American military Administration, I hope that that influence will not continue, if these are the fruits of it.
Despite the emnity of many people, I pleaded that we should seek a political solution in Korea as quickly as possible. That solution lies in our hands. It is available. If the American Administration will not only resist an act of aggression in Korea—for which we support them—but, at the same time, give effective assurances to the Chinese People's Government that they accept the Chinese revolution as an accomplished fact; that they are prepared to accept China on the Security Council; that they are prepared to disband Chiang Kai-shek's forces in Formosa and not connive—as the Chinese people think they are—in a counterrevolutionary movement at some time or other, the armistice could succeed quite easily.
I should have thought it would be to the advantage of the whole world to say those things plainly, because the British people will not support a war against China. It is necessary for us to understand that and to tell our American friends that we should not get the support of the British people for any action in the mainland of China which looked as though it were directed merely at the destruction of the People's Government of


China and the re-establishment of Chiang Kai-shek.
The lesson of this action is to be sought in the fact that no earnest attempt has so far been made to seek a basic political solution. The armistice negotiations have been narrowly directed to a military objective. Behind the war in Korea stands the whole suspicion of the Far East. Behind these actions in Korea are much more fundamental things than the future of South Korea itself. Do not let us drift from point to point, from week to week and month to month until the impatience of soldiers creates a situation which politicians cannot solve.
I beg and pray the Government to revert to the policy of the Labour Government, to revert to a policy of limiting military action to what is absolutely essential and to press upon the American Administration at the earliest possible time to change their policies in order to bring about peace in the Far East.

5.6 p.m.

Major W. J. Anstruther-Gray: I am rather sorry to find myself following the right hon. Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. Bevan) because, although I found much in the last few passages of his speech with which one could agree, I am bound to say that in general I am suspicious of his whole outlook upon these matters. I have a feeling that the right hon. Gentleman is only too ready to use foreign affairs as a plaything in the internal affairs of his own party—and it may be that he is engaged in those internal affairs at this moment—and as a plaything for internal conflicts.

Mr. Bevan: That is really a most objectionable statement. If that statement is true, it could have been levelled at the hon. and gallant Gentleman's leader for 10 years.

Major Anstruther-Gray: I maintain my statement. I think the right hon. Gentleman uses the subject of foreign affairs as a plaything in internal affairs not only against Her Majesty's Government but also in his own party. I am sorry to see that the Leader of the Opposition has gone. If I may substantiate——

Mr. Geoffrey Bing: Mr. Geoffrey Bing (Hornchurch) rose——

Major Anstruther-Gray: I am sorry; I cannot give way. I will give way to the hon. and learned Member for Horn-church (Mr. Bing) in a moment. I should like to continue with the case of the right hon. Member for Ebbw Vale. I should like to cite, as justification for my assertion, the action which he took yesterday, when his party and, in particular himself, attempted to debate this matter on the Adjournment. Surely it was evident that the Prime Minister was quite prepared to grant time for a debate; and surely it was equally evident that the Government wanted the opportunity of consulting the most up-to-date information which they could obtain on the subject.
When we had sent what I would call the best pair of eyes in the British Empire to learn the truth in Korea; when we had sent a man entirely qualified to learn from what he saw, was it not a crazy thing not to give that man the opportunity of getting home so that he could give the Government the benefit of his impressions, and so that we could have a debate in the light of full knowledge?
We have learned some knowledge today, and I think the more knowledge we can get of that part of the world the better. I have often thought that it would be an advantage to allow one or two hon. Members, or pairs of hon. Members, to go out to Korea. I would gladly go myself, with the hon. and learned Member for Hornchurch, who wants to interrupt me, in order to see the troops, to come back to the House and give our impressions, not from the point of view of brass hats but by getting the "low-down" from the lower deck and telling what we learned from our humble point of view.

Mr. Bing: Would not the hon. Gentleman agree that it is desirable in these circumstances to have a Minister of Defence responsible to the House of Commons in matters of this sort and not responsible to another place?

Major Anstruther-Gray: No; I do not think the point is well made on this issue. I think it is irrelevant to which House the Minister of Defence belongs, but I think in any event the Government were most anxious to have the advantage of his personal experience in Korea when he arrived back.
If I may leave—and oh, so gladly—the controversial aspect of this. I will do so, because I am sure that in all matters of peace and war the great body of opinion on all sides of the Committee is for united action. Let me turn to the very welcome and moderate terms which the Leader of the Opposition adopted in opening the debate. I was entirely with him when he expressed his anxiety at the situation, and if ever there were words of his which I feel prepared to echo it was when, referring to the damage which could be done to Anglo-American relations, he said such damage would be playing into the hands of those who hate us; and I commend those words to some of the hon. Gentlemen who sit behind him.

Mr. A. C. Manuel: We do not need the hon. and gallant Gentleman's lessons.

Major Anstruther-Gray: I do not know if the hon. Gentleman needs the lesson or not; if the cap fits he is welcome to it. The position, as I understood it before the debate, was exactly the position stated by the Washington correspondent of "The Times," in today's edition:
However, so far as can be ascertained, both the State and the Defence Departments were consulted and agreed, and the British Government was informed.
We have been told today that, in fact, the British Government were not informed, but I think it is a matter of no little significance that the Washington correspondent of "The Times" should be under the impression that we had been told, and I think it will be found that the great bulk of American opinion is also under the impression that we are going on arm in arm. I believe this was an oversight, which I am sure Her Majesty's Government will do their best to see does not occur again. Perhaps I may make some suggestions as to how that state of affairs could be avoided in future.

Mr. Turner-Samuels: Supposing all this caused a world war; should we be told it was an oversight?

Major Anstruther-Gray: I do not think that is very fair. I am sure that both the hon. and learned Member and I, from our different points of view, are doing our level best to see that it does not lead into a third world war.

Mr. Turner-Samuels: Not by talking nonsense.

Major Anstruther-Gray: Please let me continue making my remarks, which may not commend themselves to the hon. and learned Gentleman, but there is support for them elsewhere in the Committee and I am pretty sure there is support for them in the country. The article continues:
It is understood in any case that this was one of the types of action covered by Mr. Morrison's agreement of last September"—
that is, the agreement of the right hon. Member for Lewisham, South (Mr. H. Morrison) last September—
and confirmed during Mr. Churchill's visit in January. But it is an exaggeration to say, as some military spokesmen are saying, that the action has no political implications.
I think all here realise that very fully. The article continues:
Any new decision taken in Korea must have them, and it is not always clear that the American armed services even yet understand how large a political content any modern war —and particularly this war—has.
That, I think, is largely the problem we are up against. I was quoting from the centre page of "The Times," of today's date, from an article by the Washington correspondent. What we are up against is this difficult problem of a military decision possibly dove-tailing with, or even conflicting with, the political policy.
I felt much reassured by what the Foreign Secretary said about the legitimate status of the power stations as a target for air bombardment. I feel in no doubt that these power stations, by supplying electricity to aerodromes and enemy troops, and by allowing the industrial expansion of the enemy, and his re-armament, were being operated to the detriment of our war intentions.

Mr. Bevan: The United Nations addressed itself to this very fact and, because these power stations were being used not only by North Korea but by China and Siberia, they declared that we should not go beyond the frontier. This was not only about the power stations; there was a frontier zone. In this action, therefore, the American war machine has gone beyond the Resolution of the United Nations.

Major Anstruther-Gray: I follow the right hon. Gentleman's interest in words, but I urge him to face the fact that the


build-up of the Communist forces has proceeded apace during the whole of the protracted 11 months of the armistice negotiations. The fact is—and I commend it to his attention—that according to the military leader on the spot, we have been told that some 2,000 Communist aircraft have now been assembled there and some 500 tanks. Under the threat of attack from that build-up, I find it impossible to criticise a military decision which seeks to strike a warding-off blow instead of receiving the whole weight and volume of that offensive.
I turn now to how we can ensure that we do not again find ourselves in the vexatious position of an action of this sort being taken without the British Government being informed. Could it be by having in Korea a second-in-command to General Mark Clark? That is not without attraction, but we have to face the fact that numerically our contribution to the Korean army is a small one compared with that of the Americans, and the doctrine that he who pays the piper has a right to call the tune, while rather out of fashion in this country these days, has still quite a following in the United States. I am not sure that the appointment of a second-in-command would be the best decision.
I wonder whether a position in some ways analogous to that occupied by my right hon. Friend the Member for Bromley (Mr. H. Macmillan), now Minister of Housing and Local Government, in Algiers during the North African campaign, would possibly be the answer. I do not know that he himself should go; perhaps it could be the Minister of State, who has had the advantage of seeing Korea—it is now more than 20 years since I saw it—and who knows what are the attractions and disadvantages of that country. I think it is worth the consideration of the Government whether a Minister of State, not of military standing but with high tact and of Cabinet rank, could not, if he were resident in the Korean area, save us from just the kind of rather embarrassing complications with which we are faced today.

5.20 p.m.

Mr. David Logan (Liverpool, Scotland Division): It is very seldom that I have spoken on Far East questions or on foreign affairs at all, but I cannot sit in

this Chamber and listen to some of the points of view that have been expressed today and remain silent. I feel I must explain my view-
Looking around the Committee and some of the Members here, with many of whom I could not agree on any subject, I wonder why I should be silent when matters of such great importance are being debated—especially when I remember that my sons and brothers have had to go to fields of battle. What we are debating here today are exactly the same problems we had between 1914 and 1918—and I had dear ones at Festubert and Ypres. Considering all this I should be nothing more than a coward if I sat here silently.
Leaders may come, and leaders can go, but leaders must have people behind them to support them, and it is important today that in this Committee we should know where we are going—and where the leaders would lead us. In the old Roman days "Quo vadis?" was the cry. It is as essential today as it was then.
I want my hon. Friends to understand that I am not really concerned about what is said about me. After all, I am not looking for any position. No one could give me any in this Committee at my age. Therefore, what I say I say with all sincerity and with all my heart—particularly to those on these benches, to the Labour Party, which has a great heritage to sustain—something more important than what are merely political considerations and aspirations.
I heard someone today talking about politicians. What we want is statesmanship. We want statesmanship to be exemplified in the Labour Party, so that in the near future our party can take over and rule the destinies of this land. I am speaking from the point of view of unity inside the Labour Party. I do not believe in having little cliques and circles.
What was enunciated here today was clear and definite. The action taken was necessary. While I do not agree with the right hon. Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. Bevan) about many things of which he has spoken, I do say that it was essential that this debate should have taken place today on this important issue. But I would also say that we must not forget that debates are meant to settle matters, not to unsettle them.
I have seen enough of the affairs of the continent of Europe—and I have seen my home broken up by war—to understand as many people in my area understand, the importance of avoiding another war if possible. The way in which some people are going on is not the right and proper way of pursuing peace, and is detrimental to the best interests of the peace of this country and the protection of all that we hold sacred.
I am surprised that we hear always so much about the other country and never anything about the land in which we live. I cannot understand that. I have talked before here about the "Cook's tourists"—the people who go to Russia, for instance, for a week or two," and then come back pretending to know all about the political movement there and the minds of the Russians and all the affairs of Russia. The thing is damnable and nonsensical; there is no logic or reason in it.
I sometimes believe that I am not living in a land of reason and of logic—a land of sane men. For many people words seem no longer to mean what they do —or what they used to do. I am careful to whom I speak nowadays lest the one I speak to does not understand me. Very often I do not understand the point of view of the other man. I find myself rather in an unique position—a position of solitude.
I hope that I shall not be taken to account for daring to intervene in a foreign affairs debate. It will be said— I know it will be said—"Why do you intervene on foreign affairs when you can jump up for five minutes any day and intervene and say what you like? But people can say what they like about me. In fact, as hon. Members know, I do not do that, but today I feel that I must, for I am visualising the homes in my city, of my family, and of families round about.
I say to the leadership of my own party that the sooner we get rid of this internal discussion and get down to building up the Labour movement and making it worthier of the people of our land the better it will be for us all. I do not mind thrashing our opponents; I do not mind having a go at the opposite benches and telling hon. and right hon. Gentlemen opposite what I think about them; but it is just as well to start telling some

of our own hon. and right hon. Friends, too, where we are and where we are going.
In my opinion, a fatal mistake has been made, for there never should have been this attack without consultation with the British Government. However, I shall not say that to make the attack was an abuse of authority, because I do not know —and I do not think anybody yet knows —what really caused the action to be taken when it was. This much I do know, though, that if we put a military commander in command he must command, and must assume responsibility. Therefore, until we really know all about this we ought to be careful in our judgment.
We have no right to create false impressions in the country. It is all very well to use this Chamber for rhetoric but it must also be used for truth. Men and women outside must feel that this institution of ours stands for the interests of the common people of this country— indeed, of the world, for although our country's powers are more limited now than they were in the past, it is not less important, and, perhaps it is even more important than ever, for Britain to be among the foremost in justice and peace. We are living at a time when it is essential that men should be true to themselves and be true to each other.
We have warned the Americans. We have let them know what we think about the matter. The Foreign Secretary did so in a judicious manner in his explanation. The Leader of the Opposition has done so in the careful and moderate language he used today. We, having listened to both, have sound reasons for not misunderstanding or exaggerating the gravity of the position. What does it matter to me what anybody thinks about me? What does it matter about ambition?—for when one has a foot in the grave ambition goes. But it does matter if, sitting in this House, a man is a coward and is afraid to open his mouth because one or two others may express an opinion with which he differs but is afraid to say so.
I have some influence in some parts of this country. I want to tell some of the people that it is essential that we should be able to separate the wheat from the chaff, that we should be able to understand where we are going and what we are fighting for. We are fighting for the betterment of our people, a higher stan-


dard of living and greater knowledge. I have dared to state my mind, because I felt it was necessary. I am afraid of no one in this House, whatever may be thought of my opinions. I owe no apology to anyone. I stand here expressing the view that I have expressed before my God.
We are living in a critical period. The idle words that are spoken here can incite to war. Surely if the negotiators in Korea have spent 11 months dilly-dallying in trying to arrange an armistice, are we on these benches to condemn all and sundry because of an indiscretion by America? Would it not be better if the voices that are raised here were raised in quarters where they might be beneficial, to see whether an armistice could be obtained and peace for our people ensured? I want peace, and I want the people to understand that it is truth that will eventually count in the affairs of our land.

5.33 p.m.

Mr. J. Grimond: I am sure the hon. Member for the Scotland Division of Liverpool (Mr. Logan) will forgive me if I do not follow him in his plea for unity in the Labour Party—and I am sure the Labour Party will forgive me, too. I think Members will have listened with great interest and agreement to his plea that we should face as a united nation the very serious situation which confronts us.
I think that the explanations of the Foreign Secretary about the events of the last two days have considerable force. As I understand it, he does not pretend to be able to say why the attacks were made at this particular time. All he is prepared to do is to point out that these targets, or the great majority of them, were perfectly legitimate military targets and that bombing attacks of this nature have been going on for some time, presumably with the full knowledge of this Government as well as the American Government. He is also, I understand, very much aware of the demand in this country that there should be more consultation; and indeed we, and I would say other members of the United Nations, should have more say at the highest level in determining the political and, indeed, the higher military strategy of the United Nations.
Where I found his speech rather less satisfactory was in regard to the future, because it seems to me that while he has an open mind on whether these attacks at this time were justified, and while he is exercised about the need of this country making its opinion more effectively felt, he did not, so far as I know, lay before the House any suggestion as to how this might be done and how our opinions might be made more effective, nor as to how similar decisions about possibly similar targets in the future might be reached. It seems to me that it is about the future that this debate must be largely concerned.
Two main questions have been raised in this debate. One concerns the particular attacks, and among them obviously the most important is the attack made on the power station that lies near the border, and secondly, there is the question of consultation. I personally would agree with those who say that as far as the military aspect of these attacks is concerned, neither I nor, I would have thought, any other Member in this House is in a position to say whether these targets were proper targets for attack. All we know is that they are targets of first class military importance and that we are engaged in a war of considerable ferocity in which targets of military importance cannot escape attack.
But, of course, the real crux of the matter is that these targets are invested with very considerable political as well as military importance at this time. We are engaged not in a total war but in a war in which we have accepted, I think rightly, very limited objectives. There is considerable opinion in the world that it is not possible today to fight a limited war.
I rather think that Lord Russell, a man who is neither very stupid nor very reactionary, would probably say that with modern weapons and in the state of political division in which we find the world today, it is total war or nothing. Indeed, for the last 60 years most wars on this planet have been conducted as total wars. They have been wars of people against people, and wars in which the victors have been out to establish their overall supremacy and in which the vanquished have expected slavery or something very like it. That type of war is obviously outside the scope of the


operations undertaken by the United Nations.
I think it is of considerable importance that we should realise that this war in Korea is a war waged by the United Nations in defence, paradoxically, of peace, in defence of the freedom of a small country which has been attacked and, therefore, in the hope of preventing or limiting future attacks of a like sort. We know that the last Government and the present Government have accepted the limitation that they would not, except in extreme circumstances, carry the war beyond the frontiers of North Korea. I would certainly have said that if we like we have every excuse for carrying it beyond those frontiers. What the Foreign Secretary said about the use of aerodromes in Manchuria alone has given us at least a prima faciecase, if we put it no higher, for retaliation outside the frontiers of Korea.
But we have accepted these limitations as much in our own interests as in the interests of world peace as a whole. It is clearly in our interest that this war should be limited. It is clearly in our interest that we should find some way of living in peace with China in the Far East. I am perfectly certain that neither we nor the Americans want to have more and more of our resources drawn into that part of the world. But we have obviously to face up to the serious difficulties and limitations of trying to conduct a war which stops at a dead line.
It might have been more satisfactory to say that we would limit our effort to certain objectives. It might be possible to say that we would be content when the sovereignty of the South Korean Government had been restored over a certain area or possibly when troops were withdrawn from North Korea. In a sense we have done that, but we have also placed ourselves under the disadvantage that we cannot advance beyond the Yalu River.
Within Korea itself, like the Foreign Secretary, I do not see how we can accept the point of view that because other countries are supplied by power stations within Korea these stations are to be exempt from attack. That would seem to me to be carrying limitation to a point at which it would make the conduct of a war—and this is a war— virtually impossible.
We must remember that, not only are our men fighting in Korea in defence of peace and liberty, but they are also accepting, presumably, additional casualties because we are not allowed to bomb the air bases from which they are suffering attack. As the hon. Member for Liverpool, Scotland, pointed out, we owe our men there a considerable debt, and we should take the greatest care that we do not unnecessarily hamper their operations.
Then we come to the second point, that of consultation. The very fact that we are accepting this limited war makes it all the more vital that we should have the very closest consultation at the top level where policy is decided. In the debate so far hon. Members have spoken very much as though the only thing needed was that the point of view of the British Government should be taken into account.
To my mind, it is extremely necessary that the point of view of the Commonwealth Governments should also be taken into account. In addition, we must always bear in mind that we entered on this war for the United Nations, and that is not an Anglo-Saxon preserve. It may be that its nature will alter and a more old-fashioned time of alliance may come about, but this is a war in which not only we and the Americans are concerned, but all the other constituent members of the United Nations.
Clearly, if there is to be consultation at high level representatives of different Governments must be taken into account. If the Foreign Secretary finds it difficult to devise a way by which the British Government can be represented, I am sure I should find it difficult to find a way by which, not only the British Government but also the other constituent member Governments of the United Nations could be represented. Nevertheless, my own feeling is that that must be done, and done at the political level.
It has been suggested that perhaps a second-in-command to General Mark Clark would be a solution. I, personally, think that that would be no solution. I have no objection to the command of the United Nations Forces being in charge of an American, a Briton, a Dutchman or a Turk if he is the best


general to do the job. I quite see, though, that if 90 per cent. of the troops are American there is a very strong case for having an American general. But when it comes to the political decision taken on behalf of the United Nations' organisation, then we must try to work out some means by which, not only are we consulted before this sort of thing happens, but by which when action of this sort is taken it is taken as the joint action of all the Governments concerned.
I must confess, without being unduly critical of the Americans, that I think that on this sort of point their views and their methods differ from those of some other nations. I do not see that there is any harm in saying that. On all these questions of higher strategy, and on the border-line between politics and strategy, different nations have different approaches. Our experience in the last war was that the tendency of the Americans was to throw in everything once the objective had been decided.
I think nobody would deny that on certain occasions extreme military action, taken largely by the Americans and supported by all the Allies, had political effects which, looking back, we should probably liked to have avoided. I can see no harm in saying that, and I think we must insure that American methods and views, and their ways of doing things, do not completely override those of the other nations concerned in the wider political strategy of this war.
But the Foreign Secretary really told us the paramount considerations when he said, that, right or wrong, we are in a war with allies in defence of freedom of liberty—things for which we all stand —against an enemy who has had every opportunity for coming to terms if he wanted terms, who started the war in the first place and who has pursued it relentlessly for two years; and in those circumstances we will naturally support the Americans in any action which can possibly be supported. It is not for us looking back to break away from them and say, "Well, you have gone too far, therefore we draw aside." Nothing, in my submission, could be more dangerous not only to the unity of the Western world but to a decent and moderate policy in the Far East.
Nothing, in my view, could be playing more into the hands of the extremists in America; and nothing would more strengthen the hands of those who support the MacArthur point of view who will say, "Look at our allies, the British and the others of the United Nations. As soon as stresses come and difficulties arise they leave you. You bear 90 per cent. of the burden while the fighting is hot and when, in defence of your own men, you take action of which they disprove they say, ' We take no responsibility for it'." I suggest that such a policy in this country would be absolutely untenable, and that both the unity of the Western world, upon which the hope of survival depends, and ordinary political decency demand that in events to date we support, and support wholeheartedly, the action taken.
But again I say, as the Foreign Secretary said, that that by no means prevents us from attempting to stop similar things happening in the future. It does not by any means release us from the obligation to make our views more generally known. Above all, it does not, in my submission, mean that we approve, step by step, of every action that has been taken. I feel on the case presented to the House, which is the only evidence I have to go on, that very likely it was a mistake to bomb this power station which happened to be near the frontier at this particular time when truce negotiations are proceeding.
But that having been done, the overwhelming case, in my view, lies with the United Nations, and with the Americans, on the side of freedom and order, and not with those who are either conducting this war for which they are responsible for starting in the Far East, or with those who are prepared to make this war an excuse for sowing disunity among the nations upon whom the hope of this world rests.

5.47 p.m.

Mr. Christopher Hollis: I hope the hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland (Mr. Grimond) will take it rather as a compliment if I do not follow him in detail, because I was largely in agreement with the argument he deployed though I shall have some passing references to make to one or two things he said.
I wish to return to an earlier speech, that of the right hon. Member for Ebbw


Vale (Mr. Bevan), who I am sorry to see is no longer in his place. I do not think he can ever have made a more unhappy less satisfactory and more embarrassed speech than he made this afternoon. The difficulty he was in, of course, was that he wished to attack the policy of this Government and at the same time, if not to defend the policy of the late Government, at least to make a passable pretence that he agreed with things that he pretended to agree with some two or three years ago when he still held office.
Therefore, he pretended that there was a radical difference between the policies of the two Governments on the ground that the United States was now showing itself the defender of Chiang Kai-shek, and seeking for what he called an opportunity for counter-revolutionary action. Whatever the rights and wrongs of the policy of the American Government towards Chiang Kai-shek, the American Government, as everybody knows, made that declaration about its Formosan policy at the very moment when the North Korean invasion took place, and long before the right hon. Gentleman thought it necessary to sever his connection with the late Government.

Mr. George Wigg: If the hon. Gentleman intends to attack my right hon. Friend, I hope he will attack him where he needs to be attacked. My right hon. Friend did not make his case on the difference of opinion with the present Government on the ground the hon. Gentleman has said. What he said— as I understood him, anyway—was that at the point at which the Americans decided to ask the authority of the Chiefs-of-Staff for bombing the hydro-electric plant on the Yalu River there was a change in policy.

Mr. Hollis: Our time is limited, and if the hon. Gentleman can wait I was coming to that point. I can only talk about one point at a time. The right hon. Member for Ebbw Vale started by making this general remark about American policy. It is perfectly true, as the hon. Member for Dudley (Mr. Wigg) has said, that he came on to this subsequent quotation of the United Nations declaration in 1950 that it was their policy to keep the Chinese Korean frontier inviolate. If it had been the policy of the Governments of the United Nations now

to attack the frontier just for the fun of attacking it, I agree that would have argued a very great change in policy.
But surely the change which has taken place between 1950 and now is not a change in the policy of the United Nations in the first instance, but the fact that whilst these truce negotiations are going on the Communist forces have seen fit to use these power stations as part of their defence scheme for building up a vast army of which there is the great danger that it may fall upon our forces and I cannot think that the soldiers in Korea would be grateful to the right hon. Gentleman if they learned that he advocates a policy in which we should do nothing at all to defend them until they have already been killed.
The right hon. Gentleman put forward his policy which was that there should be a political solution of the problem. I do not think that that is entirely original, although the right hon. Gentleman seemed to think that it was so, and he thought that it was desirable that the fighting, in the first instance, should come to an end. We all think it desirable that the fighting should come to an end if that can be managed, and for that reason truce negotiations have been going on and are still going on and, difficult though they are, the difficulties are not on the side of the United Nations.
The right hon. Gentleman went on to say that a political solution is available and it was available, he argued, if we could persuade the Americans to accept the Chinese revolution, allow the Chinese Communist Government to join the Security Council and get the Americans to repudiate Chiang Kai-shek. There is something to be said for our urging the Americans to do all these things. They are debatable points, but there is not one shred or tittle of evidence that if they did them that would bring the Korean war to an end.

Mr. S. Silverman: I hesitate, in view of the Congrevian inhibitions against doing so, but I think it might be of assistance to the hon. Gentleman if I remind him that in September, 1950, there were very active negotiations going on, and they looked at that time like being very profitable negotiations, for a political settlement of the whole matter at a meeting of the Security Council in New York, at which there were, in fact, Chinese


representatives. Those negotiations broke down completely and wholly, and, I think I am right in saying, solely because of the American refusal to recognise the Government with which it wished to negotiate.

Mr. Hollis: If I may add to the hon Gentleman's literary repertoire the names not only of Congreve but also of St. Thomas Aquinas, I would say that what is asserted without evidence can be denied without evidence. He has raised an entirely different point which is quite irrelevant. I am extremely doubtful if these negotiations did break down on that point alone.
We all know, without debating or assessing the force of it, that there has been a vast active revolutionary Chinese policy throughout the Far East, but because that negotiation was said to break down on that one point, that does not mean to say that it did so of fact. What happened to Mr. Nehru's negotiations then at any rate has nothing to do with this particular point of truce negotiations at this moment. I think that the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs dealt with that point very competently the other day when we had a debate about the United Nations special organisations, and I think that there is nothing more to be said about it, except that the right hon. Member for Ebbw Vale amused himself by making up this case for which there is not the slightest evidence.
There are three different propositions which we have to consider this evening. The first is whether this country should have more say than it does have in the affairs of Korea; secondly, whether this particular action of bombing these power plants was justified, and, thirdly, the general question of what are our objectives in Korea and how we hope to attain them.
I think that we should get our minds clearer if we try to separate these points from one another. As to the first point, I think that there is little to add to what the Foreign Secretary has already stated. I, for my part, am certainly strongly in favour of our being consulted as much as we possibly can be consulted so long as our troops are involved, but, on the other hand, I see clearly the difficulty which the right hon. Gentleman pointed out

when the Americans have by far the greatest commitments there.
I agree that it is to be regretted that we were apparently not consulted over these particular incidents; and, as for the complaint of the hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland (Mr. Grimond) that the Foreign Secretary did not tell us the precise details of how we hope to be more effectively consulted in the future, I presume, although I am not in any Cabinet secrets, that the answer is that it is only a matter of courtesy to wait until the Minister of Defence and perhaps the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs have recovered their breath and recovered from their air sickness before we ask them to tell us what success, if any, they have had in negotiations on that point. I am strongly in hope that we shall get the maximum consultation that we can.
On the point as to whether this particular action was justified from a military point of view, I do not think that there can be any argument but that it was amply justified. The Leader of the Opposition condemned it on the grounds that it had brought us nearer to a conflagration and that it was a mistake in psychology. It is anybody's guess how these things will turn out. My guess would be that such actions will make a truce rather more probable than less probable. As long as the situation is that the Chinese are allowed to build up forces without anything happening to them, they have every motive for spinning out the negotiations for a hundred years, and I think that this will have increased the probability of a truce.
I think that what is important, and about which I am more disturbed, is the larger background—about what are our objectives in Korea and how we hope to attain them. It is clear today what we are fighting against, but it is, unfortunately, a great deal less clear what we are fighting for. It is perfectly clear that we are fighting against an active act of aggression.
Between the wars there were many people who made speeches about collective security, but when acts of aggression took place nothing was done, and so, when two years ago, we heard that the Communist North Korean forces had crossed the parallel there were very few people in this country who did not agree with the right hon. Gentleman the Mem-


ber for Lewisham, South (Mr. H. Morrison) when he pointed the contrast between the action taken now and the actions taken in the years before the war and claimed that the new policy would vindicate the principles of collective security and show to the world that aggression did not pay.
We supported that action not because most of us knew very much about Korea but because we told one another that this would vindicate a general principle and as a result there would not be acts of aggression elsewhere in the world, and the peace of the world would be brought more nearly to salvation. Most of us, I think, were very ignorant—I was myself until I met a very well-informed person that evening—of what was the military situation in Korea. We thought that the action would be a great deal easier than in fact it has proved to be. We thought that it would be something of the nature of a police action—something like a policeman arresting a criminal. As we know, it turned out to be far from that. It turned out, to begin with, that we could only liberate the South Koreans by a long war, and that to liberate a victim of aggression is a very different thing from merely defending him.
The battle ebbed to and fro up and down the peninsula, and then it was all complicated by the Chinese intervention, and people found it very difficult to see whence a solution could come. When the suggestion was made that there should be truce talks and there seemed hopes that we should be able to obtain a truce on honourable terms, which would, at any rate, prevent the force of aggression from remaining in possession of any territory which they had won as a result of aggression, everybody was delighted.
The first hopes were that the truce would be concluded comparatively easily. But it has not happened like that. The truce negotiations have petered along in this intolerable fashion until nobody can feel any great confidence in the sincerity of the Communist talkers and there is fear that they are playing for time in order to turn a bad military situation into a good one.
The Leader of the Opposition and others have talked about there being merely the one point of the prisoners standing between us and a truce. If we could feel confident that that was so most

of us would feel inclined to add a compromise over the prisoners to the compromises we have made on other points; but can we feel any confidence that that is so? Are we not bound to fear that if we compromised about the prisoners some new difficulty would arise and that there really is no basis for the hopes of a truce?
In Southern Korea there are increasingly disturbing revelations about the nature of the regime which we are defending. When the attack first took place some people criticised President Syngman Rhee's regime, but most of us agreed with the argument used by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Lewisham, South. He said, in effect, that it might not be a perfectly good regime but it was one elected under the supervision of the United Nations and presumably it could be changed and there could be another election if the regime was unsatisfactory. He said that it was not our business to say whether it was the best government possible. His view was that it was at least a free government and we should defend it against aggression.
That seemed a reasonable attitude, but now we find that President Syngman Rhee is apparently prepared to violate his own constitution, and our situation is a great deal more difficult. I do not entirely accept the criticisms about foreign statesmen with whom we have to work which sometimes come from the Opposition Benches, for they are occasionally difficult to reconcile with each other. Apparently when Dr. Adenauer does not wish to take the suffrage of his electorate that proves he is a very wicked man and a Fascist, though when President Syngman Rhee wants to take the suffrage of his electorate that also proves that he is a wicked man and a Fascist. What they are supposed to do I do not know.
The Foreign Secretary told us at Question time the other day that considerable Communist guerilla activities are taking place behind the lines in South Korea and that the military forces last April made over to the civil forces the responsibility for dealing with Communist guerilla forces. It is disturbing that that responsibility should be put on President Syngman Rhee and it is disturbing that he is apparently not dealing with it with too great competence. The situation we


must confess, is a confused one and it is not very easy to answer in clear language what it is we are fighting for, and it is still less easy to say in clear language how it is we propose to attain what we are fighting for. There is reluctance to extend the fighting if we can possibly avoid it, and there is the difficulty of seeing how we can win without extending the fighting.
The hon. Member for South Ayshire (Mr. Emrys Hughes) would simply cut the cackle and take the troops away. That is a point of view, but those who are not prepared to take that point of view, whether on this side of the House or the other side, have a very grave responsibility, if they are going to ask British troops to remain there long with the troops of other nations, to provide them with conditions in which they have a reasonable hope of survival and a reasonable chance of victory.
If it were merely a question of Korea doubtless there would be a very great deal to be said for the argument of merely evacuating the country, but it is by no means merely a question of Korea. This was put before the world as a test case of the virtues of collective security. Just as it would have been a test case of the virtues of collective security if it had been easily successful, so obviously it will be a test case of its virtues in the reverse situation. If the whole expedition should prove a failure and we should evacuate Korea, in the Far East particularly and all over the world people would decide that the machinery of collective security was incompetent and it was no good to rely upon it, and that the Communist ticket was the winning ticket and that they must make such terms as they could with the Communists. No one can doubt that, apart from the Korean consequences, the whole world consequences would be disastrous.
On the balance of the arguments—I do not think this is seriously disputed in the House—we are certainly compelled to go on with the Korean campaign, and if we are compelled to go on with it, we are also compelled to win it. I wish I had a very much clearer impression than I have of the views of Her Majesty's Government about how we are to win it. There seems to be a great danger at present that the truce talks will be bogged

down and we shall enter into a "Hundred Years' War." We must have some scheme for bringing the war to an end. If we can have a truce in the immediate future, that will be the best method. If we can bring the war to an end without extending the warfare, that will be very good.
But I should not talk too much about not extending the warfare. Who can tell what we shall be compelled to do? Although we do not want to extend it, there is no point in telling the Chinese that, whatever they do, we shall no nothing in return, for nothing is less likely to make them reasonable. I should say comparatively little to the Chinese about what we will not do to them, for that will not help us win the war.

6.8 p.m.

Mr. Sydney Silverman: The hon. Member for Devizes (Mr. Hollis), in replying to what I intended to be a helpful intervention, referred to St. Thomas Aquinas. I never understood how many angels could dance on the point of a needle, nor why anybody wanted to find out.
I should have followed the hon. Gentleman's argument with much greater sympathy if his speech had consisted only of its third portion in which he dealt— I thought, very conscientiously and honestly—with the important question: What do we want out of this war and how do we propose to get it? I wonder whether the hon. Gentleman will think it malicious or impudent if I suggest that no nation in the world and nobody in it, has the right to support for a single moment any modern war with modern weapons, with all that modern war with modern weapons involves, unless he has a very clear idea indeed of what it is that he is fighting for, unless he is very sure that what he is fighting for is worth what the world is paying for it, and unless he is satisfied that it can be done in no other way.
When the hon. Gentleman says, "I do not know what we want out of the war, I have no idea how we are going to get it, and because I do not know and because I have no idea we should, therefore, go on fighting and make sure that we win"——

Mr. Hollis: The hon. Gentleman puts in the word "because." What I said


was that I hope to be told clearly by the Government what the position was, but to say that because I have no idea therefore we should go on fighting, is an entire travesty of my argument.

Mr. Silverman: I extend my humble apologies to the hon. Gentleman and withdraw. He said that he did not know what he wanted out of the war, and he did not know how to get it. He said that we ought to go on with it, and I inferred that he was implying some connection between those three statements. If he says that he was throwing them out as an intelligent contribution to the debate he is entitled to do so, but it still remains true that the hon. Gentleman does not know what he wants and does not know how to get it, but is in favour, nevertheless—not "because"—of going on with the war and making sure that we win it. I say that that, in a world sense, is an immoral and asocial point of view.
At the beginning of June, 1950, with great reluctance I admit, I supported the then Government in their declaration that they would accept the decision of the Security Council and intervene in South Korea to repel what was held up to be an established act of unprovoked aggression. That was a very definite objective. On the resolution of the Security Council we knew what we wanted. We knew, on that resolution, that the case for it had been established. It was part of the whole basis on which the United Nations was organised—that aggression should be prevented if it were committed by one nation against another by the collective action of all the rest.
I have come to think since—and I believe I am not alone in so thinking— that the facts on which the Security Council based that resolution were certainly incomplete, and possibly in some respects fraudulent, and that the whole action that was founded on it was based on a deliberate attempt to deceive.

Mr. W. Nally: That is possibly one of the most important things that will be said in this debate, and we must have no misunderstanding about it. As my hon. Friend says, he speaks for a number of other of my hon. Friends——

Mr. Silverman: No, only for myself.

Mr. Nally: —and he is saying, in effect, that he is now revising his judgment and

that he regards the original decision of the Security Council as having been wrongly conceived, because the evidence before it on subsequent examination has proved not to have been justified, and that the war going on in Korea is wrong, that it was wrong at the beginning and is wrong now, and it ought to be ended now.

Mr. Silverman: I am not going to attempt to anticipate what the verdict of history may be upon that war.

Mr. Nally: It is my hon. Friend's verdict we want, not history's.

Mr. Silverman: I cannot anticipate it, because I do not know.
What I am saying—and I am sure my hon. Friend will accept it as a fair and honest answer to his question—is that I thought in June, 1950, that the facts were clear and established. Today, I do not know whether the facts are clear and established, and what was clear then seems to be unclear now. I think what has been established since is that a number of important facts that were relevant to that decision were deliberately withheld from the Security Council. I think that that has been established, but I do not want to go into it at this stage.

Mr. Arthur Holt: But the hon. Member should give the Committee some of these facts.

Mr. Silverman: I do not want to be led into that aspect of the matter at this stage, but since this question has been mentioned I have to explain my reluctance to deal with it. I do not think that this is an occasion for an analysis of the reasons for the start of this war. What the people in this country and all over the world are interested in at this moment is not how it started, but how to stop it. Since the hon. Member asks for some of the facts which I have in mind I will mention just one, and I beg him not to press me again on this question at this stage.
The one I would mention is this. The Security Council, this House and the world were all led to believe that the facts which established the unprovoked aggression by the North Koreans were facts established by a United Nations Commission on the spot. It is now known—and I think it is not in controversy at all—that that was not the case,


that the United Nations Commission on the spot—indeed, the first telegram on the whole matter rested on this—never purported to be doing anything more than to detail to the Security Council what the Syngman Rhee Government had told them, which is a very different thing. [HON. MEMBERS: "No."] Certainly, that is so.
I apologise for increasing the length of my speech by speaking on this subject but I was pressed about it, and I hope no one will grumble if my speech is a little longer now. I did not want to deal with it, and I was dealing, when I was interrupted, with the point made by the hon. Member for Devizes, which is a good point.
It may well be true, and I still think it is true, that peace in the world, unfortunately, cannot be established by pure pacifism; I wish it could; but it could be established by the genuine rule of law, and by a genuine collective system acting without political prejudice or taking ideological sides, but acting only to prevent aggression by anybody upon anybody, with the knowledge that no single nation however mighty, will ever be strong enough to withstand the combined might of all the others.
That is where we started. Provided that the facts had been right—and I do not question them for this purpose; I have indicated my own doubts about them— I suppose that the House was right in its virtual unanimous decision to support the United Nations in the war. I have always held, and I think it is now clear beyond further argument, that the moral validity of the United Nations' action was wantonly cast away when the limited objective for which we had entered the conflict, namely, the repression of aggression, had succeeded and the aggressors, if they were aggressors, forced back beyond the 38th Parallel.
All our troubles today and all those difficulties with which the Foreign Secretary was concerned in his speech today would not have arisen—he may not altogether agree with this, though I suspect that at times he has his own doubts about it—if we had not gone beyond the Parallel in September, 1950. Many of the difficulties with which we are confronted today arise directly out of, and are indissolubly connected with, our

going beyond the objective which we knew, and entering a realm where, as the hon. Member for Devizes quite rightly said, we do not know where we are going what we want, or how to get it.
What is the relevance of that to the present situation? My right hon. Friend the Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. Bevan) said that, ultimately, we could not deal with this situation except by a political solution and that we had to deal with the political issues before we could get peace either here or in the Far East. I am sure that he is right about that. I do not want to be mischievous, but I remember that in July, 1950, some 22 of my hon. Friends joined with me—my right hon. Friend was not one of them because he was at that time a Member of the Government—in putting down a Motion about Korea. It contained the suggestion that my right hon. Friend was making this afternoon, that we had to deal with the political issues and get them settled. Curiously enough, it contained precisely the five points which my right hon. Friend recommended to our consideration this afternoon.
I see my hon. Friend the Member for Devonport (Mr. Foot) sitting behind me. Again, without wishing to be mischievous. I remember that I was bitterly attacked for having put that Motion down in an editorial article in "Tribune." I am bound to add that, with its usual courtesy and generosity, it offered me immediate space to reply to the article, and I availed myself of the offer.
If we are having a very limited action, which was then described as a mere police action—the hon. Member for Devizes said that he hoped it was correctly so described—in order to defeat and to repel an act of aggression which, if it had been allowed to go unrepelled must necessarily have involved the peace of the world, then we have to accept certain political and military limitations upon what we are entitled to do. It is not true that the collective action of the United Nations, in a military sense, has ever been as uninhibited as the action of any single nation or of any ordinary orthodox alliance of nations engaged in a war.
Otherwise, we would have the paradox that collective security, agreed to by the majority of the nations of the world in order to prevent war, would have become


merely a system to make certain that every act of hostility was immediately converted into a world war. Instead of being a weapon for the avoidance of war it would become a weapon for the extension of war. That is why those limitations were placed expressly by resolution of the United Nations upon the things that we were entitled to do.
One of the things excluded was an attack, any attack, upon this zone in North Korea which had industrial and other importance for Manchuria, and, indeed, for Siberia, too. It was the violation of that which brought China into the war in the first place. It must be remembered, when we now talk about China committing acts of aggression, and about the resolution branding them as aggressors and about not admitting them into the United Nations because they are acting otherwise than in accordance with its principles, that they did not come into the struggle at all until we had violated the very limitation which, by the United Nations' own declaration, we had no right to violate.

Mr. F. Maclean: To what declaration is the hon. Gentleman referring?

Mr. Silverman: To the resolution of the United Nations which was quoted in detail by my right hon. Friend the Member for Ebbw Vale.

Mr. Maclean: Why not quote it accurately?

Mr. Silverman: I do not think it was quoted inaccurately.

Mr. Maclean: What was the date of it?

Mr. Silverman: The hon. Gentleman is always intervening in debates about foreign affairs, and I am not complaining. About this particular matter he made an intervention yesterday which brought a well-deserved rebuke from his own leader. If the hon. Gentleman is going to take part in debates of this kind he ought to equip himself with a basic minimum knowledge of essential facts instead of interrupting other people's speeches in order to find them out.

Mr. F. M. Bennett: I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for the courtesy of letting me make an intervention in his speech. What is the

evidence on which he bases his assertion that the Chinese would not have invaded North Korea when they did? I am asking it as a military matter. Is he seriously suggesting that a military offensive, with the number of men and material that were engaged, was only arranged and brought into effect so as to arrive simultaneously with our going over the frontier? Must it not have been the result of weeks and months of preparation?

Mr. Silverman: I will answer the hon. Gentleman's intervention briefly, though to do so will inevitably lengthen my speech. These are among the basic, elementary facts that hon. Members of the House, called upon to express a responsible judgment about matters that might involve the final fate of civilisation and of mankind itself, ought really to have inquired into.

Mr. Godfrey Nicholson: The hon. Gentleman makes many assumptions.

Mr. Silverman: I am not making any assumptions at all. I am stating well-known facts. [An HON. MEMBER: "How do you know?"] It may be that some hon. Gentlemen opposite assume that everybody who speaks on our side is lying. If they make that assumption, then the answer is that I do not know at all. The evidence I am relying on is the repeated declarations of the Chinese Government itself, prior to the intervention. The evidence does not rest only on their declarations.
It rests on the fact that they were not in the original attack in South Korea. It rests on the fact that they did not intervene when we crossed the 38th Parallel and on the fact that they did not intervene until we got actually to this area which we had declared, by resolution of the United Nations' Security Council, we would not enter. At that point they did intervene, and they drove us back.
The hon. Member opposite who interrupted me asked whether I thought they could have done that without prior preparation. I think no such thing. Of course, there must have been considerable prior preparation when they saw what was happening, and having regard to the fact that when the Japanese invaded Manchuria so long ago, with all that that involved for the history of the world, they


did it exactly through this Korean Peninsula.
The Chinese would have been guilty of great negligence to their own people if they had not been prepared for anything of the kind happening. They intervened, and they drove us back, and we went back; and they sent our prisoners of war home, released them. They withdrew their forces back beyond their own frontier. But we were not satisfied. We misinterpreted their withdrawal. We said, '"Oh, they were only making a gesture, they did not mean business." So we went back again, right to this point, and then they came in and stayed in.
This makes a formidable case in favour of the proposition that I put before the Committee: that but for our violation, not merely of what was right and proper, but of what we ourselves had declared to be the limitations upon our actions, the Chinese would never have been in the war at all.

Brigadier Terence Clarke: Assuming that we were wrong—I do not assume that, but the hon. Gentleman was rather assuming it—does he suggest that two wrongs make a right? If we merely approach a border does he suggest that the enemy are right in coming over the border? As one of the other side of the Committee, I suppose he supports that argument?

Mr. Silverman: I am only saying—and I commend it seriously to the attention of the hon. and gallant Member, who is a distinguished and loyal soldier—that they did nothing in those circumstances which any other nation in the world, including ourselves, and the hon. and gallant Gentleman, would not have done in the same circumstances.

Brigadier Clarke: Brigadier Clarke indicated dissent.

Mr. Silverman: They violated the frontier as we had violated the 38th Parallel.

Brigadier Clarke: No.

Mr. Silverman: The hon. and gallant Gentleman cannot have it both ways. One of the troubles in all this is that the United Nations have been endeavouring throughout to have it both ways. They have been endeavouring to say at one and the same moment that China ought to hold herself bound by the whole system

of collective action, submerging to a certain extent her own sovereign right to determine her action and to act according to international law, merging that in the collective action of a number of nations united in the United Nations organisation. We have been asking them for two years to act as if they were bound by that proposition and, at the same time, have been refusing to admit them into the collective organisation by which we hold that they ought to be bound.

Mr. J. McGovern: May I ask a question?

Mr. Silverman: If my hon. Friend does not mind how long I am on my feet.

Mr. McGovem: My hon. Friend makes a great deal of play of the fact that China would not have entered the war unless certain things had happened, including our violation of the frontier. Does he seriously believe that when the war began in Korea the Manchurians, the Chinese and the Russians were not backing North Korea in the attack?

Mr. Silverman: My hon. Friend is tempting me into a much wider field than would be in order and I will not follow him. [HON. MEMBERS: "Go on."] Do not say that; I can easily be provoked into doing so. The point is that China was exercising in its own discretion, in its own right as a sovereign Power in international law, in its own interests, the right to protect the power stations without which the whole of Manchuria could not live, and only protecting them in the area which the United Nations itself have said it would not attack.

Mr. F. Maclean: Mr. F. Macleanrose——

Mr. Silverman: No, I think the Committee will acquit me of being reluctant to give way. I have been on my feet a long time and even my speech must come to an end at some time.

Mr. Maclean: The hon. Gentleman has been very rude—

The Deputy-Chairman (Mr. Hopkin Morris): Order, order. It is undesirable that there should be all these interruptions of a speech. Many hon. Members want to take part in the debate and it


is much more satisfactory that hon. Members should make their own speeches when they are called.

Mr. Silverman: I was dealing with the question of whether the Chinese would have intervened and the point I was making was that the United Nations, by its resolution, had deliberately exempted from the area of operations these areas precisely in order to do everything in its power to localise the conflict and to prevent it from becoming world wide or even being extended in the Far East.
This brings me to the point in the speech of the Foreign Secretary with which I want to deal. I am sorry that the right hon. Gentleman thought there was anything improper in my intervention. It was not intended, and if it embarrassed him in any way I am sorry. However, I judged from his reactions that he was not quite so embarrassed as he would have liked the Committee to believe. What he was saying was that these were military targets, that they were, therefore, legitimate objectives, and in view of their importance to the enemy and in view of their danger to us, nothing could be said against attacking them.
But they had been there all the two years. They had been there all the time since the Chinese intervention. They had been there all the 10 months of the armistice negotiations. They were there at the time of the United Nations resolution to which I have referred repeatedly. All the considerations that the Foreign Secretary advanced have always been part of the argument. They did not arise yesterday or last week or last month. They have been part of the struggle since the beginning of the conflict. Yet, in spite of that, we did not attack until two days ago.
The question which the right hon. Gentleman has conspicuously failed to answer is why, having failed to attack such legitimate military objectives for the whole of the two years, and at times when it must have been very tempting in view of our military fortunes to attack them, we should now have thought it proper to attack them at a moment when only one point, and a small point, and a point on which there is considerable doubt whether we are right, prevents the signing of an immediate armistice. [HON. MEMBERS: "No."] But the right hon. Gentleman did say so.
There is no doubt that this attack took place for the first time when we were on the eve—but for one point which the right hon. Gentleman told the House he was hoping to see solved—of an armistice. That moment was chosen for the attack on these excluded areas and excluded objectives. Surely this is a change of policy and a change of policy at the wrong time and a change of policy from the right policy to the wrong policy; and it is done without any consultation.
The right hon. Gentleman says he regrets the lack of consultation and then he goes on to say, "Nevertheless we support it." The right hon. Gentleman grumbles because one intervenes to ask, "If you regret a thing why do you support it?" He explains, after rather indignantly protesting against being asked such a question at all, that when he said he supported it, he did not mean that it was right, he only meant that since it had been done it was better not to quarrel about it now. This seems to me to be the most perilous statement I have ever heard a Foreign Secretary make.
That is saying to our Allies in the United States of America, "We would rather that you consulted us. We regret it when you do not. But if you do not consult us and if you then do something of which we do not approve, even though the result of that may be to land us in a world war which we are all trying to prevent, nevertheless rather than quarrel with you we will support you." That is exaotly what the Foreign Secretary said. [HON. MEMBERS: "No."] That is exactly what he said—"We support it because it has happened and because we do not want to quarrel with our Allies."
Suppose that after the result of the impending United States Presidential election General MacArthur should become Secretary of State, and suppose that he retains the view which he held at the time when he was dismissed, and suppose that he then, without consulting us and relying upon our loyalty to support him in whatever he does afterwards, extends the war into Manchuria or into Siberia or anywhere else. Is the Foreign Secretary saying that rather than have any row about it, we will support such action?
There were no limitations on the right hon. Gentleman's statement this afternoon. He said, "We must support this because it happened. I am sorry that


they did not ask us first." That is a very dangerous thing. If the Foreign Secretary did not mean to go so far— and I suspect he could not possibly have meant to go so far—I hope that, in the interests of our relations with the United States of America, whoever replies for the Government at the end of the debate will take very great care to see that the necessary limitations upon that unlimited statement are quite clearly made.
It seems to me that no one could have supposed that to take this moment to do a thing which, by reason of its peril, we had avoided doing for two years, was really doing it in the interests of limiting the conflict. Some of us suspect that it was done for much more irrelevant considerations not altogether divorced from the fact that a Presidential election is going on in the United States of America.
I hope that my right hon. and hon. Friends on this side, in view of the speech by the Foreign Secretary and by the general impression that was to be derived from it—not merely that we will never quarrel with whatever is done, as long as it is done first and we are faced with a fait accompli; and, secondly, that there was nothing very seriously wrong in making this attack at this time—will vote very clearly and strongly against the Government at the end of the debate tonight.

6.44 p.m.

Mr. Fitzroy Maclean: I am glad to follow the hon. Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. S. Silverman) in order to clear up the point which I wanted to clear up while he was speaking but when he was not so accommodating as to give way.

Mr. S. Silverman: I gave way several times.

Mr. Maclean: The hon. Member did not give way to me and he did not answer the specific question. All that I wanted to ask him was the date of the resolution to which he and his right hon. Friend the Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. Bevan) referred. It is very important.

Mr. Silverman: It may save the hon. Member some time if I tell him that the date was 30th November, 1950.

Mr. Maclean: If that is the resolution to which the hon. Member was referring, I do not think it can be regarded as

binding on us or on anyone else. In the first place, it was a draft resolution. Secondly, it was vetoed by the Soviet Union.

Mr. Silverman: Mr. Silvermanrose——

Mr. Maclean: I am very sorry. I want to go on. There is very little time.

Mr. Silverman: The hon. Member refuses to give way because he knows that that explanation is really a deliberate swindle.

Mr. Maclean: I suspected that there was a swindle when the hon. Member did not give way—I could not attribute his refusal to give way entirely to bad manners.
In this debate there are two main questions to be considered. The first is whether it would be a good thing if the United Nations Commander had informed us of his intention to carry out this large-scale bombing. Even though the United Nations Commander had the authority to carry out such an operation without prior consultation, it seems to me a pity, as my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary intimated at the beginning of the debate, that we were not informed, especially when there were so many opportunities for us to be told. I hope that this debate, which I welcome, will lead to improved liaison and that better arrangements for keeping us and the other Governments concerned informed will be made. If it secures that, our time will not have been wasted.
That, however, is not the real issue that we are discussing.' The basic issue is whether the decision to carry out this particular bombing raid was right. I must say I have been very much surprised by the attitude of some hon. Members opposite yesterday and today on this issue. I am convinced that they want peace; I am convinced that everybody in the Committee wants peace. Why should anybody want war, especially anybody who has had any experience of it? But I cannot help feeling that hon. Members on the other side have been so carried away by their detestation of hostilities and warfare that they have forgotten why we are in Korea at all. And, I cannot feel that the remarks of the hon. Member for Nelson and Colne have helped very much to clear up that particular issue.
We are in Korea thanks to a very courageous decision which was taken by the last Government. I think they deserve the highest credit for having so promptly taken the decision to follow the lead given to them by the United States. We are there in order to halt aggression and to support collective security. That is why we are there today, in spite of what anybody says. And that is why this bombing raid on power installations in North Korea has been carried out.
If we accept that aggression is an evil and that it has got to stop, then we must accept the means of stopping it—and strategic bombing is one of them. That, no doubt, is why the Leader of the Opposition, when he was in office agreed in certain eventualities to bomb targets not only south of the frontier, but even, in certain cases, north of the Chinese frontier.

Mr. Attlee: Aerodromes.

Mr. Maclean: I maintain that a hydroelectric installation is as good a military target as an aerodrome.

Mr. Attlee: That may be so, but if
the hon. Member was quoting what the decision of the Government was, it related to the specific case of large-scale attacks by the enemy air force from airfields in Manchuria and that those airfields might be bombed. I am not quarrelling with the hon. Member, but as a matter of fact that was the decision.

Mr. Maclean: I am most grateful to the right hon. Gentleman. I was using this example to illustrate that if one is trying to put down aggression one has to take these decisions, and I was giving that as an instance of a decision, again a very courageous one if I may say so, which was taken by the late Government. We cannot go into these things with one hand tied behind our backs. As the hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland (Mr. Grimond) said, by the restraint they have imposed upon themselves up to now the United Nations Forces in Korea have undoubtedly run the risk of incurring additional casualties which they would not otherwise have run.
Some hon. Members opposite take the line that these raids cause frightful destruction, that they go very near the Chinese border, and that they are therefore very likely to upset the Chinese and

the North Koreans. I must say, I hope these raids will upset them. That is what bombing is for. It is meant to upset people. It is meant to make them think twice whether aggression pays, whether it is worth committing further acts of aggression or worth going on with an act of aggression already committed. That is why we bombed the Germans and the Italians and the Japanese.
What I cannot understand is that hon. Members opposite grasped this principle then, when it was a question of dealing with Fascist aggressors, but cannot grasp it now when Communist aggressors are involved. I think there were some who did not grasp that in order to punish aggression one had to have armed forces.

Mr. Michael Foot (Plymouth, Devon-port): Is the hon. Member now repudiating the whole policy of a limited war, which hitherto has been supported by both sides, and trying to substitute the policy of unconditional surrender, which we assumed in respect of the last war?

Mr. Maclean: I am not repudiating anything of the sort. All I am saying is that if you want to stop aggression you have to accept the means of stopping it. The specific point I was trying to make was that many hon. Members, including the hon. Member for Devonport (Mr. Foot), were extremely censorious in 1938 and 1939 about the policy of appeasement which was followed by the then Government. I am not going into the merits or demerits of that now, but if they felt that way about aggression then, why do they feel differently about it when it is committed by a Communist country?
Hon. Members opposite have advanced another argument. They say that this bombing may upset the truce talks. If that were true, it would be very much more serious. If it were going to prolong hostilities, I do not think anyone would want it. But I am not for the moment convinced that it is going to have that effect and that it will aggravate the situation. What has been happening is that the Chinese Communists, for nearly a year, for a considerable portion of which the late Government were in power, have been spinning out these negotiations on one pretext or another.
As the Foreign Secretary said when he spoke just now, we have made one concession after another and always the


other side have found some reason for not coming to agreement. As we have accepted one stipulation, they have thought of something else. And that has gone on until it is only natural that one should begin to assume that they are doing it for some ulterior motive. That assumption is very much strengthened by the fact that during the whole of this time they have been building up their forces in Korea and Manchuria on a most enormous scale. [An HON. MEMBER: "So have we."] Not to the same extent.

Mr. Foot: The hon. Member says we have not been building up on a comparable scale. How is it possible, then, for the Foreign Secretary to inform us today that the military report brought back by the Minister of Defence is very reassuring?

Mr. Maclean: It is reassuring because we have air superiority, amongst other things, and because we are now prepared to use it. But the fact remains that they have built up on a very much larger scale than we have and started doing so much sooner. Now, one cannot let them go on indefinitely. There is every reason to suppose that they are doing this because they want, at some moment most convenient to themselves, to launch another offensive with all this accumulated strength. It would not be fair to our troops in Korea to let them do that with impunity.

Mr. S. Silverman: Mr. S. Silvermanrose——

Mr. Maclean: I am sorry, I cannot give way; we have only a minute or two to go.
I do not know for certain whether I am right about this or not; I lay no claim to infallibility. But it seems to me, and I have had a certain amount to do with Communists of one kind and another in my time, that a display of strength at present is more likely to discourage further aggression and accelerate the conclusion of an armistice than any amount of appeasement. We shall see what happens. We shall see whether the bombing attacks produce the results which hon. Members opposite have said

they will and whether they do immediately aggravate the situation or do not; whether there is now a large offensive or whether it is nipped in the bud.
But one thing we have learned from past experience is that strength is the only thing these aggressors, whether Fascist or Communist, can understand, the only thing that will deter them. That, after all, is why we are re-arming. We are not re-arming because we want war. We are re-arming because we want peace. And I should have thought there was a certain amount of agreement in the Committee on that issue. That is why I welcome the resolute action which has been taken by General Clark, although I must say that I deplore the fact that he did not inform us of his intentions in advance.

6.59 p.m.

Mr. W. Nally: I think that on both sides of the Committee it is obvious from the speech of the hon. Member for Lancaster (Mr. F. Maclean) and from the speech which preceded it on this side of the Committee, that whatever may be the difference between us— whether this difference be horizontal or vertical—there is a feeling of sadness and sorrow that it should be even necessary to hold this debate at this time, to hold it in special circumstances in which we lack a great deal of information, but to hold it because there is on both sides of the Committee a sense of grievous disquiet about some recent happenings, particularly the happenings of the past three days in Korea.
I am fully conscious that there are many other hon. Members who want to speak, but I invite the Committee to consider the background of this matter. There really must be no misunderstanding—

It being Seven o'clock,The DEPUTY-CHAIRMAN left the Chair, further Proceeding standing postponed until after the consideration of Private Business set down by direction ofThe CHAIRMAN OF WAYS AND MEANS under Standing Order No. 7.(Time for taking Private Business.)

Mr. SPEAKER resumed the Chair.

Orders of the Day — ESSEX COUNTY COUNCIL BILL (By Order)

As amended, considered.

Part XIV.—(SUPPLY OF HEAT BY DAGENHAM CORPORATION.)

7.1 p.m.

Sir Herbert Williams: I beg to move, in page 110, line 31, to leave out Part XIV.
I think it would be for the convenience of the House if we considered at the same time the next Bill—Preston Corporation Bill—because although one is in the stage of consideration and the other is down for Second Reading the object of my hon. Friends and I is to have a general debate on something which is common to both. My action is not intended as an attack on the Bill, and there is no desire to vote against either Bill, but for a long time we have been seeking an opportunity of debating the development of a new public utility.
I expect that those who report our proceedings and listen to them may be a little surprised at the procedure whereby we suddenly jump from the banks of the Yalu River to the banks of the River Thames. It is not my fault that this debate has interrupted the debate on Korea, but it may be that if we spend a little time on district heating it might help to reduce the temperature over Korea.
District heating is a relatively new development in this country. It might be said that central heating is a form of district heating, but district heating as we understand it means the supplying of heat from a central source to a large number of houses or flats. That is something quite different from what we understand by central heating. Last year we were hoping to have a debate on this subject on the Bill promoted by the Aycliffe New Town Corporation. Their Bill related solely to district heating. Ultimately, that corporate body withdrew their Bill so we did not get an opportunity to discuss this important matter.
The subject which we have just been discussing may be of transient importance, but what we are now debating, I believe for the first time in this House,

is something which may affect the happiness and convenience of the people of this country for generations to come. Therefore, it is not inappropriate that we should have an opportunity to discuss it.
My Friends and I have been trying to find out something about this subject for a considerable time. I do not know how many of these schemes there are in operation in this country, but there are not very many that have received Parliamentary approbation. There are one or two which are limited to a certain estate in respect of which it was not necessary to secure Parliamentary authority. There are one or two schemes which have received Parliamentary authority, and it is about them that I am endeavouring to make such inquiries as a private person can.
In the United States a good deal of success has been achieved. His Majesty's Stationery Office, as it was at that time, published a Report on "District Heating in American Housing." It was entitled "National Building Studies. Special Report No. 7." That Report related to the period February-April, 1947, so it described the position in the United States about five years ago. Having read that Report I am satisfied that in the U.S.A. a substantial measure of success appears to have been achieved in some of their district heating schemes.
The contrary appears to be true of those in operation in this country. There is one in the Withington district of Manchester. I regret that I have not secured any precise statistics about it, but I have discussed it with some of the Manchester Members and others familiar with the district. It is not regarded as successful; it is far too costly for the people who use it.
I have made some inquiries about other schemes, and have obtained some rather more detailed information. There is a scheme at Urmston, outside Manchester —that of the Urmston Urban District Council. I have obtained a good deal of information about that, and I had the pleasure of listening to a speech at the Conservative Conference at Blackpool in October, 1950, by Councillor J. L. Moloney, who was then the chairman of the committee which was operating that scheme.
He outlined the ideas behind those who began it and their great degree of optimism, and drew attention to what had happened. He said that it was very costly and that when they began the estimates were based on the assumption that there would be an average charge per house of 5s. per week. However, that was not enough and the charge was increased to 6s. 9d. By October, 1950, it was 10s. 3d. a week, more than double the original charge. That means that the original estimates must have been seriously wrong.
In Councillor Moloney's opinion, apparently, the economic charge would be about 12s. per week, but these are council houses and there is some confusion between rent, heating charge and subsidy. However, in his opinion, and as he was chairman of the committee he ought to know something about it, the correct figure would be about 12s. per week. That is a very costly and heavy charge for people to bear.
There is another kind of scheme entirely in the City of Westminster, only about two miles from this House, which is known as the Pimlico scheme. Those who travel along that part of the Embankment may have noticed the erection of a large structure which is now glassed in to improve its appearance. That is, I presume, the central reservoir of the hot water—I think it is water and not steam —which comes from the Battersea Power Station, and which serves a block of flats. According to the Town Clerk of Westminster, with whom I have been in correspondence, this scheme came into operation about a year ago. A letter I received from him is dated 16th January this year so they had not had long enough to see how the scheme is working out.
When it started the charge for heating and hot water was 3s. 7d. for a bed-sitting room, 6s. 7d. for a two-room flat. 8s.for a three-room flat, 9s. 5d. for a four-room flat and 10s. 9d. for a five-room flat. They seem to think that they have got a very good scheme, but I suggest that these are rather high prices for people to pay. Whether they represent an economic charge, I do not know.
There is another important scheme, I believe the largest in the country at Salisbury, or to give it its correct name the City of New Sarum. I have a letter from the Town Clerk in which he states that

they have had certain engineering difficulties, perhaps due to the lie of the land —I am not quite certain. He says that fuel consumption is high, but may improve when the scheme is properly regulated. The letter says:
The original estimated charge to the tenant, based upon 1946 prices, was 4s. 11d per week,…
It is now 10s. per week
All these schemes were based on false estimates and it appears that their charges are all now about double what was contemplated. A very exhaustive technical investigation is needed to discover whether these schemes are economic in the widest possible sense. I am not thinking merely of the charge to the tenant, although that is one aspect. They involve considerable capital expenditure which may well be better spent on other things. They involve a very large consumption of fuel. Whether the consumption of fuel is greater or lesser than other methods we use for heating water and houses, I do not know, and I do not think that anybody knows.
My purpose is neither to condemn or praise. The proper approach to any problem is the middle approach. I know that some people think that every new idea is good and that others think that every new idea is bad. Both those approaches are stupid. The right approach is the one I was taught when I was an engineering and scientific student—to examine all the facts before coming to a decision.
Such facts as I have been able to acquire indicate a measure of failure in this country. It may be that I am drawing the wrong conclusions, but if this scheme is wasteful in capital resources and fuel, and if it imposes high charges on tenants, it ought not to be pursued. If, on the other hand, it is a good scheme, it ought to be encouraged. At the moment, we do not know which it is, and this is, so far as I am aware, the first opportunity the House has had of considering this important issue—because it is important; it may affect the future domestic arrangements of hundreds and thousands or even millions of people. For that reason my hon. Friends and I thought that this issue ought to be raised.
We do not want to divide on this occasion because there are many other matters in these Bills which are reasonable and


proper and ought no doubt to become law, after going through all the stages and being modified. What I ask is that there shall be a proper inquiry, carried out, I imagine, jointly by the Ministry of Housing and Local Government and the Ministry of Fuel and Power. I am grateful that the Parliamentary Secretaries of both these Ministries are present.
I am told the authorities have some kind of heating on the job. I have only just discovered that. It has not advertised itself and in that respect it is not like an M.P. In any event, I do not know what they have done. I was told before any of these schemes are put in a Bill, there is consultation with the Ministry of Housing and Local Government. I do not know whether that is true, and if it is I am surprised, because when discussing another Bill, not now before the House, I asked if the corporation had any precise scheme and I was told they had not. I do not see how the Ministry could have approved something which was not in definite form.
What happens in local government legislation is that a corporation promotes a Bill for some purpose or other and they get certain powers because they think they need them. A body upstairs approves the Bill and it becomes law. Next year other corporations promote Bills and they put into their Bills, without thought or consideration, every power granted to the other corporation in the previous year. That is how we get the law of this country altered so far as half of the country is concerned. Then along comes an enterprising Minister of Health who introduces a new Public Health Act and makes general a whole series of proposals which have never been discussed by this House as a whole at any time. That is why we are having this debate tonight and I hope that as a result there will be the proper scientific and economic investigation which this important matter calls for.

Mr. F. J. Enroll: I beg to second the Amendment.
I wish to support what my hon. Friend the Member for Croydon, East (Sir H. Williams) has said about the approach of an average person to a new idea. It is so very important to consider a new idea in a detached, judicial manner and not to embrace a new idea just because superficially it appears to be a good one. I

think that, superficially, district heating has many attractions, especially in a densely populated country such as ours. One has only to look at the immense amount of waste heat from power stations to bewail the loss of so many thermal units and to think what a pity it is that all that hot water is going down the river when it could be used to heat homes.
I understand that in the highly specialised example of Pimlico that system is economically worth while and is proving a moderate success. What is superficially attractive, however, is not necessarily sound from an economic point of view when it is thoroughly examined; and it is because we wish to have the whole question of district heating thoroughly examined by engineers who can weigh up the exact cost of such schemes that we are promoting this debate tonight.

Lieut-Colonel Marcus Lipton: Is the hon. Gentleman suggesting that the Pimlico scheme is not economically sound, or was that part of his argument directed to the problem generally?

Mr. Erroll: I was saying that I understand the Pimlico scheme, which is a very special example of district heating, was economically sound. The main reasons for that are that the water received from the power station is transmitted under the river and the temperature gradient between the pipes and the surrounding atmosphere is small, because the river water maintains a reasonably constant temperature; while, at the user end, the heat is used solely for one large block of flats, or several contiguous blocks of flats. It is an altogether different problem when there are considerable lengths of piping running under streets through residential areas, with subsidiary pipes going to houses through the front gardens, where heat losses can be very considerable.
7.15 p.m.
The fact is that except in these specialised examples, of which Pimlico is one, the economic case for district heating has still to be made. If the hon. Member for Salisbury (Mr. J. Morrison) is successful in catching your eye, Sir, he may be able to refer in some detail to the district heating scheme in the town of New Sarum, where their experiences have not been at all happy.
I do not think that we should rush into schemes of district heating. We should not allow local authorities to go


ahead with such schemes without proper examination of the data available to date, and without proper examination of any specific schemes which those local authorities may wish to put forward. I rather deplore the way the general powers are being written into local authority Bills without full consideration being given, either to the merits of district heating as such, or individual schemes being considered by the local authorities concerned. It is certainly time we had a statement from the Government on the whole question.

Mr. John Parker: I think most hon. Members will agree that there is a strong case for inquiry into the district heating schemes as a whole, but I do not think that is any reason for holding up progress with the particular schemes before the House. On the general argument, I would make the point that if we are to have progress in technical fields of this kind someone has to take the initiative, and on schemes of this kind it is some local authorities who have to take the initiative. When they have done so and their schemes have been carried out, then by all means inquire into their experiences and lay down certain rules and find out what the nation can learn from the experiments. Then that information and experience can be passed on to other authorities so that it may be used in future schemes.
There are bound to be teething troubles in such experiments. So far, what they are suffering from are teething troubles and nothing worse. The particular scheme before us today in the Essex County Council Bill is the Dagenham Scheme, which was not mentioned by the hon. Member for Croydon, East (Sir H. Williams). It is a scheme which has much in its favour. I should like to be frank with the House and, having given its merits, I will also give some of the difficulties we have had to face in carrying through this scheme.
To begin with, I would say that the idea was to utilise the waste heat from the refuse disposal plant of the council and to use plants using low grade fuel, and thus to economise in building and in fuel costs in carrying out the construction of a large municipal housing estate; and also to include in the scheme part of an adjacent London County Council estate.
In 1947 approval was given by the Ministry of Health, and now the scheme is nearing completion. There are 416 Dagenham Borough Council houses already supplied with this heat in this way, and 63 L.C.C. houses are already connected up. As every week passes further houses or blocks of houses are added to the scheme. Ultimately, it will be a considerably bigger scheme.
Powers are sought under this Bill to try to make the scheme somewhat larger and self-supporting. Initially it was not thought that any extra powers would be required from Parliament in addition to those already possessed under the various Housing Acts, but experience has shown that extra powers are required, and that is why this provision has been placed in the Bill. In order to make the scheme as large and comprehensive as possible it is desirable to include in it an Essex County Council school, a social centre, shops, a laundry, and so on.
That means that pipes will have to be laid under the streets and mains put down in streets which are not part of the housing estate. Similar powers have already been granted to eight councils between 1949 and 1951, including those at Slough and Bristol. They found it necessary to have the extra powers. In developing this scheme it has been thought necessary to seek rather wider powers than those granted by existing Housing Acts.
As to the growing pains which I mentioned earlier, there are a number and it is only fair that I should be frank about them. The main one so far felt by tenants is the variation in temperature. That is due to the fact that, as new houses or blocks of houses are added from time to time, one has to make a balance so that there is even heating over the scheme as a whole. That requires to be done every time new houses or blocks of houses are added. That involves difficulties for the existing tenants. Once the scheme is completed and in working order those difficulties will disappear. They are literally growing pains.
We have had a certain amount of unauthorised interference with valves by tenants. That is partly as a result of the variations which have taken place in the past. People have tried to solve the problem themselves. That practice has had to be discouraged by the local authority.
Also, there have been some bursts in the hot water part of the scheme. There was difficulty in connection with copper piping. The Copper Development Council are co-operating with the Dagen-ham Council and working out a solution to this problem. All the fractured pipes have been copper pipes. That is a problem which we are certain will be solved by co-operation on the technical level.
Another criticism which might be advanced is that during the summer months there are certain cold spells when the heating is not on. Provision has been made for that by the installation of electrical points so that people can have electric fires when that kind of difficulty arises. I submit that none of these criticisms or difficulties are serious or fundamental. It is highly desirable to complete the scheme as soon as possible on the lines I have suggested and to give it an opportunity of running as a whole. When the scheme is running fully that will be the time to judge and to find out whether or not it is a success.
I submit that the difficulties which have arisen are definitely teething troubles. No doubt other authorities can learn from our experience.

Mr. Gerald Nabarro: Will the hon. Gentleman tell us what the cost is for the occupier of a three-bed-roomed house in Dagenham and the occupier of a four-bedroomed house there?

Mr. Parker: I cannot give those figures offhand. The average heating cost per week is 8s. 11d. in addition to the rent, and the average rent is around 30s., though it varies according to the size of the house. I do not think that that is an unreasonable charge for the service provided if the scheme runs as smoothly as we intend.

Mr. Enroll: Can the hon. Gentleman, in his most interesting remarks, explain whether the scheme applies only to space heating or to hot water heating as well?

Mr. Parker: Both.

Mr. Erroll: Is it not awkward in the summer months not to have the heating on?

Mr. Parker: Hot water is provided in the summer months, but the space heating part of the apparatus does not operate then.
On the general point, I suggest there is a strong case for completing this scheme so that, when it is in full operation as a whole, one can learn further lessons, apart altogether from these teething lessons. When the scheme is in full operation we shall be able to judge how far the scheme makes a contribution to life in a large part of this borough. If it is a success there will be a strong case for similar experiments in other boroughs.
To sum up, I suggest that at this time in our national history there is a strong argument for any kind of experiments which will save fuel. It is necessary in the national interest to save fuel. Here is an opportunity to do that. As the hon. Member for Croydon, East said, a lot of heat goes to waste at present in power stations and places of that kind. We should experiment and find methods of using that heat.
This experiment will provide much cleaner houses for everybody. It will lead to a considerable degree of smoke abatement and it will simplify housing construction. It will lead to a good deal of labour saving in the house. These are important considerations which should be borne in mind by hon. Members when they are deciding whether to support this provision. Although I am in favour of a full inquiry into this matter, I hope that the House will back the Bill and agree that the inquiry should take place after this scheme is in operation. I am certain that more will be learned then than could be learned now.
I do not think that an inquiry now would provide very much more information than that I have given about teething troubles. When the full scheme is in operation a lot which is of value might be learned. I ask the House not to accept this Amendment.

Mr. Nabarro: I wish strongly to support what has been said by the hon. Member for Dagenham (Mr. Parker). The Dagenham experiment is very important in the interests of fuel efficiency in the United Kingdom. I have been advocating for many years that waste heat, notably from power houses, must be utilised for domestic services in the immediate proximity of the point at which the power is generated.
The hon. Member for Rotherham (Mr. Jack Jones) will be familiar with a scheme


promoted, in theory, at the end of the war which is often referred to as the Warrington scheme. That was a similar scheme in principle to the Dagenham scheme, although it embraced industrial considerations.
It was a scheme to provide industrial power in Warrington, using the steam at a lower pressure for heating and processing in factories. The effect of such a scheme—and the principle is similar in the Dagenham scheme—is to raise the thermal efficiency with which coal is burned from something of the order of 22 per cent., which is the average thermal efficiency at a British Electricity Authority power house today, to a thermal efficiency of about 70 per cent.
I am prepared to agree that to achieve that high thermal efficiency in district heating schemes of this nature, using steam the first time for driving a turbo-alternator, the second time for heating purposes, either domestically or industrially, and a third time for processing industrially, it is absolutely essential that there should be a proper balance between the power requirement and the heat requirement.
7.30 p.m.
That is the fundamental factor, and it is often exceedingly difficult to achieve. Our trouble in this country is that there is very little reliable evidence to guide us, and, therefore, while I do not wish in any way to see the Dagenham scheme delayed or held up, because I regard it as a pilot and a very useful experiment, I support my hon. Friend the Member for Croydon, East in calling for a general inquiry as to the potentialities of district heating.
My hon. Friend the Member for Croydon, East mentioned American successes, and he is quite right, but we need not go as far away as the United States. Any hon. Member who has toured Denmark will know that in that country they have no indigenous sources of coal, but have to import all their coal. There, in many important cities, ever since the early 1920s they have been gradually developing combined power and heating schemes, a notable example being that of Esbjerg in the western part of the peninsula. There, for a reasonable capital investment they have demonstrated, over a period of years that power and heat services for

industrial purposes and domestic heating and hot water services can be provided at relatively low figures.
My final comment upon the remarks of my hon. Friend the Member for Croydon, East is this. He referred to the cost of operation. The hon. Member for Dagenham rather fought shy of the figures supplied by his own county council as to what occupiers of the houses in Dagenham pay for this service. I am sure he will not be offended if I quote them, since they were provided for me by the Parliamentary agents promoting the Bill. The occupier of a three-bedroom house is paying 8s. 11d. per week all the year round for a combination of heating and hot water services, and the occupier of a four-bedroom house is paying 10s. a week.
These figures are not high. The average consumption of coal per household in the United Kingdom is five tons a year, of which only about one-third is taken in solid fuel, the remainder being taken as a combination of electric andfor gas andfor other forms of fuel. The value of five tons of coal, taking £5 per ton as a reasonable figure for a householder to pay, is something of the order of £25 per annum, which works out at slightly less than 10s. per week for a heating and domestic hot water service which approximates the results produced at Dagenham.

Mr. Erroll: What about cooking? Would my hon. Friend care to explain? Of course, the Dagenham scheme does not include the cost of heat for cooking or the thermal equivalent of electricity used in operating wireless sets.

Mr. Nabarro: That is quite true. I am only making an approximate comparison. I do not want it to be thought that the charges in Dagenham are exorbitant or very much out of line with those for the country as a whole. This is not the only experimentation which has taken place in the United Kingdom so far, and a number of technical journals have published articles in the last few weeks, giving full particulars of some existing schemes.
The "Steam Engineer" in April of this year published full particulars of the Esbjerg scheme, and "The Builder," in February of this year, published comprehensive particulars of a most illuminating experiment in the East End of London,


where Messrs. Mann, Crossman and Paulin's brewery are supplying their surplus steam or waste heat for the heating of a block of L.C.C. fiats which have been built recently only a few hundred yards away.
I hope we shall have the inquiry called for by my hon. Friend the Member for Croydon, East, but I do not want that in any way to delay or postpone the completion and expansion of this very valuable experiment that has been commended to the House this evening by the hon. Member for Dagenham.

Mr. Ian Winterbottom: It is with very great pleasure that I follow the hon. Member for Kidderminster (Mr. Nabarro) in this debate, because his knowledge of the use of fuel is well-known and appreciated by the House, and I have nothing to add to what he said. I appreciate also the remarks of my hon. Friend the Member for Dagenham (Mr. Parker), who touched on important social aspects of district heating.
I rise because we in Nottingham have in preparation a Bill which includes district heating and which is linked with the decision of this House this evening on the Essex County Council Bill. We are most anxious that the powers that we wish to have conferred upon us in this Bill are in no way curtailed, and, for this reason, I very much welcome the undertaking given by the hon. Member for Croydon, East (Sir H. Williams) not to divide the House.
I will touch only on one or two minor points which have been raised in the debate so far. First of all, on the question of this being a new invention, it is, of course, nothing of the kind. The first experiments of this kind were made in this country in 1835, and the first major American experiment, which is still functioning, was made in 1870, while this system is in common practice throughout Western Europe and in the more recently developed countries, like Russia and Manchuria.
In regard to this country, it is completely wrong to judge any scheme which is in process of development. The hon. Member for Croydon, East suggested that because one scheme was not doing well and that the expenses in the Pimlico scheme were high, such schemes were

going wrong. Actually, what is happening is that these schemes are being linked to series of houses, blocks of flats and so on.
The hon. Member for Altrincham and Sale (Mr. Erroll) was mistaken when he said that the Pimlico scheme was attached to only one block of flats. It is being taken up by four such blocks in the Churchill Gardens scheme. It has already been connected to Dolphin Court, and there is a further housing scheme which is going to receive this steam from the Battersea Power Station. The economic running of such a system can only be assessed when the whole of the houses to be supplied from the central station are linked to the source of the heat.
In regard to fuel saving and economy, this is a very important point. Both the illustrations which I have given are from the Battersea Power Station, and this is a strictly limited scheme which is being operated at its most efficient. The estimated saving for the 3,000 flats which will eventually be linked to Battersea Power Station will be the equivalent of 10,000 tons of fuel a year, namely, three tons per flat, which is a very considerable saving.
Further, there has been a direct comparison of cost already made between the Pimlico scheme and the conventional central heating scheme. There is a large block of flats in that area called Russell House, consisting of 74 flats, built in 1950 and supplied with an efficient central heating scheme. The cost of supplying area heating and hot water in Russell House has been such that the Russell House scheme, after only two years of operation, is being linked to the Battersea Power Station in October of this year, which shows that the conventional heating schemes may be affected by the work done at Pimlico.
I agree that an inquiry might be of value, because it might publicise the virtues and economies which such a scheme might bring about, but I would urge the House to allow those councils which have their own schemes in preparation or wish to prepare them to be permitted to do so.

Mr. John Morrison: I do not wish to detain the House for long, or to obstruct a Bill which, I am sure is in many ways a most admirable one. As my


constituency has been mentioned by my hon. Friend the Member for Croydon, East (Sir H. Williams), I should like to say that I believe that he has done a useful service to the House in bringing this matter to the notice of all of us here this evening.
Certainly, the district heating scheme in the city of New Sarum in my constituency has not been, I am afraid I have to say, a very great success. It means far more cost than was originally anticipated in the planning. There are certain technical details to be considered. One house has hot water and the next one sometimes does not have quite such hot water which on occasion causes considerable feeling. There is also the psychological fact that there is no fire against which to warm one's toes, which is a considerable point, I think, although it may sometimes need more fuel to do that.
As one who is in no way an expert on mechanics or engineering, I feel that the hon. Gentleman who raised this matter made a strong point in emphasising that every possible examination of further details in regard to district heating schemes should be made before they are adopted on a wholesale scale throughout the country.

Mr. Jack Jones: When all the technical difficulties have been overcome, this particular scheme will be of immense value to this country, and it must not be forgotten that such schemes are linked with the re-armament programme. The two most valuable assets of this country are its coal and its manpower. We must make the best possible use of every ounce of coal we have, and people who want to go back to the prehistoric idea of every house having its own smoke hole ought to try to be more modern.
I saw the Urmston scheme put into operation and developed. It is an extraordinarily good scheme. No longer does the elderly pensioner have to get up in the morning and look round for wood to chop, paper and coal, if he can get it, and at the end of the month send for the sweep, at the end of three months send for a decorator, and at the end of six months find himself suffering from asthma because of the smoke and fumes which come from the coal. Those days are

over. One pensioner looks after the plant, and the houses are clean. There have been difficulties, and there have been increasing costs, but does the hon. Member for Croydon, East (Sir H. Williams) suggest that his own coal bill has not increased?

Sir H. Williams: The cost has gone up from 5s. to 10s., which is double, and the 10s. is still inadequate.

Mr. Jones: That is not because of the tremendous increases, but because the original charges were based too low. I do not want to prolong the debate, but I could if necessary go into details as to why the cost of coal is as high as it is. There are not going to be any more cheap miners. Those who want cheap coal can go and get it for themselves if they feel so inclined.
I suggest that this particular scheme can in the interests of the nation be a very fine scheme. I live within 1,000 yards of a big steel works at which I worked for 37 years. There every day I see millions of cubic feet of gas being wasted from the coke ovens. That gas could easily be diverted both into the homes of our people and into the factories for use by industry which is short of power. I am amazed that the hon. Member for Altrincham and Sale (Mr. Erroll), who always talks about engineering difficulties, should be opposed to this scheme.
I have seen these schemes at work. They are a boon to the housewife. It is easy to talk about the cost, but no one mentions the saving that accrues. When we have got over the teething troubles of this particular type of development and when instead of Bill Smith turning the radiators full on and Bill Brown turning them to zero, thus getting a variation in the amount of heat, our people are educated in the use of these modern devices, then we shall be able to get the houses properly heated with all the hygienic advantages and with a tremendous saving in coal which means everything to this country.

7.45 p.m.

Mrs. Eveline Hill: I support this Bill. The Manchester scheme mentioned by the hon. Member for Croydon, East (Sir H. Williams) was, in fact, a scheme actually intended for my division of Wythen-


shawe, but the negotiations took so long that we were unable to defer building the houses any longer. Therefore, the area is now built up and we have had to abandon that scheme for the moment.
Schemes of this sort were tried out many years ago, one or two of which have been successful. I had the privilege of visiting one in Dundee where the housewives heartily approved of it. As has been mentioned, it is very much easier to turn on the tap than to have to wait until the fire burns up and the water gets hot in the cylinder behind it.
From the point of view of saving coal, we must obviate what we see so frequently, waste heat going into mid air. That is something we must attempt to overcome, and we must utilise such heat to the very best advantage. I hope we shall all profit from the scheme at Dagenham, and I therefore trust that this Bill will be passed. I am sure we shall have a much greater knowledge of such schemes after the Dagenham experiment is complete.

Mr. Edward Shackleton: The proposals for district heating have not included one aspect of it which is provided for in the Preston Corporation Bill—district heating for industrial purposes. In that Bill, which I am glad to know we shall not have an opportunity to discuss, it is proposed that the Corporation should take powers, if they think fit and if the Minister gives the necessary loan sanction, to provide district heating for an industrial estate.
What could be more desirable or more essential in industrial Britain than that some form of district organisation should take place for this type of purpose? The fact that Preston does not intend to exercise its powers forthwith does not mean that it is not desirable that they should obtain them now. In fact, what the House will do by means of this debate will be to establish the principle that these are suitable powers for corporations to have and to exercise with the approval of the Minister at the appropriate time.

Sir H. Williams: I hope the hon. Member will not say that. We are not seeking to hold up these two Bills, but when we get the report we reserve the right to vote against further Bills.

Mr. Shackleton: I was afraid the hon. Member might not fall for that one, but,

none the less, the principle is clear, and I think it is a good one. After all, the arguments deployed by those hon. Members who know something about district heating have been overwhelmingly in favour of it. I know that on one occasion I had a short lecture from the hon. Member for Croydon, East (Sir H. Williams) on the second law of thermo-dynamics, and as I thought he might be referring to it again today I came armed with the encyclopaedia.
It is clear that this is the right line of advance, but I would agree that there is no harm in an inquiry, especially if as I hope that inquiry gives a favourable report as a result of its impartial investigations on the value of this type of scheme.

Sir William Darling: Does the hon. Gentleman know that in the Glasgow Technical College at the moment they have set up a number of experiments in which they are extracting heat from the soil which is much better than getting it from the refuse which they use at Dagenham?

Mr, Shackleton: I know that many progressive things happen in Scotland. We know perfectly well that costs in connection with new capital equipment have risen very heavily since the war. In fact, I do not think that the rising costs for these new schemes has been anything out of proportion to the rising costs of other capital developments, such as the heating scheme at Russell House which was mentioned by the hon. Member for Nottingham, Central (Mr. Ian Winter-bottom).
I hope, therefore, that this matter will go forward and that in due course, at an appropriate time, we shall have no trouble with the Preston Bill and that a message will go out from this House that on the whole we are in favour of this kind of thing rather than against it, even for the reasons given by the hon. Member for Croydon, East.

Mr. Julian Amery: I find myself in general agreement with what the hon. Member for Preston, South (Mr. Shackleton) said. We in Preston pursue a bi-partisan policy on this matter. The arguments for and against district heating are nicely balanced and, in the circumstances, I think there is a great deal to be said for the request of my


hon. Friend the Member for Croydon, East (Sir H. Williams) for an inquiry into the whole matter.
I should like to join with those who say how glad they are that the hon. Member for Croydon, East is not pressing his view to a Division. It would be a pity if Bills of this character were delayed until this matter had been looked into by a public inquiry. After all, some 23 Measures of this kind have already been passed. The final decision as to whether these powers are to be used or not rests in the hands of the Minister.
Although the House may be surrendering a measure of control at the present time, we still have safeguards which give good reason to hope that these schemes will only be introduced if there is reason to believe that they can make a valuable contribution to the life of the community.

Mr. Harry Wallace: I am not a technical expert, but I have just listened to the arguments as a layman. I have some experience of local government and I wish to see local authorities have scope for experimenting. I thought that the speech of the hon. Member for Croydon, East (Sir H. Williams) was divided into two parts. First, he wanted a general inquiry and I should not object to that at all. It would be most unfair, however, to penalise Dagenham and to obstruct the passage of the Bill in order to secure a general inquiry.
While a general inquiry is proceeding, all the individual schemes which have been mentioned in this debate plus the Dagenham development would help that general inquiry. I think we should take into account the fact that the Minister has given his approval. I thought that my hon. Friend the Member for Rotherham (Mr. J. Jones) made a very practical contribution to the debate. I urged him also to say something about dustbins and the collection of ashes, and so on.
The hon. Member for Croydon, East emphasised the cost of this type of scheme. I do not disagree with him that that is an important point, but he did not attempt to mention the saving which is also involved. I wish he had brought that into the picture. After listening to my hon. Friends I am certain that the advantage lies with the development of

this kind of scheme. If I may say so, this is a development in the spirit of a country which means to experiment and to develop and to make better use of its coal and to abate the nuisance of smoke and all that follows from burning coal. It would be wrong if the House failed to give this Bill a Second Reading.

The Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Housing and Local Government (Mr. Ernest Marples): It is quite clear from this short debate that both sides of the House are quite unanimous that this Bill and the Preston Corporation Bill should go through without a Division, and that this debate is merely a Parliamentary device to use these Bills to raise a subject in which some of my hon. Friends are extremely interested. Therefore, I shall not detain the House by going through the legal provisions by which district heating schemes are introduced except to say that there are three important ways of doing it.
First, there are the Housing Acts under which one can have district heating; but that is limited to housing and if Dagenham wished to supply heat to schools the procedure under the Housing Acts would not be sufficiently comprehensive. Then there is the Electricity Act, 1947, which provides, for example for the breaking up of streets. Finally, there are the legal powers under private Bills, of which we have two examples before us tonight.
In view of the way in which the debate has gone, I should like to answer some of the points on the methods of procedure afforded in these cases—the machinery for implementing powers given under these Bills and under the Housing and Electricity Acts. This started in 1946, when Sir Ernest Simon, as he then was, issued a report on district heating and advised that an inter-Departmental committee on central heating should be set up, with a district heating sub-committee to pay special attention to the possibility of district heating in this country.
In 1948 it was decided that the number of schemes which should be started in the United Kingdom would be 12 and the commitee have examined 29 schemes, 11 of which have now been started. In other words, one scheme is still to be started and then the pilot batch of 12 will have been started. The terms of reference were to consider and make recommendations on the practicability of district heating


schemes generally and of particular schemes which might be referred to them, and to include in their report recommendations as to the particular Department required to take action on those reports.
So far, the sub-committee have not submitted a report on a scheme; but they have in final draft a memorandum on experience so far gained which they will shortly submit to the main committee who, in turn, will submit it to the Minister. I suggest that the matter be left to the Minister to consider because when it is submitted the report will be based on factual evidence and no really useful purpose can be served until that report has been analysed.
I should like to go through the stages necessary before starting these schemes. In the first place, the local authority submits to my right hon. Friend the Minister of Housing and Local Government a district heating scheme prepared by their own consulting engineers. The sub-committee consider it in detail and recommend it or reject it. If it is approved, further and almost complete details are submitted to the Ministry's consulting engineers and discussion takes place. If the scheme is then approved loan sanction is given.
Those are the initial stages. But in the operating stages a monthly return is sent to the sub-committee of what, in fact, is happening to the scheme, so that the sub-committee have the necessary information each month on which they base a factual report which is ultimately sent to the main committee. The main committee in turn submit the report to the Minister.
It is very difficult to generalise on these schemes because every scheme varies in some degree from every other. In building work it is possible to compare a great deal in this country because building is concerned with work above ground and the stresses and strains are known and are common to every part of the country. Like can be compared with like. But civil engineering underground deals with the forces of Nature and each scheme is different.
8.0 p.m.
The 11 schemes which have been started cannot be compared one with the other; they are entirely dissimilar in certain elements. Salisbury, for example,

could not be compared with Pimlico. The elements to be considered are quite numerous. First, there is the size and scope of the particular plant. In America, there is a scheme which provides space and water heating for 16,000 dwellings. One can scarcely compare that with a scheme for 2,000 dwellings.
Another element is the saving of fuel. A thermo-electric scheme is more likely to save fuel than other schemes. In the case of Pimlico, where the Battersea waste heat is being used, it is more probable that there will be a saving of fuel than in places which use their own fuel to start off the heat in a central plant.
Another element to be considered is the question of labour costs in blocks of flats or offices. The other day I was having a casual conversation with the chairman of Dolphin Square. He told me that he had turned over to district heating, but that it was no cheaper than the former type. As against that, he was certain that the water was always going to be hot and he could dispense with porters who had been giving him some difficulties in the past owing to their moving to other blocks of flats.
Then there is the cost of heating to the particular tenant. It may be cheaper in some cases and more expensive in others. All these elements must be considered and it is difficult to select one and say, because of that, "I think it is a good thing," or," I think it is a bad thing." I think it would be much better to let the main committee submit its recommendations to the Ministers, based upon the evidence collected month by month from the actual scheme, and that the Ministers should decide what action should be taken on that report.

Sir H. Williams: Is it proposed to lay the document before Parliament?

Mr. Marples: I do not think that any document will be laid until the Ministers have studied the report. It is a Ministerial responsibility. If the Ministers decide to do nothing I am sure that my hon. Friend the Member for Croydon, East (Sir H. Williams) will be continually prodding them. I should not like to commit the Ministers in any way to the publication of the report because there may be sections of it which they do not want to publish.
I hope that these two Bills will join those of the other 54 local authorities who already have the powers, so that the fears of the hon. Member for Dagenham (Mr. Parker) and the hon. Member for Preston, South (Mr. Shackleton) can be set at rest. The hon. Member for Dagenham gave some of the facts and figures with regard to the scheme in his constituency, and he referred constantly to what he called teething troubles. There have been a few more troubles than that. The report of the district auditor pointed out that Dagenham was carrying out this scheme without proper legal authority so that, in effect, it is ex post factoapproving what Dagenham has already done. I am sorry that the hon. Member for Dagenham, with the dispassionate analysis which we all associate with the great Fabian figures of our time, did not mention the teething troubles which were referred to by the district auditor.
I would assure the House that the question of district heating is being examined closely. Of 12 pilot schemes 11 are now in operation and I think it would be better, in the words of a famous statesman. To "wait and see" what is the effect of the report.

Sir H. Williams: In view of the Minister's speech and the general tone of the debate we have no desire to divide the House, but I must tell the Under-Secretary that I think it is most unsatisfactory if he thinks this document is to be a private document for the Minister himself. I really must ask him to consider the question of publication. Future Bills must be decided by us and we are entitled to all the information that can be collected. I hope that the Parliamentary Secretary will reconsider this matter. In the circumstances, however, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the Amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Standing Order No. 205 (Notice of Third Reading) suspended.—[The Chairman of Ways and Means.]

Bill read the Third time, and passed [Queen's consent, on behalf of the Crown, signified].

PRESTON CORPORATION BILL [Lords] (By Order)

Read a Second time, and committed.

Orders of the Day — SUPPLY

Again considered in Committee.

[Sir CHARLES MACANDREW in the Chair]

Question again proposed,
That a further sum, not exceeding £20, be granted to Her Majesty, towards defraying the charges for the following services connected with Korea for the year ending on 31st March, 1953, namely:


Civil Estimates and Ministry of Defence Estimate, 1952-53




£


Class II, Vote I, Foreign Service
…
10


Ministry of Defence
…
10


Total
…
£20

Orders of the Day — KOREAN CAMPAIGN (GOVERNMENT POLICY)

8.6 p.m.

Mr. Nally: Subject always to correction by the HANSARD reporters, my recollection—and, I hope, that of the Committee —is that the last few words I had the honour to say were to the effect that "there must be no misunderstanding." I could not say anything more because it was then 7 o'clock.
Part of what we are discussing tonight is a misunderstanding, and the interruption to my speech—a speech possibly completely unimportant in itself—illustrates that fact. During the war I once had the honour—I emphasise the word"honour"—of discussing with a group of young American officers the British Parliamentary system. I would defy any Member to explain to an intelligent American, or Russian, why it is that the British Constitution, its rules, regulations and procedure, are such that it is necessary—indeed, it is especially provided for in the rules of the House— that a vital debate should be interrupted for one hour or one and a half hours in order to discuss such an admittedly interesting matter as a district heating scheme in Dagenham or wherever it is or was.
Among the municipal leaders in the north-west of England—and the hon. Member for Wythenshawe (Mrs. Hill) may bear me out in this—who understand most about district heating, my father would take a very prominent place; but if one tries to explain how


it comes about that we can abandon a debate on matters of life and death in order to discuss district heating, not all the eloquence of my right hon. Friend the Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. Bevan), coupled with that of the Prime Minister at his best, could possibly explain to Americans—or to those who for some reason or other spend their time listening to us in our debates—why that curious Parliamentary system operates.

Mr. Charles Pannell: May I give the hon. Gentleman a reason?

Mr. Nally: The point I am seeking to make is that just as it is difficult to explain that sort of thing either to Americans or Russians——

Mr. George Cherwynd: Or Koreans.

Mr. Nally: —or Koreans, so, in a complicated situation such as we were discussing before we came to the question of water heating, it is necessary for us all to exercise a reasonable amount of toleration and restraint in our attitude to the Americans or the Russians, or in their attitude towards us. It sometimes happens that it is the British attitude which is illogical—as is the case with the long interruption to tonight's debate.
I thought that it was absolutely necessary and proper for this debate about Korea to be held. It would, of course, have been far better if we had been able to wait until next week, when the Government would have had time to consult at length and, with a certain amount of leisure, to digest, what was being presented by the Minister of Defence and the Secretary of State, and when the Opposition, equally, would have had time to consider the vital events which have been taking place. However, circumstances have been such that we simply have to have this debate now, because of the grave events which have occurred during the past three or four days.
We have a very brilliant Commander of the United Nations Forces in Korea. But it is perfectly clear that, in the channels which exist for the conveyance of information about intended acts from the Commander to his own Government, and the transfer of that information either through the United Nations or directly to participating countries in this

great and dangerous Korean enterprise, there has been an appalling breakdown, which might easily lead to the most tragic results. It should be made clear that by its very nature modern war tends to produce such breakdowns. I am not using that as an excuse for what has been done, as I shall show in a few moments, but the very circumstances of war under modern conditions may produce exactly the sort of situation we are discussing.
One presumes that the Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations Forces in this theatre approved of this action. It must have taken a long time to prepare If one judges it purely from the military context, it was brilliantly conceived. Consider the scale on which bombing was carried out from aircraft carriers, which represents an operation which I think we rarely had, even in World War II. To that extent it was a brilliant action and it may well be justified. The political consequences, however, were so vital— and I do not think there is any dispute about this on either side of the House— that it was a mistake, inadvertent or not —and I believe it to have been inadvertent—that we were not fully consulted and fully informed about this action, and the preparations which were made for it.
I do not want to speak of military misconceptions to hon. Members, many of whom know more about these matters than I do. It is, however, quite ridiculous to talk about conducting any war at all, even if the only weapon in use is a 303, by drawing a straight line across the map and then assuming that once the line has been drawn, nothing must take place the further side of it. Consider the slowest form of aircraft appearing on both sides—we will forget the Mig. 15 for the moment, and leave aside the most modern aeroplanes. Shortly after the beginning of the war, the Chinese were operating reconnaissance and other aeroplanes capable of between 250 and 300 miles per hour. We were using fighters capable of 300 to 350 miles per hour. That means five miles a minute. If an aircraft is over a battle area many thousands of feet up, chasing an obviously enemy plane, how is the pilot to judge whether he is 100 yards or 200 yards on one side or the other of an artificial line, when he is travelling at that five miles a minute?
It is a great mistake, and it is unfair, to pretend that it is possible to restrict operations to that artificial line drawn across the map. What was done, and was sensibly done originally, was broadly to restrict operations, and to make it perfectly clear that, for the time being, we would do nothing which might be or possibly conceived to be an attempt to extend the area of the conflict. That was a sound and wise policy. It still is.
Although my views are not important —and I do not say that from mock modesty—I am certainly not completely pro-American. Many days before President Truman dismissed General MacArthur, I was, I think, the first in the House to put down a Motion on the Order Paper which, whilst paying tribute to the great and gallant and leading part which the Americans had played in Korea, went on to say, quite bluntly, that this House could no longer entrust British forces to General MacArthur's command. If one or two hon. Members accuse me of being too pro-American, I recall that fact in aid.
I think my Motion of that time was entirely justified for it seemed to me that the policy which General MacArthur— not the United States Administration— was pursuing, and which he said he proposed to pursue, in Korea, and indeed in the Far East might be disastrous. He was in the contradictory position of being not only Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations Forces in Korea but also Allied Chief of the Japanese Occupation controlling commercial, economic and social problems. This was not a position which we could possibly have supported any longer. I ventured to say that General MacArthur represented a menace to General Eisenhower, and was endangering the great work Eisenhower was doing in Europe; but, above all, MacArthur was handicapping the United Nations' cause.
General MacArthur was happily and speedily replaced by another distinguished American General, but here I ask the Committee to see that there is no misunderstanding of the position— and here I come back to the exact words I was using before we dealt with Dagenham's heat. Not only every hon. Member but every citizen of the country must make up their minds, and make

them up fairly quickly, about some quite simple points. First of all, was it or was it not justifiable to resist aggression in Korea, assuming that aggression came from the North? I think the overwhelming answer of the country would be, if face to face with that question, that it was justifiable—and all our experience in the past and before World War II proves it to have been so.
Equally, hon. Members on both sides must face this fact. I am sorry that my hon. Friend the Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. S. Silverman) is not in his place; I thought he was here. He has a very efficient deputy in the hon. Member for Leek (Mr. Harold Davies), but I should have preferred the hon. Member for Nelson and Colne, as I want to mention him. My hon. Friend the Member for Nelson and Colne and my right hon. Friend the Member for Ebbw Vale, if I may say so with respect, must not ride off by saying, "We believed it was right at the beginning but now subsequent contrary information has come to hand"; I notice a certain coyness and reluctance—and it is not my fault that neither my right hon. or hon. Friends are here—to say exactly what is that new information they have. What is worse, however, is a tendency for both my colleagues to allow themselves that degree of manæuvrability that would entitle them a month from now to say," We are for the war," or "We are against the war."

Mr. A. C. Manuel: I hope my hon. Friend will be fair about the position. He heard the speech of our right hon. Friend the Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. Bevan), who made it quite clear that at that time the Cabinet came down on the side that the North Korean Forces caused the aggression. The point he was making was that of containing the war within Korea as the policy of Ernest Bevin which we were carrying out. That was the only point he made arising from the issue.

Mr. Nally: If that was the only point my right hon. Friend was making——

Mr. Manuel: Of course it was.

Mr. Nally: —he had no need to make it at all, because the policy of our party during the whole of the time we were the Government and since has been perfectly clear upon that issue. We wanted to con-


tain the war. Of course we did, and do. There is no need to reiterate the obvious. But what was added to that was the ominous postscript to the effect "as we believed then"—I have no doubt that a reading of HANSARD would show to the Committee and my hon. Friend who interrupted me, for whom I have a great regard, that that speech does give the impression that possibly, although it was thought at the time when my right hon. Friend was a Member of the Cabinet that this was a proper war, engaged upon for proper purposes, he subsequently discovered that evidence came from poisoned sources, and that reflection upon events since then had transformed his view of it.

Dr. Barnett Stross: May I ask my hon. Friend a question before he leaves that point? Suppose for argument's sake, purely as a hypothesis, there were ever evidence that in fact all the information given to us was entirely wrong, would he still refuse to change his attitude?

Mr. Nally: Far from refusing to change my attitude I should stand up in this Chamber and advocate the bringing of every British Service man out of that war forthwith. I could far better understand the attitude of some hon. Members if that was what they said—if, in effect, what they said to us was, "Although we may have thought at the beginning that this was right, our original views have been changed by new evidence, and we discover that we were tricked."
If I found myself in that position it would not only be open to me, but it would indeed be my duty to stand up and say, "I believe now it is a war wrongly conceived for improper purposes, and, among others, I have been tricked." That is what I should say, and I should follow through with the consequences. What I should not do, what I think it is wrong to do, is to try still to keep a foot in each camp—to hint that it is a wrong war, but at the same time make certain one does not follow through and be too definite about it.
There are in this country, as elsewhere, and there is proceeding in this country as elsewhere, a campaign whose techniques are not new at all; they date back, for example, to the beginning of the last war. I well remember once making a

collection, in my capacity as a reporter, of some leaflets that the Germans sent over in the period of the "phoney" war —the 1939-40 period. What did they consist of? I still have those leaflets.
In the French areas of the Maginot Line they consisted of messages telling the French that they were being made to fight an English war; that they were being used as cannon fodder for Britain, and that this country would seek to collect the loot. The leaflet sent to the British troops—those we had in that area —said that, in reality, the war had been forced upon Germany, that there were far too many British lying dead in France already, and why did not the British go home? Later, when the Americans came in, we had the same sort of thing, playing one against the other.
What we have at the moment is this. The whole foundation on which Soviet policy is based today—and I state it as a matter of fact, without attaching blame— the whole basis of Soviet policy today is the driving of the greatest possible wedge between ourselves and the United States. The second and subsidiary purpose is to create for us both, the United States and Great Britain, as many "running sores" as possible, that may not in themselves be serious, but that add to the ill temper and discontent of those who have to suffer from them.
Therefore—and I am not being wise after the event now—I do not and I never did believe—I said so at the time—in the genuineness of the original truce in Korea negotiations. I do not believe in the genuineness of the Chinese in these truce negotiations now—although I hope, at the same time, to be proved wrong.
What I thought was that a stage had been reached at which it was essential for general purposes for the Soviet Union and its supporters—for one thing they do have which we have not, and that is patience, long-term patience—to have a truce in order that there could be a build-up behind the North Korean line. Well, such a military build-up has taken place north of the 38th Parallel.
Now we have to ask ourselves about the only thing about which it is said there remains a difference. That is the matter of the prisoners. Some people dismiss it as though it were a minor matter. The question of the prisoners is not a


minor matter. The prisoner issue is a vital one. As to the screening, there may have been inefficiency. I do not think any hon. Member of this Committee would dare to say that because of mistakes we should forcibly return any prisoners who plead not to be returned. I think that this is vital. I think it would be vital if there were only a few thousand who did not want to return among the many scores of thousands of prisoners that we have.
Suppose there were only 1,000 who did not want to go back. I should still think it an important matter—although to reduce the figure to so small a one in the face of the evidence is to reduce the case to ridiculous extremes. I do not think there is any Member of the Committee who would say we should forcibly return those men who would be shot or otherwise dealt with because they are regarded as enemies of the Communist regime. I do not think anyone would say, "There are wider interests to be considered, so let us return them."
If any hon. Member would say such a thing I should hope that he would be driving one of the lorries with those people being forcibly transferred in it— driving one of those lorries over the line. Some of us have seen the sort of thing that happens. Some of us saw immediately after the war Ukranians who did not want to go back to the Soviet Union, who were forcibly driven back. We do not want to see such sights again. We should not want to see them if only 10 people were returned who objected to being returned. We cannot, any of us, want to see such things re-enacted in Korea.
I am not suggesting that anybody is saying we should do such a thing. The only point I am making is that, whereas some people talk as though it were only a minor matter holding up the truce negotiations, the prisoners issue is an important matter. The lives of men are involved. Moreover, it is well for us to remember that during the whole of these long drawn out truce negotiations every single major concession has been made— by whom?—by the United Nations negotiators. That process cannot go on indefinitely.
Part of what has been happening during the past 12 months, because of difficulties

in things like communications, is that the North Koreans have been able to build up what the Nazis were able to build up in some camps in England; to establish in many of the prison camps solid, well-organised and instructed groups, exercising a complete discipline of their own. In the case of Koje Island this was taken to the extent of carrying out their own death sentences, without any fear of the Americans. There is no dispute about this. Even my hon. Friend the Member for Nelson and Colne would accept that evidence as overwhelming.
That leads me to a point of complaint about the Americans; a complaint in the right direction. The Americans are not bitter, ruthless, intent on war, as some small sections of people in our country like to paint them. The reverse is true, as I ventured once to say to some of my colleagues in other circumstances.
I remember an occasion in Aachen when the fighting was very fierce. It will be within the recollection of many hon. and right hon. Members that Aachen was very fiercely fought over, and was twice taken. When the street fighting was at its fiercest, involving the sacrifice of the lives of many Americans, within 300 yards of where extensive fighting was proceeding were 150 German prisoners in the charge of two G.I.s—Heaven bless them —whose guns were leaned up against the wall while they were smoking cigarettes. My colleague, another war reporter, and I ascertained that not one of those Germans had even been searched.
The point I am making is that the Americans are invariably careless with prisoners, not because they are hardhearted but because their attitude is largely the reverse. It is part of Dr. Malan's campaign—one of the few things about which he may have a minor case —that during the Boer War the British could run very efficient prisoner compounds. So we did. Do not let us be too anxious to use this prisoner control point against the Americans. They have made grave mistakes and errors, about which we are right to rebuke them, but do not let us use that sort of thing as an excuse for backing out of our major responsibilities. If we do back out of them, do not let us fool our people, or the people of other nations about what the consequences of our action would be.
Much is said about the desirability of telling the Americans where they "get


off." I am all in favour of frankness in these matters, but when we get distinguished people arguing that what is needed is not so much preparation for war but preparation for peace and the raising of the standard of living, particularly in the Near and Far East, I would ask: Who is going to raise it? Those distinguished people may possibly be right, but they might recognise that the truth is that in the next 10 or 15 years, if we avoid World War III—and there is not one hon. Member who does not want to avoid it—whether it is for capital goods, food or raw materials, the country that has to be depended upon in the main is the United States.
It is easy enough to make great speeches about raising the standard of living of the Indians and the people of the Middle East. I say that the standard of living must be raised, and already— although this is not a popular thing to say—the United States Administration as it stands at present—there may be changes—and the United States people, can be proud of the part they have played and the contribution they have made to the partial recovery of not only Europe but the world since 1945.
I would add a final word. We know that there are now, and rightly so, doubts and anxieties about recent events in relation to Korea. I would offer three suggestions.
As to the first. It is beyond dispute now that the general liaison machinery, not only between ourselves and the United States Commander and his own Government, but the general relationship between all the nations putting troops in the field under the United States Commander, is radically wrong and that reorganisation must take place at that level.
Secondly, it is an intolerable situation that a Prime Minister of this country should have to come down to this House and, on a matter of major political importance, frankly confess that he really did not know anything at all about it. It is equally bad that the Minister of Defence, a distinguished soldier with a great record, who was sent across there partly because of his military qualifications, could casually say to a Press conference in New York that he knew nothing whatever about an action which carried with it vital political conse-

quences. It is perfectly clear that there are some grievous errors here.
Lastly, I would say that if this war continues, as I fear it will, there must be a more regular arrangement for full reports to this House. Not only reports by way of speeches, but regular written reports, in the form of White Papers or otherwise, about every aspect of proceedings in Korea.
I ask the House to realise this: we can, of course, pursue the policy of appeasement with the Soviet Union. That policy will pay no more dividends than did the appeasement of Hitler. What is needed is a firmness, but a genuine readiness to negotiate at all times. That, both the United States and ourselves have shown time and time again. The next move is not with us and not with the United States; the next major political move lies with those who have been opposing us. If that move is not made, the consequences are with them and not with us.
While venturing these criticisms, I hope that the events of the past 48 hours, tragic as they have been, will not lead this House to the sterile desert that is constituted these days in general, vague, anti-Americanism that has become a substitute for hard and honest thinking about the real facts of our present situation and the real responsibility for its dangers.

8.38 p.m

Viscount Hinchingbrooke: The hon. Gentleman the Member for Bilston (Mr. Nally) has had a good innings and perhaps he will forgive me if I do not follow him into the intricacies of some of his arguments. At the end of his speech he said that we should be frank with the United States. I agree with him heartily. It is because we have not been sufficiently frank with the United States in the past few years that we are in some of our present difficulties.
I yield to no one in my tribute to the United States for their gallant, effective and even wonderful economic assistance to the Western Nations and also to the depressed and under-privileged countries of the world. However, I am sure that the hon. Gentleman had no thought that we should allow any connection to exist in our minds between our right and moral course in foreign political relations and our expectation of some concessions,


economic or otherwise in the future. That would be disastrous.
In not speaking sufficiently frankly to the Americans I believe that we sometimes mistake the quality of mind of the average American citizen. The minds of young nations, like the minds of old gentlemen, are only moved by considerable events. I do not think that the nuances expressed through the quiet corridors of the Foreign Office are sufficiently telling when they reach the turbulent world 3,000 miles across the ocean.
It is all very well for our nation and for Western nations, schooled in an old tradition that established means of communication through chancelleries, to expect appropriate and important reactions to take place in the countries with which we communicate and to expect those countries to understand these nuances and devices. But if we want the United States to move, if we want her to operate in a different field or on a different principle, we have to express ourselves in no uncertain terms by forthright speech in the open and in the House of Commons.
I deplore the fact that for so long in this Korean war we have not had important representatives in the various centres in the Far East. The fact that we have not had them goes right back to the failure of the Socialist Government when the Korean war began. It was their responsibility to set up the appropriate channels of communication with the United Nations and with the United States so that from the very first British policy could be made apparent in the operations in Korea. They failed to do it, and I regret very much to say that in the last eight months of our Government we have failed ourselves to make the correction which ought to have been made.
I cannot quite understand how it is that my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister, who, during the war, saw that in every important field of operations we had the most effective military and diplomatic channels to the very centre of operations, has, through what process of thought I know not, allowed this situation to persist.
We have now reached the point which was brought most forcibly home to the House of Commons yesterday afternoon,

when, through a technical device which I will not dispute or enter into, the House was debarred from immediately discussing a matter of vital concern to the course of operations overseas and to the lives and fortunes of our soldiers, sailors and airmen. That we should have got into a situation where we have no more control upon the United Nations in its actions than that, seems to me to be very serious indeed.
I trust most earnestly that as the result of the visit to Korea and to Washington of Field Marshal Alexander and my right hon. Friend the Minister of State, who is present at this debate, important changes will be made so that the British point of view can be securely applied to the scene of operations.
I was, frankly, rather disappointed by the speech of my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary this afternoon. It was a speech, if I may say so to him, in his absence, without offence, which was more appropriate to a Secretary of State for War than to a Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. That is not to derogate at all from the high quality of the speech, but it was a speech that seemed to me to move almost too exclusively in the military field. It is politics and foreign statesmanship that really govern the question as it confronts us tonight.
My right hon. Friend spoke of the situation in North Korea, where there are these power stations which were overrun originally in the advance and were subsequently repaired, and then have been in the last few days heavily bombed. He said that that bombing action was justified because the power from them was used to supply airfields over the border in Manchuria.
The United Nations have been bombing airfields in North Korea which formerly contained Chinese aircraft. It is not unnatural that the Chinese withdrew their aircraft from those airfields to airfields further back. If we continue to follow them up in this strategic sense, chasing the aircraft wherever they may be on the airfields and chasing the sources of the electrical power which feed their bases and their industries, it seems to me that the whole process is quite unlimited. It may go on for ever. It may go on by longer-ranged aircraft reaching out


further over Manchuria through Mongolia until we find some fine day that the Russians themselves are harbouring these Chinese aircraft. Then the full scale war will begin.
I do not believe that in present circumstances in Korea an opening up of the military strategy of the United Nations can possibly result in peace. Peace is of two kinds. There is the kind which comes about through unconditional surrender—and here I thought my hon. Friend the Member for Lancaster (Mr. F. Maclean) was, in his arguments, recalling the experience of unconditional surrender of Germany a little too much —or it can come about through a truce. It can come about through the desire of both sides to get together and negotiate. That sort of truce, which rests on the willingness of both sides to come together, can only be obtained by peaceful processes. You cannot obtain a truce by the processes of war. If you want unconditional surrender, if you want to launch a whole scale war against China and bring them to Panmunjon suing for peace, then bomb them, bomb them to hell——

Mr. Emrys Hughes: And we reap the results.

Viscount Hinchingbrooke: But, if you want them to come to the council chamber, negotiating with us in the United Nations for a truce, you must exercise the arts of peace. You must exercise infinite patience—[An HON. MEMBER: "Eleven months."] It is not enough. I would not mind paying negotiators a high salary for a whole lifetime to sit in those tents and in those conditions in order to conclude peace and I will tell the Committee why.

Mr. Harold Davies: Thank God for your courage.

Mr. Beverley Baxter: If the other side used those months and months for assembling very highly trained Chinese armies to attack, would my noble Friend still tell us to go on and on?

Viscount Hinchingbrooke: The assumption of the whole argument is that they are also negotiating for a truce. That persists until we have evidence to the contrary. I believe that this truce making rests upon the arts of peace and that we must, therefore, have infinite patience.
I would not be advocating such policies at all if I thought that there was any high and moral advantage in continuing this war coming either to the United Nations or to ourselves. Since we crossed the 38th Parallel it seems to me from the strictly United Nations point of view, based upon the original sanctions and resolutions, that the war has lost its moral content.
As a United Nations endeavour it seems to me to have no purpose now. It is producing an unending series of operations, or seemingly producing them. I have always doubted from the very start —since the San Francisco Conference days—whether the United Nations was ever capable of being made an instrument of war, because it would inevitably divide the world into great groupings of Powers and produce war on a scale surpassing any that have gone before. I have always hoped that the United Nations would remain as a truce-making organisation, devoted to peaceful persuasion and the art of good international relations.
Nor do I think that this war serves the British purpose in any degree. From a strictly selfish point of view we are getting nothing out of Korea. Indeed, since the war started great historical trading ties affecting the lives and fortunes of many of our people have begun to come to an end and may be ended altogether. I do not think that from our own individual point of view there is anything to be had from going on with the war.
For those reasons I earnestly trust that the Foreign Secretary will recall again the splendid words he used when he went to Paris soon after the General Election and said that it would be his aim to conclude a series of definite and limited agreements with the Communist world, that it would be his aim to pacify public relations, to exercise the art of peace. If he will consult those techniques and those opportunities I am perfectly certain that it will serve this nation well, and the cause of the United Nations also.
We are a country which has gone through two wars in one generation. We are in many ways an exhausted country, physically, morally, spiritually and militarily. We need a long period of peace in which to build up our economic strength. We need our statesmen to exercise the arts of peace; and if the United States, in a different phase of


development, in a different corner of the world, cannot march with us in those policies, then I think, much as I value the Anglo-American relationship, that we should begin gently but definitely to indicate to them that we cannot face the endeavours, and that it is not in our interest to face the endeavours, which they seem successfully to be able to endure.
The hon. Member for Bilston (Mr. Nally) said that at all costs Anglo-American relations must remain intact.

Mr. Nally: The phrase "at all costs" was once used in a most unfortunate context by the Prime Minister. I did not say "at all costs." I said, as HANSARD tomorrow will show, that the most important factor in preserving world peace is the relationship between ourselves and the United States. But not at all costs, certainly not.

Viscount Hinchingbrooke: I agree that as long as American policy is pursuing what we should regard as an honourable and moral course I am by all means in favour of maintaining a full-scale alliance. But if, for any reason, one began to think that the course of the United States was not in the true interests of world peace, and was not fully alive to our own highly honourable and moral purpose in foreign relations, I would admit of a temporary separation and a different switch in foreign policy.
I think that this debate has done good. I am in very great difficulties about my vote tonight. I must tell the Government that if there is a vote, and no further statement can be made by my right hon. and learned Friend to the effect that immediate discussions will be entered into with the Americans for better representation of this country in Korea and in Japan, that their attitude may not in the course of a few weeks become much firmer than it has been indicated by my right hon. Friend this afternoon, I must, with all the consequences that may flow from it, abstain in the Division Lobbies tonight.

8.55 p.m.

Mr. Michael Stewart: We always listen to the noble Lord the Member for Dorset, South (Viscount Hinchingbrooke) with much interest and

respect, not only because none of us can ever be certain about what he will say next, but also because of the deep sincerity and thought which has obviously gone into the construction of this and other speeches he has made on foreign affairs.
I profoundly agree with the comments he made about the remarks of the Foreign Secretary. Quite naturally, the Foreign Secretary stressed the military importance of the recent raids in Korea, which was, after all, the original subject of our debate. But I would suggest that we have to take into account the coincidence of certain features with regard to those raids; their size, which was not unprecedented but exceptional and their timing at this juncture of the negotiations which was to say the least unfortunate. The choice of objective was one which was not only of military importance, but which must be interpreted as an attempt to show the Chinese people what are our powers to inflict injury, not only on military objectives, but on civilian life as well. And there is further the description of this raid by American spokesmen as the beginning of a new policy of getting tough.
If we add together the coincidence of the size, timing and objective and the descriptive words used, I think we are obliged to conclude that we have here not only a military operation, but a political act designed to affect the course of the negotiations at Panmunjon. It is on that account I think that hon. Members on this side of the Committee are concerned about them. We believe it to be extremely dangerous and undesirable that political acts of this kind, an attempt by a display of power to affect the course of the negotiations, should be conducted by military commanders apparently not even in complete liaison with their own Government and without any consultation with ours.
We believe that to be extremely dangerous; and when the right hon. Gentleman says of this act, "We support it," does that mean he thinks it desirable to go on with further acts of this kind with the object, by a show of power, of altering the course of the negotiations at Panmunjon?

Mr. Eden: Mr. Edenindicated dissent.

Mr. Stewart: The right hon. Gentleman shakes his head. But if that is not


what he means by the phrase "We support it," I hope the right hon. and learned Gentleman who will be speaking later will make clear what that extraordinarily ambiguous and difficult phrase does in fact mean. I should say not that we support it, but that we regret it. We must consider these occurrences against the background of the difficulties which have been arising in the relations between the United States and this country.
Before saying anything that is critical of the Government or the people of the United States, I should like to say that I believe there are some criticisms that can and ought to be made in this House; but that whoever makes them ought to set them against the background of the enormous services, both political and economic, that the United States rendered to mankind during and since the war.

Mr. Ellis Smith: May I ask my hon. Friend——

Mr. Stewart: I cannot give way. I have very little time——

Mr. Ellis Smith: But the United States should reciprocate that.

Mr. Stewart: I agree. There were the goods poured out through U.N.R.R.A., some of them to countries behind the Iron Curtain not in sympathy with the United States, and the determination with which they went into Korea, and the immense patience they have shown in the negotiations. But against that background we must notice that these raids, which are systematic of a certain recklessness and a certain belief that nearly everything can be solved by military means, come after the mishandling of the Koje prison camp, after the mishandling of the screening of prisoners; and in the knowledge that there are certain elements in the United States associated with General MacArthur who has said that the way to deal with this is actually to spread the war, and against the background of the attempt by the United States to support General Chiang Kai-shek.
Because of those matters, there is a danger of a growing divergence between ourselves and the United States. More and more, unless the proper steps are taken, people in this country will say that the United States is reckless and people in the United States will say that we are faint-hearted. It is of the greatest

importance—I am speaking now of what I consider to be a dangerous growth of opinion in this country—that more and more people are getting worried about what they believe to be the recklessness of the United States.
I give it to the people of the United States that equally they are entitled to make all the criticisms they feel proper of us, but surely our task is to try to heal that breach. It should be the job of any Government in power in this country today to make it clear to the United States what that danger is; to make it clear that, while we stand by them resolutely as allies in the United Nations and in the Atlantic Treaty, for the proper purposes of those bodies, we are not to be taken for granted.
We must not have an atmosphere in which it can be assumed that American military commanders can do anything and that we shall come forward afterwards and support them. If the American Government were to get that idea it would have the most disastrous results on Anglo-American relations. I suggest, therefore, that it is the task of the right hon. Gentleman and those who work with him to represent to the Government of the United States the serious anxiety—perhaps based on misunderstanding—that is steadily growing and to which this raid has contributed.
I believe that it could be remedied if we had either a representative at the truce talks or some other means of closer liaison with the command in Korea; if we could make it clear to the American Government that we deplore and reject their attitude towards Chiang Kai-shek; and stress that the whole purpose and intent of the people of this country is not to engage in any kind of preventive war but that our whole object and desire is the prevention of war.
It would be an immense disaster if any great and final breach occurred between this country and the United States, so great that I can only think of one greater and that would be for the people of this country to find themselves drawn into a conflict which a large number of them could not morally support, simply because the United States had acted in ignorance of the feelings and concern of people here.
It is the task of the Foreign Office to prevent that situation arising. I wish that


I could feel that in his phrase, "We support it," and in his handling of this incident today the Foreign Secretary had given us reason to believe that in fact the Government were engaged on that necessary task.

9.4 p.m.

Mr. E. Shinwell: My hon. Friend the Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. S. Silverman) who has just left the Chamber——

Mr. Emrys Hughes: He is coming back.

Mr. Shinwell: —made a most interesting speech which, however, as no doubt he would agree, extended beyond the issues in this debate. He declared that, looking back, he doubted whether the decision to support the Security Council over the Korean affair was justified. Moreover, he stated that, in his view, the facts have not been clearly established.
I do not propose to discuss the merits or demerits of those statements. Nevertheless, I must direct the attention of hon. Members in all quarters of the Committee to the fact—and it is a fact—that the House unanimously supported the United Nations decision.

Mr. Hughes: On a point of correction. The hon. Member for Merthyr Tydvil (Mr. S. O. Davies) expressed our opposition at the time.

Mr. Shinwell: The hon. Member who has just interjected expressed opposition to the decision of the Security Council, but there was certainly no opposition in the Division Lobbies. Therefore, I am justified in saying that there was unanimity.
In expressing our unanimous view at the time, we obviously accepted the implications of that decision, and one of the implications was to despatch to Korea bodies of troops, who have rendered very gallant service, as we know, and to associate ourselves with the United Nations Command in all their activities. It is quite futile to come to a decision after careful consideration and then seek to reject the implications of that decision.
I beg hon. Members to appreciate that it is obvious that, at this stage, we cannot contract out of the United Nations activities in Korea. That would mean abject

surrender. At the moment, I do not discuss the merits of the situation, but that would place us in a most invidious position, and it might bring about in due course a catastrophe, not only in the Far East but in the West, through a full-scale conflict.
I am impressed by what the noble Lord the Member for Dorset, South (Viscount Hinchingbrooke) said about Anglo-American relations, and also by the remarks of my hon. Friend the Member for Fulham, East (Mr. M. Stewart). I would say this. We must not truckle to the United States. We must speak to the State Department, and, if necessary, through the Defence Department of the United Kingdom, to the Pentagon in the most forthright fashion. We must leave them in no doubt as to where we stand. Nevertheless, we must exercise the greatest care in order to prevent any impairment of Anglo-American relations.
I would say to some of my hon. and right hon. Friends who are troubled about events in Korea and who are disposed to criticise the United States, that, as internationalists, accepting all the implications of international co-operation, we must remain on the most friendly terms with the United States. I can only foresee disaster if a different course is taken. Indeed, the case that is presented from this side of the Committee—the case put by my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition—is not presented in terms of criticism of the United States. It is an objective study of the situation which has emerged in Korea—no more than that— and upon that objective study we make our comments.
It is clear from what the right hon. Gentleman the Foreign Secretary said— and he was most frank in his statements —that the Government cannot be regarded as blameless in relation to what has occurred. That is not using very strong language which might ordinarily be used. On only one occasion since the General Election have we had a statement from the Government on the course of military operations in Korea, and that only as a result of persistent pressure by myself and by other hon. Members on this side, and, I have no doubt, with the consent of hon. Members opposite.
Contrast that position with what happened during the period of office of the Labour Government. Almost every week


demands were made by the Conservative Opposition for a statement about military operations in Korea, and responsibility— I ask hon. Members to note—was imposed on the Labour Government in this respect. When these reports were submitted, hon. Members on the Conservatime side always asked for more, and we were very willing to furnish what information was in our possession. No hon. Member can say that we withheld information in our possession.
But the present Government, in spite of the knowledge they possess—and, obviously, they must be receiving almost daily reports from Tokyo and Washington —withheld it from the House. We were not informed. The remarkable factor in this situation is that before the General Election and before the Conservative Party were returned to power, complaints were made that the Members of the Labour Government responsible for foreign affairs, defence, and the like, were quite unable to exercise any influence on the Administration of the United States, and that what was required was somebody like the present Prime Minister, with his remarkable influence and powers of persuasion.
They said in quite plain terms that if only the right hon. Member for Woodford (Mr. Churchill) were handling this matter, our relations with the United States would be more friendly, that there would be more effective cooperation and that we would be fully informed and that everything in the garden would be lovely.
What has happened? The Prime Minister went to the United States not long after the Election, and he came armed, no doubt, with information and having exhausted his powers of persuasion. But nothing happened; there were no more effective consultations as a result. Then, after a long time, the Government decided to send the Minister of Defence and the Minister of State to Korea, Tokyo, Washington and Canada to ascertain the facts for themselves. We welcomed the decision of the Government to send these right hon. Gentlemen to those places.

Major Tufton Beamish: Why did not you go yourself?

Mr. Shinwell: The hon. and gallant Gentleman asks why I did not go myself.
The answer is because we were getting the information and were presenting it to the House.
But on this occasion, and because of the circumstances which I have just disclosed, it was decided by the Government to send these two right hon. Gentlemen to find out the facts for themselves and duly report to the House of Commons. The Minister of Defence was welcomed. His visit was appreciated by the commanders in Korea and elsewhere. But what information do we receive? Did he, in fact, ask for any information? Did he go merely for the purpose of paying compliments to General Mark Clark?
He admitted, quite frankly—this is not what we say, but what he said—that he had no information about the events that have caused this debate. I should have thought that in conversation with General Mark Clark, who, at one time was one of his subordinates, he might have been able to ascertain what the intentions and plans of the Commander-in-Chief were. But not a word about it. He went there, and he saw and he returned without having conquered, without having obtained the information which the Committee desire. That is the position.
I must say of the incident which has given rise to this debate that it is incredible that he was not properly informed. There must be some reason for it. It is inexplicable and unaccountable. What could be the reason why the Minister of Defence, who is not merely a politician —I presume that he is a politician now— but a great and distinguished soldier, talking to distinguished soldiers on the other side, was unable to ascertain what was happening? The right hon. Gentleman the Foreign Secretary has given the game away, because he said that this particular incident, this air attack involving the use of more than 500 aircraft—no minor affair—was planned, must have been planned in advance.

Mr. Eden: I imagine so.

Mr. Shinwell: The right hon. Gentleman imagines so. All right, I accept his imagination. He imagines that it must have been planned. Of course it must have been planned in advance, and it might have been planned whilst the Minister of Defence was over there. But not a word was breathed to the Minister of Defence about it. He saw what was going on around him, but he never


detected any preparations or plans in relation to that air strike which has caused so much trouble.
This is a most incredible affair. It may well be due to the fact that the Minister of Defence knows nothing about politics and, being concerned only with military operations, would never consider for a moment the political implications of an attack of this kind. It is a very deplorable situation. The Foreign Secretary, in what he said about the plan of operations, said that, after all, this was a very minor affair because every day spasmodic and sporadic attacks were being undertaken by the United Nations command.
We read of these things almost every day in the "New York Times." There is there a summary every day of the military operations and hon. Members can avail themselves of that information. But we have not had for many months, certainly not during the course of the truce discussions, an air strike of this character. Indeed, the right hon. Gentleman himself said that as regards one particular objective, one particular target, reference was made to Washington to ascertain what their views were.
If that is not a departure from normal policy I should like to know what it is. It is obvious that this was a departure from policy, and it is no use trying to boggle at that. We have to consider the effect of what has happened. I must say —and I represent the views of nearly all, if not all, hon. Members in all quarters of the Committee—that the effect of what has happened is perhaps more important than any other consideration, because it may well be that the Chinese will retaliate. After all, it would not be surprising if they did. All I can say about it now —there is a great deal to be said about it—is that I hope that this debate will convince the Chinese that we in the United Kingdom, whoever we are, where-ever we are, and whatever our views may be, prefer a successful conclusion of the talks rather than a prolongation of the war. I am sure that that represents our attitude.
I go further. I say—and in this I agree with what was said by the noble Lord— that I doubt whether military operations can bring this war to an end. At the very best the air strikes and the land and naval operations may cause a great

deal of havoc and may prevent the Chinese and North Koreans from advancing or gaining the victory, as the case may be; but obviously, there is no hope that military operations alone can prove successful. In any event, military operations are bound to be prolonged.
I would go so far as to say that this air strike itself must have been ineffective on the first day, because the aircraft had to return to the attack on the second day. I go further still—and this is within the knowledge of hon. Members opposite who have had experience of this kind— and say that air attacks, even by heavy bombers—and in this case the attack was undertaken by light bombers— although they can cause some damage will not end the war. There is no question about that.
Now I come to the question which is, perhaps, uppermost in the minds of hon. Members, and that is the question of consultation. The noble Lord accused the late Labour Government of having failed in respect of consultations. I was surprised to hear that because I am bound to say that the ex-Foreign Secretary, Mr. Bevin—not my right hon. Friend the Member for Lewisham, South (Mr. H. Morrison), although he undertook the task afterwards—and myself at the Ministry of Defence consistently brought pressure to bear on the State Department and the Pentagon to ensure more effective and closer consultation.
What is the history of this matter? When General MacArthur was Commander-in-Chief we sent out Air Vice-Marshal Bouchier to act as his liaison officer. He was not treated too well by General MacArthur, but subsequently General Ridgway appeared on the scene and Air Vice-Marshal Bouchier was less harshly treated. We were never satisfied with the consultation and co-operation that had been going on. We always pressed for more consultation but for some reason or other the United States Administration resisted the pressure and we never received the satisfaction we desired.
To indicate the attitude of the Labour Government, I should like to quote a statement which was made by my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition in December, 1950. He said:
As a result of my talks with the President,"—


it will be remembered that my right hon. Friend went to see the President of the United States—
I am completely satisfied that the fullest weight will be given to the views of His Majesty's Government before instructions are issued to the United Nations Commander which have political implications."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 14th December, 1950; Vol. 482, c. 1356.]
Bearing on the same point, Ernest Bevin said that no military action which had political implications should be taken without appropriate consultations with other Governments. The present Prime Minister, following upon a speech from my right hon. Friend the Member for Lewisham, South, supported this view by expressing his general agreement with the traditional view that the civilian and constitutional authorities should control the action of the military commanders.
That is the crux of the problem. We have never taken exception to the principle that the commanders on the spot should exercise their discretion in determining what action should be taken— that is, action of a minor character—but where political considerations are involved, it is quite a different story. That is the question to which we have to address ourselves. What are the political considerations which emerge out of this attack? The first is this. I claim that this was a departure from the traditional policy, and secondly, which is much more important, that the action was undertaken at a time when the truce negotiations were proceeding, although temporarily suspended. Surely this was an ill-timed action, to say the very least of it.
The question we have to consider is what is to be done about consultation. I express the view that, first of all, machinery should be devised not unlike the machinery associated with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. This does not mean that the 40 or so countries associated with the United Nations' defence against aggression in Korea should be associated directly with the Command.
In the case of N.A.T.O. the representatives of those countries meet together from time to time and they have their Chiefs-of-Staff Committee, where there is full and effective consultation and where the nations concerned in the struggle are fully informed all along the line. It may

well be that that machinery is not appropriate to the situation in Korea, but something like that machinery is required to ensure an effective partnership and co-operation based on terms of equality; and that is the very least that we are entitled to demand.
I should like to direct the attention of hon. Members to a statement which appeared in the "New York Times," I think the day before yesterday, which bears on the subject of consultation. This is an American view of which we should fully avail ourselves. It says:
We shall never understand ourselves or form an effective working team with other nations until we are all more adequately informed about the reasons, processes and events that shape our common decisions—and our common destiny. Since we have no choice but to work together, the pooling of information and explanation is as vital as the pooling of arms.
There is an instruction to the right hon. Gentleman and, as I say, this in the crux of the whole problem.
This Korean affair may be prolonged, unduly prolonged, unnecessarily prolonged. If that should be the case—and we should all deplore it—it is all the more reason why there should be effective consultation, not necessarily on minor matters, for these can be left to the commanders on the spot, but wherever there is the least likelihood of political implications in the proposed action, there consultation is essential.
I know what the argument is—the argument used by some hon. Members; I am not sure whether it was used today on the other side of the Committee, but it certainly has been used by the Prime Minister—that, after all, the United States have sustained 100,000 casualties— which we all very much deplore, and we offer the utmost sympathy with those concerned—and that they are using large bodies of troops, aircraft and machinery of all kinds, whereas we, the next largest nation concerned, injecting the next largest number of troops and weapons into the struggle, are comparatively insignificant. We have not sustained anything like the casualties which the United States Forces have sustained.
I am bound to say that we cannot determine these problems in terms of mathematics. This can be no question of arithmetic. If we make our contribution —and we have made our contribution earnestly and with a readiness to bring


this struggle to an end and to defend the free world against aggression—we must be treated by the United States Administration and by the military commander as equal partners in this affair. That is our demand. What we want to know is what the right hon. Gentleman is going to do about it. [Interruption.]It is all very well for the right hon. Gentleman to say that he hopes to do something.

Mr. Eden: I said I hoped to do better than was done before.

Mr. Shin well: The right hon. Gentleman hopes to do better than was done before, better than we have done. He has had more than six months in which to undertake the task. [HON. MEMBERS: "The Labour Party had six years."] Well, of course, the Korean affair has not been going on for six years. It has been going on for 18 months. [HON. MEMBERS: "Two years."] All right, two years—whatever hon. Members opposite desire. But we never experienced an incident of this kind during that period.
When there was a prospect of General MacArthur's taking action which exceeded his authority, and which was resented not only in this country but in the United States, we took effective action. [HON. MEMBERS: "NO."] Well, if we did not take effective action I should like to know—and hon. Members can consult HANSARD about it—why I and other Members of the Labour Government were accused of taking action which brought about General MacArthur's dismissal. Hon. Members opposite cannot have it both ways.
At any rate—for I wish to be fair in this matter—let hon. Members opposite rail against the Labour Government. Let them complain that we were ineffective in persuading the Administration of the United States to provide more consultation. Let them complain. After all said and done, they have always pretended to be more competent than hon. Members on the Labour side. This affords an opportunity for them to provide a demonstration of their competence, and if they fail, as they have failed in the last six months or so, since the General Election —[Interruption.]I cannot understand the right hon. Gentleman's cavilling at what I have said, because he admitted he had not been properly informed about

this affair, and, what is more he deplored not having been informed about this affair.
The right hon. Gentleman sought to justify the proceedings; but, of course, he could not do anything else. It was quite impossible to do anything other than justify what happened although he knew nothing about it. He agreed he knew nothing about it, or of the events that led up to it, but, at the same time, he deplored the fact—and it is a fact, an inescapable fact—that he was not informed about it.
Does that mean, in spite of the Prime Minister's remarkable and undoubted influence and powers of persuasion with the people of the United States, that the Government have failed in their task? Is that what it means? It cannot mean anything else. Anyway, we are going to give the right hon. Gentleman a chance. [HON. MEMBERS: "Do not bother."] But—I want to make it quite clear beyond a peradven-ture—we are not going to tolerate a situation in which activities of this kind can be undertaken in Korea without consultation with the United Kingdom Government. We want to make that plain.
I must give way to the right hon. and learned Gentleman opposite. I want to say, finally, that we propose to take this much further. It may be unnecessary-it depends, of course, on what the right hon. and learned Gentleman has to say —to divide the Committee tonight— [HON. MEMBERS: "Oh."]—although the noble Lord the Member for Dorset, South is very anxious to divide the Committee. At any rate, he said he would abstain if there were a Division, but he did not like what the Government said or what the Government did, or failed to do. As I say, it may be unnecessary to divide the Committee, but we propose to take the matter further.

Mr. Eden: The right hon. Gentleman should support us.

Mr. Shinwell: I cannot possibly support the right hon. Gentleman in his lack of information, in his lack of knowledge, and in his lying down to the contempt with which he is treated by the United States.

Mr. Eden: Surely the right hon. Gentleman does not believe that.

Mr. Shinwell: The right hon. Gentleman has to change his tactics. He must be vigorous. He must be more forthright, and if the Minister of Defence is not capable of understanding the political implications of military decisions the sooner he resigns the better. It might be better to have a civilian Minister of Defence who is not afraid to talk to the military commanders or afraid to ask them questions or to offend them occasionally, if necessary. We have not got that kind of Minister of Defence at the moment. Perhaps he is too much of a gentleman. However, there I will leave it.
I wish to make it clear to right hon. Gentlemen opposite that we shall take the matter further. It may be that after the statement of the right hon. Gentleman, and that which his colleague the Minister of Defence is to make next week —I believe it is to be next Tuesday— we may require to raise another debate, and it may well be that in the absence of satisfactory replies and assurances we may require to test the feeling of the House.

9.36 p.m.

The Minister of State (Mr. Selwyn Lloyd): May I make it clear at the very beginning that Her Majesty's Government welcome this debate and will be very glad to have the opinion of the Committee tested upon this matter? So far as I personally am concerned, I would have welcomed it more had it not taken place quite so soon. I was decanted from an aeroplane at Heathrow at only 1 p.m. today, after travelling 25,000 miles by air in 19 days, and after a number of other things, and I might not be quite so clear-headed as hon. and right hon. Gentlemen on the other side would like me to be.
In the debate that has taken place there was a remarkable speech from the hon. Member for Bilston (Mr. Nally). I shall not deal with very much of what he said, but I agree very much with his impression of the character of United States' personnel who have to deal with prisoners of war. It might not reassure or satisfy some of his hon. Friends, but I can certainly tell him that I was very reassured by what I saw of conditions out in Korea. This idea of a collection of bellicose, irresponsible Americans thirsting to extend the war is a gross injustice to a very fine body of men.
Certain matters relating to Koje and the screening of prisoners were raised in the debate, particularly by the hon. Member for Fulham, East (Mr. M. Stewart). Those are matters which will be more properly debated, if there is to be a debate, next Tuesday.
Coming back to the question of the attack by air on the electric light plants near the Yalu river, I would make one point. The right hon. Member for Easington (Mr. Shinwell) criticised the present Government because more statements had not been made about the progress of operations in Korea. There has been a rather different type of operation going on in the last six months to what went on when he was Minister of Defence. Those operations were all very complicated and mobile, and it might not have been necessary to make anything like the same number of statements during the past six months as it was during the right hon. Gentleman's period of office.
A tendency has been shown when discussing the matter to underestimate the extent of the operations at present in progress. The right hon. Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. Bevan) said it was agreed between the two sides that fighting should be allowed to fade away, and that was the idea. It is true that we occupy strong positions which I believe can be defended with success, but it certainly is not a quiescent front. Operations are not, in fact, fading away. There has been this steady build-up of the enemy. There has been a steady improvement in their organisation and equipment. There has been a considerable amount of artillery fire on the front.
There has been a great deal of mortar fire, and on the day when we visited the Commonwealth position some positions of ours some distance away from us were being mortared by the Chinese and being mortared very accurately. It is not very pleasant for the people at the receiving end of a mortar bomb to be told that the front is quiescent. [HON. MEMBERS: "Who said that?"] At another position which we visited during the same day we could see a place where some casualties had been incurred that morning, and I know that the son of one of my hon. Friends in this House has been a casualty in Korea quite recently.
There is constant patrol activity, and some actions have taken place recently on, a battalion scale. It is only strong air pressure by the United Nations that has maintained the comparative stability of the front. There has been a constant effort by the Chinese to rebuild their airfields, and those attempts have had to be neutralised by a substantial air effort on the part of the United Nations. That air effort, in turn, has been met with strong anti-aircraft defences which have been improving of late. I tell the Committee quite frankly—and I am certain that my noble Friend the Minister of Defence would agree with this—that if the Chinese were to re-establish themselves on the forward airfields with their aircraft, there would be serious danger to all the United Nations forces in the line.
There is a lot of talk about not spreading the war. Of course there is no desire to spread the war, but no one seems to talk much about the safety of our own troops who are engaged in Korea. I say again that there can be no doubt that their safety at the present time depends in large measure upon the efficiency of the United Nations air effort.

Mr. Emrys Hughes: Bring them home.

Mr. Lloyd: There has been talk during this debate as to whether this was a legitimate military target. I think my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary appeared to convince the Committee that it was a legitimate military target. I am coming in a moment to the question of consultation and to the question of any political impact it might have, but so far as this target being a military target is concerned, I believe that most hon. Members think that it was a legitimate military target because from these plants was coming the power which goes to the airfields, which goes to the munition plants, which goes to the industrial effort that is behind this very large build-up of enemy forces in North Korea.
There is another point which should be considered. Perhaps my noble Friend the Member for Dorset, South (Viscount Hinchingbrooke) will remember this when he is considering talking about restraint and a peaceable approach. When flying in North Korea the United Nations airmen can see on these Chinese airfields just over the border the M.I.G.s lined up

ready to take off at their pleasure to come and have a shot at the United Nations aircraft, knowing that if they choose not to take off they will be left there in complete immunity. That is a substantial degree of restraint for any command to display.
Then we come to the question of consultation. As my right hon. Friend has said, Her Majesty's Government were not consulted. The Minister of Defence was not informed. My right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary has said that he regretted that fact. If it is any satisfaction or consolation to the Committee to know it, I did have an opportunity of meeting certain officials of the State Department the morning after it had been announced, and I expressed to them quite frankly what I thought would be the feelings of my colleagues on this matter.

Mr. Shinwell: Tell us what you said.

Mr. Lloyd: I said exactly what my right hon. Friend has said, that I thought it was a matter for regret that we had not been informed about this action.

Mr. Ellis Smith: This makes it all the more serious.

Mr. Lloyd: Then we come to the question of planning. Some suggestion was made with regard to the phrase which my right hon. Friend used of this operation having been planned. I have no doubt at all, and I should think that the right hon. Gentleman the previous Minister of Defence would agree, that this operation had probably been planned for many months. It is the sort of operation which any intelligent commander would plan together with a great many other operations which might have to be carried out. [An HON. MEMBER: "You knew nothing about it."] The right hon. Gentleman was quite unfair to my noble Friend the Minister of Defence when he said that he was incapable of understanding any political implications in a matter of this sort.
We were not consulted, and the question has been raised as to how we can get better consultation in the future. That, I think, is the most profitable aspect of the debate. Most people with any experience of these matters would agree that a campaign cannot be fought with a committee. If a committee of 20 nations is told that a target is to be bombed in


a week's time if their governments approve, one would certainly find the target surrounded by innumerable antiaircraft guns and very substantial fighter defences when the time came. It is quite impracticable in active operations to hand over the conduct of those active operations to a committee of nations.

Mr. F. Beswick: Has anyone suggested that?

Mr. Lloyd: I am simply seeking to rule out certain methods of doing that.

Mr. Shiowell: That has never been suggested by me.

Mr. Lloyd: As long as that particular Aunt Sally has gone, well and good, because there are some people who are suggesting that all these matters should be put to all the nations.

Mr. James Hudson: More imagining.

Mr. Lloyd: I am very glad to know, and to have the emphatic and vocal support of right hon. and hon. Members opposite, that they now agree that these matters of operational conduct should not be put to the Governments of all the United Nations.

Mr. Shinwell: The right hon. and learned Gentleman has not misinterpreted what has been said, but he must understand that when we asked for joint consultations and for something more than a single command to determine military operations, we are thinking in terms of the political implications. That is the distinction.

Mr. Lloyd: I agree; I was attempting to take it stage by stage. We have agreed that military operations should not be submitted to all the nations that are contributing forces.
Then we came to the question of what form this other consultation should take. Everybody is very ready to say that there should be consultation, but people are very reticent to come forward and say exactly what form of consultation there should be. Is it to be suggested that the political implications of such a course of conduct are to be put to every government that is contributing forces?

Mr. Harold Davies: My right hon. Friend, on 4th December, 1950, when he

was Prime Minister, was given an assurance, as this quotation shows, by the President of the United States:
The President told the Prime Minister that it was also his desire to keep the Prime Minister at all times informed of developments which might bring about a change in the situation.
Our argument is that a change in the situation has taken place without even the President of the United States or our Prime Minister being informed.

Mr. Lloyd: I was attempting to say that no one is very specific in his definition of exactly what form the consultation should take.
The Minister of Defence and I discussed this matter with General Mark Clark, General Van Fleet and, in Washington, with the Department of Defence and the State Department. The right hon. Gentleman suggested that we should have a sort of N.A.T.O. set-up in order to pass information. There is in existence already such a committee. There is regular briefing and information. I say straight away that this does not deal with future events, but so far as concerns what has happened there is an existing body which receives detailed accounts from the United Nations High Command as to what has taken place. [Interruption.It is suggested that that was very ridiculous, but that is the arrangement the right hon. Gentleman approved. I am not suggesting that it should be the only link, but it is certainly one of the bodies we should have.
Then we come to the question, having rejected the idea of everything being put to a committee, and that a committee for information is not enough, of deciding what further machinery for consultation should be invented or improvised. It is when we come to that that the critics are very reticent in putting suggestions forward. My noble Friend and I have made certain suggestions and brought certain suggestions back which we discussed with the American authorities. Those will be submitted to the Cabinet, and, in due course, the House will be informed as to what action is possible and what action is accepted by the United Nations Command. If the hon. Member looks in "The Times" of today he will see one of the matters which was discussed which we believe will improve the liaison.

Mr. Ivor Owen Thomas: When will the House be informed?

Mr. Lloyd: As soon as it is decided what the nature of that consultation will be.

Mr. Peter Baker: Mr. Peter Baker (Norfolk, South)rose——

Mr. Lloyd: I am sorry not to be able to give way to my hon. Friend. I agree with the hon. Member for Bilston that we want to improve the machinery for giving information, not to the Governments but to the public, about some of the events which have taken place. I think that many people are not satisfied with the efficiency of those arrangements at present.
I come to the third matter, the question of the political effect of this action of the bombing of the power plants on the Yalu River. I know that an expression of opinion has been put forward in the newspapers, but I personally do not believe that this bombing took place in order to ginger up the armistice negotiations. There have been varying views on the impact it will have on the armistice negotiations. The right hon. Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. Bevan) thought it might have a fatal effect upon them. One of my hon. Friends thought it might have a beneficial effect on the armistice negotiations. I think it will have no effect at all.
I think the Communists will have an armistice if they want one, irrespective of whether particular military targets in North Korea are bombed or not. The right hon. Member for Ebbw Vale appeared to base his argument on this Resolution of 30th November, a Resolution which, he suggested, stated that we pledged ourselves
to hold the Chinese frontier with Korea inviolate and fully to protect legitimate Korean and Chinese interests in the frontier zone.
That Resolution was dated 30th November, 1950. The Chinese came in in October, 1950. That Resolution was tabled on 10th November to try to get the Chinese to withdraw. They failed to withdraw and the Soviet vetoed that Resolution.

Mr. Bevan: The nations that voted in favour of that Resolution were Nationalist China, Cuba, Equador, Egypt, France, Norway, the United Kingdom of

Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America and Yugoslavia. Have we now run away behind the veto of the Soviet Union?

Mr. Lloyd: We certainly are not trying to run away behind the veto of the Soviet Union, but the suggestion that this Resolution has any relevance at all is completely wrong, because it was an attempt to get the Chinese to withdraw. They have failed to withdraw and, when we have nearly one million Chinese troops prepared to fight our troops, I think that sort of Resolution becomes mere words and of no value at all. I suggest to the House that right hon. and hon. Gentlemen on the other side of the Committee should have some regard for the safety of our troops. [Interruption.]The Opposition cannot have it both ways, one half shouting "Hear, hear" and the other "Disgraceful."
The hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland (Mr. Grimond) made what I thought was an extremely wise speech. I entirely agree with two of the points he put forward. The first was on the question of the limitation of the war in the Far East, which is the declared policy both of the previous Government and of this Government. But he also spoke of the consequences of a unified command and the loyalty that must demand.
The hon. Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. S. Silverman) said that my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary had given a carte blancheto the United Nations command. That is not so. This Government have continued, so far as that is concerned, as the late Government did. There is agreement as to how certain courses of action should be taken, and there is certainly no kind of blank cheque to the United Nations command to take any action of any sort. My right hon. Friend was speaking of loyalty to the United Nations command in relation to this particular action.
I do remind the Committee once again that we have entrusted the command of these operations to a United Nations command, and that command is entitled to some loyalty from us, and not to action which is calculated to encourage our foes and discourage those people who are fighting for the United Nations in the war. I ask the Committee to approve what my right hon. Friend said this afternoon and to do so unanimously——

Mr. James Callaghan: How does the right hon. and learned Gentleman expect to get unanimity when he accuses the Opposition of not caring about the safety of our troops?

Mr. Lloyd: —because I say again that the danger of this sort of debate is that people may think that there is a division —[Interruption.]—I heard a singularly offensive remark from an hon. Gentleman. I was saying that the danger of a debate of this sort is lest it should encourage those people whose one desire is to split the nations which are fighting in the Korean war.
We have said that we regretted that we were not informed about this proceeding. We have said we believe that it was a sound military target and that attacks upon targets of this nature in North Korea are essential as part of a programme to ensure the safety of our troops who are fighting there.
We agree that we will seek to improve the methods of consultation between the Governments contributing Forces to Korea. We have endeavoured to put forward certain suggestions which we have considered with the State Department and the United Nations' command, and I hope that it will be possible to put forward, in due course, certain practical suggestions for the approval of the Committee.

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the Chairman do report Progress and ask leave to sit again."—[Mr. Kaberry.]

9.59 p.m.

Mr. Harold Davies: In the one minute left I should like to ask the right hon. Gentleman — [Interruption.]— I should like to ask a serious question—[Interruption.]

It being Ten o'Clock the Motion to report Progress lapsed, without Question put andThe CHAIRMAN left the Chair to report Progress and ask leave to sit again.

Committee report Progress; to sit again Tomorrow.

Squadron Leader A. E. Cooper: On a point of order, Mr. Deputy-Speaker. I would draw your attention to a most offensive remark made by the hon. Member for Maldon (Mr. Driberg)

which, I think, is quite out of keeping with the traditions of this House and which you should ask him to withdraw.

Mr. Deputy-Speaker (Sir Charles MacAndrew): I did not hear any remark. If I had heard an offensive remark I should have taken notice of it.

Orders of the Day — NATIONAL HEALTH SERVICE (SUPERANNUATION)

Resolved,
That the Draft National Health Service (Superannuation) (Amendment) (No. 1) Regulations, 1952, a copy of which was laid before this House on 10th June, be approved.—[Mr. Marples.]

Motion made, and Question proposed.
That the Draft National Health Service (Superannuation) (Amendment) (No. 2) Regulations, 1952, a copy of which was laid before this House on 10th June, be approved.—[Mr. Kaberry.]

10.3 p.m.

Mr. A. Blenkinsop (Newcastle-upon-Tyne, East): I was on my feet to ask a question of the Minister of Health about the superannuation regulations which you, Mr. Deputy-Speaker, were putting to the House, and I would ask, in view of the fact that these amendments are of a fairly considerable character, that we should have some explanation given to the House in spite of the disturbed state of the Chamber at the present time.
In particular, I should like to draw the attention of such Members of the House as may be interested, even at this moment, to the particular provisions of these Regulations in page 4, paragraph (9, a)which refer to the provisions for the superannuation of dentists. It so happens that exactly—[Interruption.]—a year ago to the day I moved certain rather similar Regulations in this House. I want to point out to the Minister that while it may be desirable that we should maintain the superannuation provisions for dentists by including in their remuneration such revenue as they may receive from patients, in view of the charges that were imposed last year, it does not necessarily follow from that that we should agree automatically to this provision today. I want to call the attention of the Minister—who, I hope, can hear me in spite of the general hub-bub——

Mr. Deputy-Speaker (Sir Charles MacAndrew): Order. It is very difficult to hear; there is so much noise going on.

Mr. Blenkinsop: I am grateful to you, Mr. Deputy-Speaker, for your assistance, and I hope that after a moment or two it will be possible for me to be heard a little more clearly on the other side of the House.
We are confronted here with a point of principle, and I wish to call the attention of the House to it. We are approaching a point, if we have not already reached it, where the bulk of the revenue which the dentists receive will be not from the State, but from the patients.
I wish to ask whether we are satisfied in continuing with provisions for the maintenance of superannuation Regulations for dentists when, in fact, the State is to some extent ceasing to be the employer? As far as we can understand it, it is the intention of the Minister of Health not only to approve these existing charges which relate to this provision in the superannuation Regulations but possibly to propose other charges later. He has favoured us with the information that he approves of a system of charges generally. [Interruption.]

Mr. A. Woodburn: On a point or order. I suggest that in a serious discussion of this kind it might be possible for hon. Members to allow my hon. Friend to be heard. They ought to carry on their discussions outside the House.

Mr. Deputy-Speaker: I agree. I asked the House to make less noise. I hope that hon. Members will be less noisy and that they will allow the hon. Gentleman to make his speech.

Mr. Blenkinsop: Although I have reasonably good vocal expression and power of lungs, it would be much more helpful if I could adopt a more normal tone.
The point is that we understand that it is the intention of the Minister not only to maintain the existing health charges on a permanent basis but also possibly to propose further charges at a later date. If that happens we shall be confronted with the situation that the State ceases almost wholly to be the employer. Is it then proposed that we should maintain superannuation Regulations on the assumption

that the State is the whole or at least the main employer of the dentists in this country?
This is a matter to which the Minister ought to pay some attention. The Minister should either say that this matter will be dealt with as we dealt with it a year ago, on the understanding that the health charges in relation to dental treatment were purely temporary or, alternatively, should give some assurance tonight that the Government are prepared to reconsider the whole question of the Regulations as they affect dentists in view of the fact that the State ceases very largely to be their employer.

10.7 p.m.

The Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Health (Miss Patricia Hornsby-Smith): I should like to deal with the point raised by the hon. Gentleman the Member for Newcastle-upon-Tyne, East (Mr. Blenkinsop). I think that the other points in the Regulations are generally accepted. They are amendments which are wholly beneficial to those working in the Health Service, and I think that they will be made with the general agreement of the House.
On the matter raised by the hon. Gentleman, he has said exactly a year ago today he moved that similar Regulations would be accepted. They were based entirely on the same principle as those which we are now asking the House to accept. I find it a little difficult to follow the hon. Gentleman's somersault, in that it was right and proper that payments by patients should be made part of the remuneration of dentists accepted for the purpose of superannuation when the hon. Gentleman moved the Regulations last year, but now he thinks that they should be rejected.
There is no change of principle. The fact that the charges are extended and now cover a charge of up to £1, cannot in any way alter the principle that they are part and parcel of the general remuneration of dentists and that, as such, in all fairness they should be computed as part of their remuneration for the purposes of superannuation assessment. The hon. Gentleman made the point that our Regulations were not for a specific term and that his were for a definite term.

Mr. Blenkinsop: Do I understand from the hon. Lady that if the dentists were to receive the whole of their remuneration from patients and the State ceased in effect to be their employer, it would still be proposed to press these Regulations?

Miss Hornsby-Smith: That is a hypothetical question. If such provisions were extended in any way they would have to come before this House again in the form of Regulations and the House would have the same opportunity as they had a year ago, and as they have tonight, of deciding whether or not they should become operative.
So far as the dentists are concerned, it is impossible to believe that the House seriously considers that they should be deprived of this particular part of their remuneration for the purpose of computing their superannuation assessments. I hope that the House will not be led astray by the somersault of the hon. Gentleman into opposing a principle which it accepted last year, and bringing in what would be a very grave injustice to one section of practitioners in the service by depriving them of their normal rights under the National Health Service superannuation scheme.
If I may now say a word or two on the general terms of the Regulations, which appear to be very involved, I would say that there are many Amendments which have arisen as the result of the extensions under the Reserve and Auxiliary Forces Act. We have consulted the professional associations and the general practitioners' representatives and we have had consultations with the Staff Side of the Whitley Council, on particular aspects of the Regulations, and we have had no adverse comment.
We believe that they are fair and that they will remove anomalies, and will see that there is no hardship resulting either from people being called up as reservists or, alternatively, taking additional courses in their training. We believe that they are wholly to the benefit of employees or practitioners in the Health Service, and we hope that, on those grounds, the House will support them.

Mr. Blenkinsop: Will the hon. Lady say that she really believes, now that, in fact, the bulk of the income of the dentists is likely to be derived from patients and not from the State, these Regula-

tions are desirable, without any further talks at all?

Miss Hornsby-Smith: I do not accept the hon. Gentleman's assessment that the bulk of the remuneration of practitioners under the Health Service will no longer come from the Health Service, but, even if that were so, and I do not admit it, I am convinced that the present charges should rightly be made part of the remuneration for superannuation purposes. If there were an extension, it would, indeed, again be a matter for the House to decide the proper alteration or amendment of the Superannuation Regulations.

Question put, and agreed to.

Resolved,
That the Draft National Health Service (Superannuation) (Amendment) (No. 2) Regulations, 1952, a copy of which was laid before this House on 10th June, be approved.

Resolved,
That the Draft National Health Service (Scotland) (Superannuation) Amendment Regulations, 1952, a copy of which was laid before this House on 10th June, be approved.— [Commander Galbraith.]

Orders of the Day — FOOD PRICES

10.14 p.m.

Mr. Frederick Willey: I beg to move,
That an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty, praying that the Rice (Amendment) Order, 1952 (S.I. 1952, No. 1112), dated 5th June, 1952, a copy of which was laid before this House on 6th June, be annulled.

Sir Herbert Williams: On a point of order. May I ask, Mr. Speaker, whether these Motions are to be discussed together, because I have a particular reason for doing so? When, in March last year, we had five or six Prayers on the cost of textiles, the then Speaker ruled that they had to be discussed separately. I regretted that decision, but I did not challenge it,, because one cannot challenge a decision like that. It led to a most unpleasant debate, which went on until six o'clock in the morning. I hope that your Ruling may be different, Mr. Speaker, and that we may take all these Motions as one.

Mr. Speaker: I was about to listen to the hon. Member for Sunderland, North (Mr. Willey).

Mr. Willey: I would suggest, Mr. Speaker, that as these Orders, in the main, deal with price increases, it would be for the convenience of the House if we could have a general discussion on them, and, if necessary, the Question could be put separately on each of them.

Mr. Speaker: That is what I had supposed, and I am perfectly agreeable to that course.

Mr. Willey: I am told that one of the difficulties about the new long-playing gramophone records is that the needle is apt to stick in the groove and that the gramophone goes on repeating itself. That is equally true of the Parliamentary Secretary. Although the present Government have been in office eight months, he still goes on saying that he is doing what he is doing because he is governed by the actions taken by the past Government. That is not a very virile attitude for a Government to take, but, in any case, it is patently untrue. It is probably for this reason that the "Sunday Express" has described the hon. Gentleman as the "worst flounder in the Government," which, looking at the Government Front Bench, is a high distinction indeed.
Of the seven Orders against which we are praying, six provide for price increases and the seventh for a measure of decontrol which, in turn, is designed to lead to price increases. Some of the Orders will lead to a large number of consequential price increases, and all these price increases are in addition to the 27 price increases which the Parliamentary Secretary announced in answer to a Question by my hon. Friend the Member for Coatbridge and Airdrie (Mrs. Mann) only a fortnight ago.
The first Order increases the price of rice and rice products. It increases the price of whole rice by 3d. a 1b., and over and above this the charges for pre-pack-ing are increased. The Ministry of Food says that these increases are necessary because of the continued world shortage of rice and the resultant rises in price in the supplying countries. But this is not an adequate explanation for the Parliamentary Secretary to give. During the General Election he and his friends said that they were going to bring down the price of foodstuffs by sending business men combing the world.
There is not the slightest doubt that if we sent business men out for rice they

could get more; they could certainly get better rice, and probably even cheaper rice. But if they did that it would be very unsocial; it would be disruptive of our influence in the Far East and damaging to our prestige among the countries of the Far East. I do not invite the Parliamentary Secretary to that and I never made any such promise. But it is for the hon. Gentleman to explain to his colleagues why he is not carrying out his promise, and it is for him to explain this particular increase.
Admittedly, there are world shortages today, but those shortages are less acute at the present time than they have been for the past six and a half years. Only a few days ago I noticed that Pandit Nehru, the Prime Minister of India, in addressing the people of India in his nationwide broadcast on the food situation, referred to the rice position. He drew attention to the improvement in rice supplies and justified the free market in Madras by saying that "there is a large stock of rice there, enough for more than a year on the present scale of rations," and he added that "the prices in the free market are also low."
But the increase we are discussing is the biggest we have had in the price of rice since control was introduced. Throughout the 6½ years of the last Government, when we repeatedly faced the situation of a famine in rice, we only increased the price of rice by a total of 3d. a 1b. Now within eight months and at one stroke the present Government, in much easier circumstances, are increasing the price of rice by 3d. a 1b., and I should like to know whether the Ministry of Food are making any profit out of it.
The second Order had to be reprinted. The Ministry of Food forgot to include in it Part III of the Schedule. We are getting used to this muddle. After all, the last order against which we prayed had to be reprinted. I can only hope that the Minister and his Parliamentary Secretary will pay some attention to these persistent complaints about this needless cost and needless inconvenience to traders, and will see that they print these Orders properly the first time.
That Order increases the retail price of sugar sold for manufacturing purposes by a halfpenny a lb., and it also increases the delivery charges. In other words, it


increases the wholesaler's margin. In this case the Ministry says that this increase is necessary because of increased cost of procurement. I want a fuller explanation than that. This is the first increase in the price of sugar for manufacturing purposes since 1947, and it will cause a whole host of consequential increases. It will lead to increases in the price of flour and sugar confectionery, of jam and of all food products which use sugar in their manufacture.
It has this further unfortunate effect, that the allocations of sugar to the manufacturers have been drastically cut, and that means that their overhead costs to turnover are proportionally increased. But at this moment the Ministry says, "You will not only get less sugar but you are to pay more for it." In this case the Minister of Food admits that he is making a profit out of it, and he uses it to offset the subsidies. I should like to know how much profit he is making and paying to peg the subsidies.
It is inevitable that pretty soon there will be a further Order increasing the price of sugar to the housewife. Generally on the question of sugar, what is the Minister doing? We have had far more sugar imported into this country in the first five months of this year than was imported in the same period last year. Everybody knows that we have substantial stocks. What is the Minister doing in cutting the allocations, cutting the rations and accumulating this sugar?
He is accumulating it apparently in the present world price position when I do not think anybody would dispute that it is quite clear that the price of Cuban sugar is weakening and is going to fall. What an opportune moment to put up the price of sugar to the manufacturers. I can only suggest that the Ministry is making what used to be called a "fortuitous profit" because it is alarmed at the rate at which the subsidy is running.
The third Order increases the prices of invert sugar by 3s. 9d. a cwt. The fourth Order increases the retail prices of syrup and treacle by ½d. a 1b. This will bear particularly heavily on the housewife. In the last Parliament my hon. Friend the Member for Dartford (Mr. Dodds) used to question me about syrup and treacle, and I pointed out to him that the consumption was above that of pre-war. I can only assume that this Order is in-

tended to bring it down to below pre-war level.
We should like to know by how much and why the margin is increased to the wholesaler and the retailer. Recently we have complained of or rather called attention to the fact that grocers were getting an additional £10 million by way of increased margins. Why, on this occasion, is the Minister giving the grocers an increased margin?
We on this side of the House are getting the impression that to the Government it is all very well for everybody except the poor wage and salary earners to have an increase by way of margin of profit. We have repeatedly called attention to the fact that by the action of the Government everyone is being compensated for the rise in the cost of living except the wage and salary earners.
The fifth Order increases the retail price of condensed milk by 2d. a tin. The Ministry of Food say that this is due to the increase in the purchase price of condensed milk, but we had a Condensed Milk (Amendment) Order as recently as March. We discussed that Order when we were dealing with the increased margins. What has happened since March to increase the procurement cost of condensed milk? It must have happened since March or it would have been provided for in that amending Order. In fact, we had in October an increase of 2d. a tin in the price of condensed milk. What has happened since then to justify this further increase? Again, as in the case of syrup and treacle, this is a very serious matter for the housewife.
I have complained repeatedly that the consumption of fresh milk was falling. The Parliamentary Secretary was brave enough to deny that, but the Minister corrected him and said that it was falling but not significantly. It is falling significantly enough for me. Poor people who cannot afford fresh milk buy condensed milk because they think they can make that go further; but now the Ministry of Food is saying, "If you cannot afford milk because we have put up the milk prices you will now find it difficult to afford condensed milk."
The sixth Order increases the price of clotted cream by 6d. per 1b., to make sure that that is a luxury. The last Order deals with loaves, rolls of bread and baps


not exceeding 10 ounces in weight. I will leave my hon. Friend the Member for Coatbridge and Airdrie to deal with baps. But let us have no nonsense about this Order. The bakers have been complaining persistently about the inadequacy of the bread margins, and it is quite clear that this is a backdoor way of allowing them to increase their margins. Increased prices have occurred and were, in fact, inevitable.
What is the position about the subsidy? Surely even the Parliamentary Secretary would consider that it is flagrantly offensive for bakers to receive a subsidy if the bread made out of the ingredient to which the subsidy is applied is free of control? I should like to know how the Parliamentary Secretary is going to ensure that bread being sold free of control is not being subsidised by the taxpayer. These Orders collectively not only demonstrate the failure of the Government, they also represent a callous contempt for the promises which they made so recently.

10.27 p.m.

Mrs. Jean Mann: I beg to second the Motion.
I notice that we have here seven Orders, relating to condensed milk, syrup and treacle, invert sugar, manufacturing sugar, rice and cream, and then there is the explanatory note to Order No. 976, which reads:
This Order frees loaves, rolls and baps"—
I take it that baps have a different definition according to where one lives in the United Kingdom. They may include parish buns, Chelsea buns, rock buns and so on—
not exceeding 10 ounces in weight from the need to be sold in specified weights"—
We are setting them free and depriving the housewives of a guaranteed weight for their money. The Order continues:
and, if national bread in loaves of 14 ounces or a multiple of 14 ounces is on sale at the same time, from price-control.
This was presumably what the Prime Minister meant when he talked about setting the people free. The Order goes on:
(Loaves, rolls and baps not exceeding 2 ounces in weight remain free of price-control without any condition.)
Since hon. Gentlemen opposite have come into power they have followed out

the command in the leading article in the "Daily Express" to "make a bonfire of controls," and that bonfire of controls has raised the price of 38 different items. The hon. Gentleman gave me a figure last week of 27 items. Since then there have been four more and when he calculates that there are 27 items he does not calculate the consequences. For example, one of the 27 items was in relation to the increase in the price of flour —an increase of 25 per cent. But consequential upon that increase there was an increase in the prices of as many items as there are cakes in a baker's window, because cakes of every kind went up in price in consequence of the increase in the price of flour.
This has been going on continuously during the past six months whilst this Government have been in power; and it is being done behind the backs of the public. It is true that the Chancellor of the Exchequer has rigged up the shop window and has peered into it and has said, "Look, I am putting up the prices by 1s. 6d. Take note T.U.C. Take note all who want increased pensions. I am putting up the prices by 1s. 6d. by my withdrawal of the food subsidy."
But the economist who writes in the "Observer" said last Sunday that, so far, only 4½d. of the 1s. 6d. has been imposed. Are we to assume, therefore, that the only increase in price in the last six months has been 4½d? Then the Chancellor ought to put a notice in the shop window saying, "Buy now before prices rise to 1s. 6d."
The back room boys have been busy. The right hon. and gallant Gentleman in charge of food supplies and his hon. Friends have been busy in the back shop with these orders. They have imposed increases on 38 different items——

Mr. Speaker: I have to point out that we have seven increases here. That is enough for us to deal with, without the 38, if the hon. Lady can keep to these Orders.

Mrs. Mann: May I say, Sir, that one dozen imposed on the other 26 is just a little too much, and in the back shop they are going on raising prices. Every time a woman enters a grocer's shop to buy sauce, semolina—yes, even infants' food, she finds this is so. I am surprised that infants and invalid food prices have gone up.
In regard to condensed milk it is astonishing that hon. Gentlemen opposite should penalise the mothers of young children. I know that the children under one year are still getting free milk, for which we are duly thankful, but the young ones, as the hon. Gentleman well knows since he has a young family himself, do not get tea——

Mr. C. S. Taylor: Do they drink tea?

Mrs. Mann: Yes. May I say from my experience as a grandmother that I find little ones under five are very fond of a tea tipple, provided that it is well mixed with milk. There is no allowance for them in the tea ration. Therefore, mothers resort largely to condensed milk.

Mr. James Hudson: Hon. Gentlemen opposite do not know anything about tipples of that sort.

Mrs. Mann: I deplore the fact that this concerns not only full cream sweetened—which is what we give to the children—but even evaporated milk, from which we make their milk puddings, and unsweetened evaporated milk, with which we enrich quite a number of the dishes we make for our children. One would have thought that machine skimmed sweetened milk might have escaped the attention of the hon. Gentleman, but there is not a solitary tin of milk in a grocer's shop which has not been increased in price.
Housewives who are keen, and study economy, and who have been having an eye on fruit preserving know that sugar will be scarce. They know that the hon. Gentleman opposite is not going to give the usual bonus of sugar for jam making, and so they have turned their attention to syrup and treacle for use in milk puddings and for sweetening fruit to save as much of the domestic rations as they can for any fruit there might be at the end of the season. One can imagine that the hon. Gentleman had snoopers in all their cupboards, watching the habits of the housewives, because he has discovered this habit of using syrup that has been adopted recently. Down he has come, and over the corpses of the housewives' needs he has fixed higher prices for syrup, treacle and condensed milk.

Mr. Ede: They came to a sticky end.

Mrs. Mann: The Sugar (Prices) (Amendment No. 3) Order, No. 1148, will undoubtedly put an extra increase on the price of sweets, afternoon cakes, and possibly will increase once more the price of jam preserves and tinned fruit. These are the consequences of the acts which the hon. Gentleman opposite seeks to impose by these Orders which are being constantly brought before us. Likewise, the Rice (Amendment) Order, No. 1112, will affect the price, not only of ordinary rice, granulated rice and flaked rice, but of invalid foods which have their basis in flaked, granulated or rice flour.
There will be consequential increases arising out of almost all of these Orders. Instead of having 27 items which have been increased in price, one can foresee another 10 items which will go up. What will the actual increase be under these Orders? Today I had a reply which said that so far as these Orders were concerned it was 1s. 2d. a week. I do not believe that reply. I have read that the result will be 4s. a week.
I have made a careful budget myself, and I have one here for a family of four —father, mother and two children, and I find that the consequential results of these Orders amounts to 2s. 6d. a week, in addition to the Is. 6d. a week already announced by the Chancellor of the Exchequer. That makes 4s. a week. I have another one which gives the result of these Orders at £1 a week for a family of five. I do not think that the estimate of the effect of the Orders so far, including these tonight, at £1 a week for a family of five is an inaccuracy or an exaggeration, and I implore the Parliamentary Secretary to retrieve his reputation. [An HON. MEMBER: "That is impossible."] He was held in such high esteem by the mothers of the country. I implore him to agree to our Prayer tonight and to withdraw this and the other Orders.

10.41 p.m.

Mr. C. S. Taylor: It was a little unfair of the hon. Member for Sunderland, North (Mr. F. Willey), who moved the annulment of this Order, to refer to the "Sunday Express" last Sunday. We in the Conservative Party do not judge by what professional journalists say about our Ministers. We judge them by results. [HON. MEMBERS: "Oh."] We need no advice from a. "Cross Bencher," whoever he may be, about who the Government should appoint to be the


Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Food.
But there is another paper, the "Sunday Dispatch," that publishes various stories about things, and I should liken the hon. Member who moved the Prayer to Katrina, in the "Sunday Dispatch"—a person who falls for everything and everybody.

Mr. Speaker: There is nothing about Katrina in the Orders.

Mr. Taylor: The hon. Member mentioned an article in the "Sunday Express," and I thought that I should retaliate by mentioning a story in the "Sunday Dispatch."
I well remember, when the hon. Member was sitting on this side of the House, when we taught him how to move Prayers. Had it not been for the advice we gave at that time, perhaps these Prayers would not have been moved tonight. The hon. Member has talked tonight about Ministry of Food Orders having to be retrenched. I am proud of the fact that the Ministry of Food can say, "Such and such an Order is not quite right. We will take it back. We will have it reprinted and renewed. We will not wait for the House of Commons to find fault with it. We will take it back and make a new Order which will be acceptable to the House." I am proud that the Conservative Government have done that.
The hon. Member also said that he believed that the Ministry of Food were making a profit out of their dealings in food. We all believed that in the days of the last Government. We all got up when we were on the benches opposite and we said so, and we believed it. We thought it was true. I still believe that it was true. But I now believe that the Ministry of Food, while they still exist— and I hope that they will not exist for ever, because I hope that there will be no need for a Ministry of Food before long—will be out to serve the community and not to make a profit, as I believe the Ministry of Food made under the last Government.
The hon. Member has accused the Government of importing more sugar. Of course they have imported more sugar. [HON. MEMBERS: "Where is it?"] It was one of our Election promises. We said

that we would import more sugar. But I suggest that the sugar that has been imported has had to make up the reserves that had been completely spent and used by the last Government. Likewise, the reserves of tea which were squandered by the late Government have to be built up. The hon. Member for Coatbridge and Airdrie (Mrs. Mann) talked about an allocation, or ration, of tea for those under five. I have a daughter who is under five years old, and a very attractive daughter, too.

Mr. Ede: She takes after her mother.

Mr. Taylor: I thank the right hon. Gentleman. He has met my wife, and the child does. It is unnecessary to make an allocation, or ration, of tea to a child under five years old.

Mr. Speaker: There is nothing about tea in these Orders.

Mr. Taylor: I was only answering the case which, with great respect, you, Mr. Speaker, allowed the hon. Lady to make about tea.

Mr. Speaker: The hon. Lady related that argument to the condensed milk Order. The hon. Member is not doing so.

Mr. Taylor: I shall not pursue that matter further, Mr. Speaker, but will merely say again that we on this side of the House taught hon. Members opposite how to raise these matters in the House, and suggest that when they have such a flimsy case as they have presented tonight they should leave matters alone.

10.47 p.m.

The Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Food (Dr. Charles Hill): I am going to take it that the hon. Gentleman, the Member for Sunderland, North (Mr. F. Willey), in moving this Prayer, was inspired by a genuine desire to know the reasons for these various increases in price. I think it will be convenient if I go briefly through the Orders stating these reasons.
I ought perhaps to say that the comment which the hon. Member made about the effect of our rice purchases and rice consumption upon the world rice situation was hardly justified when one bears in mind that while the world production of rice is 150,000,000 tons a year, of which about 4,000,000 tons goes into


trade, the needs of this country are met by rather less than 100,000 tons of rice a year.
The price of rice, which we have been purchasing from Burma and Brazil and are now purchasing from Burma and Siam, has risen between October, 1950, and May, 1952, by approximately 60 per cent.—63 per cent. in the case of rice purchased from Burma. The hon. Gentleman knows that we purchase rice in lots as it becomes available, and the figure of a 60 per cent. increase relates to the whole Burma purchase. The increase might be higher or lower for individual lots.
The average consumption of rice in this country is just over three pounds a head a year; but the price has gone up by 60 per cent., and it is an inevitable consequence of that increase that the price increases set out in S.I. No. 1112 should follow. The hon. Gentleman drew attention to the pre-packaging increase which, as he knows from his experience of similar increases when he held the office I now hold, is due to substantiated claims, as severely tested by the costing department of the Ministry of Food. He knows that this increase is justified.
We pass to the subject of sugar. I was surprised the hon. Gentleman made no reference to what he knows to be the cause of the sugar increase—that is the provisions of the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement. [Interruption.]I am seeking to give an objective description. The cost per ton of sugar in that Agreement was some £5 12s. 6d. per ton over and above the price paid immediately before the Agreement.
Bearing in mind that there is no subsidy on manufacturing sugar, this Order is the inevitable expression of this increase in price, which this country was glad to pay in the circumstances and bearing in mind the objectives of the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement. I am certain the hon. Gentleman would wish to acclaim that Agreement as a substantial contribution to the prosperity of the sugar growing Colonies and I am certain he will recognise that, in the absence of a subsidy on manufacturing sugar, the increases in this Order are inevitable and proper.
The hon. Gentleman referred quite accurately to a fall in the price of world sugar, and made reference to the position

of Cuban sugar. That is true, and I should say that I know nothing of the report in today's Press of Cuban sugar being offered to us for sterling. Cuban sugar is available, and can now be bought for dollars. I do not wish to pass to the other question we have hammered out here so often, but the position is that the limitation on our sugar supplies is shortage of dollars, for there is sugar available for those who have the dollars to spend.
The Orders which deal with invert sugar—the form of sugar that goes to the brewers—and syrup and treacle are the inevitable consequences of the increase of sugar prices which is the inevitable consequence of the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement. I agree that there must be other consequential increases, bearing in mind the part manufacturing sugar plays in so many items of food.
If I pass lightly over clotted cream, it is because the hon. Gentleman appeared to have no powerful convictions on this subject. I am sure he recalled that when he held this office there was a period when price control was removed and the price rose to 10s.
The hon. Lady the Member for Coatbridge and Airdrie (Mrs. Mann) referred to the newer freedom given in this Order relating to bread. I would commend to her the desirability, on grounds of craftsmanship, palatability and local taste, of securing a return as early as possible to freedom for the bakers—particularly small bakers—to make a wide variety of special breads—or reinforced bread, as it is sometimes called—to meet the tastes of different areas.
It is absolutely impossible to apply a system of price control, even if we wished, to the wide range of such special breads. The price inevitably depends on the constituents. What is more, in the last few months, Members on both sides have been urging on my right hon. and gallant Friend the position of the smaller baker. It has been possible to help him in many ways. We believe that this is a small but useful contribution to the small baker's freedom to make his own special kind of bread. As the hon. Lady will know the loaf of 10 oz. or less cannot be sold unless national bread is on sale at the same time. These special breads are unsubsidised.

Mrs. Mann: I appreciate the need to give a certain amount of freedom to produce a lighter and smaller loaf. In Scotland, before the war, we did that, but there was a restriction that the lighter and more airy loaf should not be more than a ½d. or¾d. dearer than the heavier loaf.

Mr. F. Willey: How does the hon. Gentleman police it?

Dr. Hill: The use of flour for the manufacture of bread and for other purposes is policed now. There may have been dissatisfaction with the method in the hon. Gentleman's time, but no new problem is created by this freedom. The definition is still necessary.
On the hon. Lady's point, the roll, bap, or bread of less than 2 oz. remains free of price and other control. This extension is to permit a special kind of loaf to be made. The figure of 10 oz. was not selected because of any particular attachment on our part to 10 oz., but because the weights and measures authorities insisted on it to permit of a sufficiently clear distinction between the 10 oz. and 14 oz. loaves.
I shall not be drawn into argument on the desirability of adding a condensed milk tipple to tea, nor into the condemnation of condensed milk for the infant. Perhaps the hon. Lady will agree with me that we should not give any kind of impression that condensed milk is an appropriate food for the very young child.

Mrs. Mann: I made it plain that I was referring to children over one year and under five.

Dr. Hill: I am grateful to the hon. Lady for making that quite clear.
There are three elements in this increase. One is the elimination of subsidy which creeps from time to time into this field. The second is the increased cost of milk for manufacturing. The hon. Gentleman asked me what had happened since March. What has happened since then is the Price Review. The third

element is the increase in the wholesalers' margin. It is most undesirable that anyone should seek on principle to condemn an increase in a margin without a knowledge of the case which was put up.
It was demonstrated here, for example, that this commodity was being handled at the wholesale level at a loss. The Ministry insists on high standards of proof —as high as when the hon. Member who moved this Prayer was in office—and it has been demonstrated in this case that the increase was justified. The Cooperative movement joins with its fellows on the other side of the table in demonstrating increases in costs, in search of increases in margins at wholesale and retail levels. I ask hon. Members not to indulge in wholesale condemnation of increases in margins which are made only after the most careful scrutiny.
I am not going to compete with the hon. Gentleman in his outbursts of anaemic and rhetorical violence, but prefer to give the House the facts behind these Orders. Any who may propose to divide the House against the sugar price increases, and those Orders following from it, are, in fact, condemning an agreement of substantial value to the Colonies. If there is an increase in price, it follows inevitably, in the absence of subsidy, that that increase must be passed to the consumer.

11.1 p.m.

Mr. Ede: I do not think that the hon. Gentleman will expect us to be satisfied with his answer because the theme song throughout has been "inevitable." There was a well-known leader of this party who talked of the "inevitability of gradualness," but tonight it is the "inevitability of excessiveness." We shall divide the House on the first Order, because, after all that was said at the Election last year, the hon. Gentleman can say no more now than that this is inevitable.

Question put,

The House divided: Ayes, 161; Noes, 175.

Division No. 184.]
AYES
[11.2 p.m.


Acland, Sir Richard
Foot, M. M.
Paling, Will T. (Dewsbury)


Anderson, Alexander (Motherwell)
Fraser, Thomas (Hamilton)
Pargiter, G. A.


Awbery, S. S.
Freeman, John (Watford)
Pearson, A.


Bacon, Miss Alice
Gibson, C. W.
Peart, T. F.


Balfour, A,
Gooch, E. G.
Plummer, Sir Leslie


Barnes, Rt. Hon. A. J
Grey, C. F.
Popplewell, E.


Bence, C. R.
Griffiths, David (Rother Valley)
Price, Joseph T. (Westhoughton)


Benn, Wedgwood
Griffiths, Rt. Hon. James (Llanelly)
Price, Philips (Gloucestershire, w.)


Benson, G.
Griffiths, William (Exchange)
Proctor, W. T.


Beswick, F.
Hale, Leslie (Oldham, W.)
Reid, Thomas (Swindon)


Bevan, Rt. Hon. A. (Ebbw Vale)
Hall, fit. Hon. Glenvil (Colne Valley)
Rhodes, H.


Bing, G. H. C.
Hall, John (Gateshead, W.)
Robens, Rt. Hon. A.


Blackburn, F.
Hamilton, W. W.
Ross, William


Blenkinsop, A.
Harrison, J. (Nottingham, E.)
Royle, C.


Blyton, W. R.
Hayman, F. H.
Schofield, S. (Barnsley)


Boardman, H,
Henderson, Rt. Hon. A. (Rowley Regis)
Short, E. W.


Bowles, F. G.
Herbison, Miss M.
Silverman, Julius (Erdington)


Braddock, Mrs. Elizabeth
Holman, P.
Simmons, C. J. (Brierley Hill)


Brockway, A. F.
Hubbard, T. F.
Slater, J.


Brook, Dryden (Halifax)
Hudson, James (Ealing, N.)
Smith, Ellis (Stoke, S.)


Broughton, Dr. A. D. D.
Hughes, Hector (Aberdeen, N.)
Soskice, Rt. Hon. Sir Frank


Brown, Rt. Hon. George (Belper)
Hynd, J. B. (Attercliffe)
Sparks, J. A.


Burke, W. A.
Jeger, George (Goole)
Steele, T.


Burton, Miss F. E.
Jeger, Dr. Santo (St. Pancras, S.)
Stewart, Michael (Fulham, E.)


Butler, Herbert (Hackney, S.)
Johnson, James (Rugby)
Stokes, Rt. Hon. R. R.


Callaghan, L. J.
Johnston, Douglas (Paisley)
Sylvester, G. O.


Carmichael, J.
Jones, David (Hartlepool)
Taylor, Bernard (Mansfield)


Castle, Mrs. B. A.
Jones, Frederick Elwyn (West Ham, S.)
Taylor, John (West Lothian)


Champion, A. J.
Jones, Jack (Rotherham)
Thomas, David (Aberdare)


Chetwynd, G. R.
Keenan, W.
Thomas, Iorwerth (Rhondda, W)


Coldrick, W.
Kenyon, C.
Thomas, Ivor Owen (Wrekin)


Collick, P. H.
Key, Rt. Hon. C. W.
Ungoed-Thomas, Sir Lynn


Craddock, George (Bradford, S)
King, Dr. H. M.
Wallace, H. W.


Cullen, Mrs. A.
Lee, Frederick (Newton)
Watkins, T. E.


Dalton, Rt. Hon. H.
Lee, Miss Jennie (Cannock)
Weitzman, D.


Davies, A. Edward (Stoke, N.)
Lever, Leslie (Ardwick)
Wells, Percy (Faversham)


Davies, Harold (Leek)
Lewis, Arthur
Weils, William (Walsall)


Davies Stephen (Merthyr)
Logan, D. G.
West, D. G.


de Freitas, Geoffrey
McGhee, H. G.
White, Mrs. Eirene (E. Flint)


Deer, G.
McInnes, J.
Whiteley, Rt. Hon W


Delargy, H, J.
McKay, John (Wallsend)
Wigg, George


Donnelly, D. L.
MacMillan, M. K. (Western Isles)
Wilkins, W. A.


Dugdale, Rt. Hon. John (W. Bromwich)
Mann, Mrs. Jean
Willey, Frederick (Sunderland, N.)


Ede, Rt. Hon. J. C.
Manuel, A. C.
Willey, Octavius (Cleveland)


Edelman, M.
Marquand, Rt. Hon. H. A.
Williams, Rev. Llywelyn (Abertillery)


Edwards, Rt. Hon. Ness (Caerphilly)
Mellish, R. J.
Williams, W. R. (Droylsden)


Edwards, W. J. (Stepney)
Moody, A. S.
Williams, W. T. (Hammersmith, S.)


Evans, Albert (Islington, S. W.)
Morley, R.
Winterbottom, Richard (Brightside)


Evans, Stanley (Wednesbury)
Nally, W.
Wyatt, W. L.


Ewart, R.
Neal, Harold (Bolsover)
Yates, V. F.


Fernyhough, E.
Noel-Baker, Rt. Hon. P. J
Younger, Rt. Hon. K


Field, W. J.
Oliver, G. H.



Finch, H. J.
Orbach, M.
TELLERS FOR THE AYES:


Fletcher, Eric (Islington, E.)
Oswald, T.
Mr. Bowden and


Follick, M.
Paling, Rt. Hon. W. (Dearne Valley)
Mr. Kenneth Robinson.




NOES


Aitken, W. T.
Bowen, E. R.
Dodds-Parker, A. D.


Allan, R. A. (Paddington, S.)
Boyd-Carpenter, J. A.
Dormer, P. W.


Alport, C. J. M.
Boyle, Sir Edward
Drayson, G. B.


Amery, Julian (Preston, N.)
Braithwaite, Lt.-Cdr. G. (Bristol, N.W.)
Drewe, G.


Amory, Heathcoat (Tiverton)
Brooke, Henry (Hampstead)
Duncan, Capt. J. A. L


Anstruther-Gray, Major W. J.
Brooman-White, R. C.
Dulhie, W. S


Arbuthnot, John
Buchan-Hepburn, Rt. Hon. P. G. T.
Erroll, F. J


Ashton, H. (Chelmsford)
Bullard, D. G.
Fell, A.


Assheton, Rt. Hon. R. (Blackburn, W)
Burden, F. F. A.
Finlay, Graeme


Baldock, Lt.-Cmdr. J. M.
Butcher, H. W.
Fisher, Nigel


Baldwin, A. E.
Carr, Robert (Mitcham)
Fletcher-Cooke, C.


Banks, Col. C.
Channon, H.
Fort, R.


Barber, A. P. L.
Churchill, Rt. Hon. W. S.
Galbraith, Cmdr. T D. (Pollok)


Barlow, Sir John
Clarke, Col. Ralph (East Grinstead)
Galbraith, T. G. D. (Hillhead)


Baxter, A. B.
Clarke, Brig. Terence (Portsmouth, W.)
Godber, J. B.


Beach, Maj. Hicks
Cole, Norman
Gomme-Dunoan, Col A.


Beamish, Maj. Tufton
Colegate, W. A.
Gough, C. F. H.


Bell, Philip (Bolton, E.)
Cooper-Key, E. M.
Gower, H. R.


Bell, Ronald (Bucks, S.)
Cranborne, Viscount
Graham, Sir Fergus


Bennett, F. M. (Reading, N.)
Crosthwaite-Eyre, Col. O. E.
Grimston, Hon. John (St. Albans)


Birch, Nigel
Crowder, Petre CRuislip—Northwood)
Harden, J. R. E.


Bishop, F. P.
Darling, Sir William (Edinburgh, S.)
Harris, Frederic (Croydon, N.)


Black, C. W.
Deedes, W. F.
Harris, Reader (Heston)


Boothby, R. J. G.
Digby, S. Wingfield
Harvey, Ian (Harrow, E.)







Heath, Edward
Maitland, Comdr. J. F. W. (Horncastle)
Simon, J. E. S. (Middlesbrough, W)


Henderson, John (Cathcart)
Maitland, Patrick (Lanark)
Smiles, Lt.-Col. Sir Waller


Hill, Dr. Charles (Luton)
Markham, Major S. F.
Smithers, Peter (Winchester)


Hill, Mrs. E. (Wythenshawe)
Marlowe, A. A. H.
Speir, R. M.


Hinchingbrooke, Viscount
Maudling, R.
Spence, H. R. (Aberdeenshire, W.)


Hirst, Geoffrey
Maydon, Lt.-Cmdr. S. L. C.
Stevens, G. P.


Holland-Martin, C. J.
Medlicott, Brig F.
Stoddart-Scott, Col. M


Hollis, M. C.
Mellor, Sir John
Storey, S.


Hornsby-Smith, Miss M P.
Molson, A. H. E
Strauss, Henry (Norwich, S.)


Horobin, I. M.
Mott-Radclyffe, C. E
Summers, G. S.


Howard, Gerald (Cambridgeshire)
Nabarro, G. D. N
Taylor, Charles (Eastbourne)


Howard, Greviile (St. Ives)
Nicolson, Nigel (Bournemouth, B.)
Thomas, Rt. Hon. J. P. L. (Hereford)


Hudson, Sir Austin (Lewisham, N.)
Noble, Cmdr A H P.
Thomas, P. J. M. (Conway)


Hudson, W. R. A. (Hull, N.)
Oakshott, H. D.
Thompson, Kenneth (Walton)


Hutchison, Lt.-Com. Clark (E'b'rgh W.)
Ormsby-Gore, Hon. W D.
Thompson, Lt.-Cdr. R. (Croydon, W.)


Hyde, Lt.-Col. H. M.
Orr, Capt. L. P. S.
Thornton-Kemsiey, Col. C. N.


Hylton-Foster, H. B. H
Orr-Ewing, Charles Ian (Hendon. N)
Tilney, John


Jenkins, Robert (Dulwich)
Osborne, C
Touche, Sir Gordon


Joynson-Hicks, Hon, L. W
Partridge, E.
Turton, R. H.


Kaberry, D.
Peto, Brig. C. H. M
Vosper, D. F.


Kerr, H. W. (Cambridge)
Peyton, J. W. W
Wakefield, Edward (Derbyshire, W.)


Lambert, Hon. G
Pilkington, Capt. R A
Walker-Smith, D. C.


Lambton, Viscount
Pitman, I. J.
Ward, Miss I. (Tynemouth)


Law, Rt. Hon. R. K.
Powell, J. Enoch
Waterhouse, Capt Rt. Hon C


Legge-Bourke, Maj. E. A. H.
Price, Henry (Lewisham, W.)
Watkinson, H. A


Llewellyn, D. T.
Raikes, H. V.
Wellwood, W.


Lloyd, Maj. Guy (Renfrew, E.)
Redmayne, M.
White, Baker (Canterbury)


Longden, Gilbert (Herts, S.W.)
Renton, D L. M.
Williams, Rt. Hon. Charles (Torquay)


Lucas, Sir Jocelyn (Portsmouth, S.)
Roberts, Peter (Heeley)
Williams, Sir Herbert (Croydon, E.)


Lucas, P. B. (Brentford)
Roper, Sir Harold
Williams, R. Dudley (Exeter)


Macdonald, Sir Peter (I. of Wight)
Russell, R. S
Wills, G.


McKibbin, A. J.
Schofield, Lt.-Col. W (Rochdale)
Wilson, Geoffrey (Truro)


McKie, J. H. (Galloway)
Scott, R. Donald
Wood, Hon. R.


Maclean, Fitzroy
Scott-Miller, Cmdr. R.



MacLeod, Rt. Hon. Iain (Enfield, W.)
Shepherd, William
TELLERS FOR THE NOES:




Mr. Studholme and Major Conant.

Mr. F. Willey: I do not propose to move the other Prayers which stand in the names of my hon. Friends and myself.

Orders of the Day — MUSEUMS AND ART GALLERIES (STAFF REDUCTIONS)

Motion made, and question proposed, "That this House do now adjourn."— [Mr. Butcher.]

11.11 p.m.

Lieut-Colonel H. M. Hyde: I wish to draw attention to the present position at some of our museums and art galleries as affected by the recent decision of the Government to apply a reduction in their staffs. Last month, at Question time, I drew attention particularly to two of these institutions and I was rather disappointed then by the reply I received from my hon. Friend the Financial Secretary to the Treasury. I hope that this evening he will do fuller justice to my complaint.
I should like to mention, very briefly, a few of the institutions which have been affected by the economy cuts. First of all, there is the Museum of the Public Record Office, which has been closed altogether. This institution has remained open with few interruptions from the year 1886 until the middle of last month. It

contains treasures of great historical importance of which I would mention a few. There is the Domesday Book, that great survey of this country executed by William the Conqueror. There is an early example of printing in the middle of the 15th century by Caxton. There are some of Shakespeare's autographed signatures—and not even at Stratford, his birthplace, is there anything of that kind.
There is the confession of Guy Fawkes that he intended to blow up this honourable House. There is an account of the Mutiny on the "Bounty" in Captain Bligh's handwriting. There is the logbook of Nelson's flag-ship, "Victory ' and the Treaty of 1839, which guaranteed the integrity of Belgium, which was described by the German Chancellor on the eve of the First World War as" a scrap of paper. "The public has been denied the sight of all these exhibits and the total saving to the public is really very trivial.
Then there is the British Museum. This institution has remained open since its foundation in the middle of the 18th century. Now there are several galleries open only on alternate days—particularly the Gallery of Oriental Art and the Egyptian Room with its mummies and sarcophagi. Then there are various picture collections, notably the Tate Gallery. This gallery has had to close, as a result


of the staff cuts, the whole of the ground floor which involves six rooms, and these rooms contain, among other exhibits, the British Watercolour Collection, which is the only one of its kind in the world. Altogether, some 500 pictures are involved in this closing.
Then there is the Wallace Collection which is to close four of its rooms. These include the famous collection of European armour brought together by Sir Richard Wallace, containing superb examples of craftsmanship such as the famous Pageant Shield of the Emperor Charles V. There are other museums, such as the National Maritime Museum, with its Queen's House, architectural masterpiece of Inigo Jones, Osterley Park, masterpiece of the Adam brothers, and the Natural History Museum; all these have suffered.
These economies on the whole, we have been told, amount to a saving of only £30,000 a year, but this seems to be comparatively trivial and out of all proportion to the disappointment caused to the public and to overseas visitors who receive a very unfortunate impression when they come here expecting to see these collections about which they have heard and which they have looked forward to seeing. Sometimes they have read about them in the Government's publicity overseas.
I understand that it has been left to the directors of those museums and galleries to make these staff reductions according to their own discretion and that they have been told that they must cut their staffs by 10 per cent. This falls very hardly upon them as compared with other Government Departments who have had to make similar reductions, because most other Government Departments greatly increased their staffs during the war and so a 10 per cent. cut does not fall so hardly upon them. But the museums and the art galleries have increased their staffs very little indeed since before the war and they feel these cuts very hardly indeed.
It may be that some of these institutions have not co-operated as well with the Treasury in affecting these reductions as others have, but it is plain that where a reduction in manpower is called for certain rooms must be closed, for it is quite impossible, particularly where there are valuable exhibits, to have them insecurely guarded. There have been more museum

thefts since the war than at any other time in our history. I need only mention the theft of the Nelson relics from the National Maritime Museum.
I wish to ask the Financial Secretary three questions. Why cannot these institutions make a charge for admission like Continental galleries do? I know that in some cases legislation would be required and that this presents a difficulty, but in other cases it is not necessary and here it would be a great help and would enable the directors of the institutions to keep their establishments fully manned.
Secondly, can students, who have good reason to see the exhibits in certain museums and galleries which are closed or partially closed, be allowed admission to them in approved cases? Thirdly, where articles of exceptional interest are no longer available to the interested, such as in the Public Record Office Museum, can arrangements be made for them to be lent to institutions which are still able to exhibit them?
Everyone realises the need for eliminating Government extravagance and waste, but surely economies which can be made in other directions. There is the Central Office of Informtaion and there are public relations officers and other services which it seems to me might be pruned before the museums and art galleries. These institutions are part and parcel of our national heritage. They are also part of our shop window for the attraction of foreign visitors to this country. Why spoil it like this while continuing to spend large sums of money abroad in trying to persuade foreign visitors to come to Britain?
Our museums and art galleries have a tremendous reputation overseas. It is a pity they should suffer now, particularly with the Coronation year approaching, when exceptionally large numbers of visitors will come to this country. I appeal to the Financial Secretary, therefore, to give the House some hope that before that time, if he cannot actually restore the cuts, he will at least modify their effects so that these famous national institutions can once more open their doors wide to the world.

11.21 p.m.

Mr. Woodrow Wyatt: I am happy to follow the hon. and gallant Member for Belfast, North (Lieut.-Colonel Hyde) in his admirable plea to the Government. He has done


a little to redeem the fallen reputation of his party. There were those who were naive enough to imagine that the Conservative Party would be the guardians of our culture. There was a story much put about in the past that the Labour Party would be destructive of our ancient heritage and that it was necessary to vote for the Conservative Party to preserve what was valuable in our life.
The Government is doing its best to disprove that contention and, in fact, no Government before has ever made such an onslaught on culture as the present Government is making today. Never before has the British Museum been obliged to shut any of its galleries on alternate days, except in war-time. Never before have the facilities of the other museums and galleries been restricted in this way.
It all arises from a stupid and unthinking cut imposed by the Treasury, without reflection, in a blanket manner on all the Departments with which it has dealings, instead of realising that these things are in a very special category and, in any case, that the saving effected can only be very small in size. I appreciate that the Financial Secretary will say that these are really curtailments of an increase, but I will come to that in a moment. Instead of realising that these things are in a special category, they have treated them as if they were boots and shoes and office filing cabinets and telephone extensions. They are not anything of the sort.
In addition to the list which the hon. and gallant Member for Belfast, North has given, I would also mention that the facilities at Ham House have now been restricted. The hon. and gallant Member did not mention the fact that Osterley Park has never yet been opened to the public, although it was purchased for the nation by the National Trust since the war and was due to be opened this Summer. As a result of this cut it will not now be open at all.
But it is not merely a question of closing parts of museums and galleries and closing one museum like the Public Record Museum altogether. There are other things involved in this cut. There is the question of cleaners. Many exhibits and valuable objects are not now being kept properly clean because there

are not enough cleaners. Often the museums themselves are not being kept properly clean. At the British Museum the other day there was quite an Anglo-American incident when an American lady sat in a pool of oil. The Director had to be summoned to soothe and placate her and to explain that his Government had curtailed the cleaners at the museum so that they were unable to keep the place clean any more. This will not encourage tourists to visit the British Museum.
There are many things now at the British Museum which, if one is unlucky and does not strike the right day, one will not see at all. But who is to know which is the right day before he goes? When one makes a comprehensive visit one expects to see the Mildenhall Treasure, but if one goes on the wrong day one will not see it at all now.
The Financial Secretary will say tonight, as he said before in a manner which was not quite worthy of him, that the onus was on the museums as to what they cut down, that it was nothing to do with the Treasury; that if the museums were so foolish as to close a part of the gallery or a collection altogether, it was not the fault of the Treasury. They had the choice of how to make the saving.
But how are they to make the choice? They have to cut down on something. They either have to have fewer cleaners and not keep the places clean; or they have to cut down on attendants and custodians and only allow the galleries to be opened at certain times and some to be shut altogether, or they have to cut down on something much more important —on the research and scholarship into the exhibits and in artistic discovery. One of the most disturbing features of the cuts is that a great deal of research will be stopped or curtailed, when it should be developed, into discovering more about the treasures which belong to us.
The Financial Secretary has said in answer to a Question that this was a matter of limiting the increase, that the costs of these museums were going up— as though that was something reprehensible. But the cost of everything is going up. The cost of living has risen remarkably since his Government took office, and, naturally an increase in the costs museums are paying in salaries cannot be stopped. If one is to say that


every time increased salaries have to be paid attendants have to be dismissed, then, by the time we have progressed another 20 years on that basis we shall have no museums or art galleries open at all.
What I should like the Government to appreciate is that this is what the cold war is all about. The reason we are engaged in a cold war, and have not given in to the Communists is because we value the heritage of our nation and the Western culture it represents. If we do not keep it going to the full, in our museums and art galleries, and allow the fullest possible enjoyment of them to all our people we are losing the cold war. What is the point of it all if we start denying our traditions and our stores of art treasures to our people?
For the sake of a miserable £30,000 a year all this is being done with a tremendous adverse effect on our reputation throughout the world, and our museums and art galleries have the highest reputation by an unthinking foolish Treasury action, taken without reflection or awareness of the consequences, and now stubbornly maintained. The hon. Gentleman knows it is perfectly wrong. He knows also that when Questions were originally asked in the House there was not a single person on either side to be found in support of the Government's action. He is doing it against the will of the House of Commons, the will of the country and in defiance of all our traditions.

11.29 p.m.

The Financial Secretary to the Treasury (Mr. John Boyd-Carpenter): I am glad that my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Belfast, North (Lieut.-Colonel Hyde) has elected to raise this subject this evening, in spite of the tone of the last speech, which was different altogether from that of my hon. and gallant Friend. There has been a genuine misunderstanding about this matter, which has seemed to be a fertile field for the exploitation of political aspirations by a certain section of the community. I think it would help the House if I made clear what has been done, and it is very different from what the hon. Gentleman the Member for Aston (Mr. Wyatt) appears to think.
We have not given any instruction to any museum or art gallery to close any-

thing. That is their business. All we have done is to make a reduction of 84 in the non-industrial staff. I am not dealing with the Public Record Office, to which I shall refer at a later stage, because it is not in the ordinary sense a museum or art gallery. It is a Department of State, and part of its function is the running of a museum. As I was saying, we have made a reduction of 84 in the non-industrial staff of 2,165, and that is less than half of the percentage the hon. Gentleman appeared to think. That, of course, was part of the general reductions in staff of public institutions that was imposed as part of this Government's economy campaign.
It cuts no ice whatever to say that it is "only 84 people" or "only £30,000,"because, as every hon. Member knows perfectly well, that type of criticism can equally easily be directed at any aspect of national economy. Any hon. Member with any experience in the House knows perfectly well that that criticism is very often made and not, on the whole, given very much weight by hon. Members. The justification, of course, arises from the cumulative effect of these cuts, which is a very essential part of the Government's attempt to restore the mess which it inherited.
We have not closed any gallery or given any instruction to do so. In fact, the matter is one for the museum authorities. The museums employ not only warder staff—that is, the staff who actually look after the galleries—but administrative, clerical and other staffs, and it is entirely up to the museum concerned—as I shall seek to show, some museums have applied it in different ways —to decide whether, in the first place, to apply the cut to warder staff, and secondly, if they do so, whether or not that cut shall be operated in a way which involves the closing of galleries.
I hope that I do not need to say—I do not need to say it to anybody except the hon. Member for Aston—that it is, of course, a matter for regret if the cut is applied in a way that denies the public access to any of our public treasures.

Mr. Wyatt: Mr. Wyattrose——

Mr. Boyd-Carpenter: No, I am not giving way. The hon. Member overran the time which it was understood I was to have.

Mr. Wyatt: The hon. Gentleman still has another 12 minutes.

Mr. Boyd-Carpenter: The hon. Member is wrong even on that.
It may help hon. Members if we look again at the figures. In 1939, the 14 galleries concerned employed, in the same categories of staff, 2,022. After the cuts have been applied—the 84, to which I have referred—they will still have 2,081; that is, 59 more than they had before the war. Prima facie,that increase of 59 ought at least to enable them to keep open the same number of rooms as they had before the war, but even before these cuts were applied, for other reasons connected, I think, with enemy action, 277,000 sq. ft. of galleries less were open in October, 1951, than in 1939—or approximately one-sixth of the total. Therefore, the position now is that to look after one-sixth less of the gallery area that was open before the war, there is available 59 more staff. I suggest that on those figures there is no essential justification for the closure of galleries.
Let us proceed to individual cases. My hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Belfast, North was concerned, and justifiably so, with the position of that great national institution, the British Museum, in respect of which, as he rightly said, there have been closures on certain days of certain rooms. It has today, after the cuts were imposed, a staff of 530 non-industrials, compared with 512 before the war. The Natural History Museum, which was referred to, has 341, as against 306. The National Maritime Museum has 63 non-industrials, compared with 55.
That is one aspect—the actual numbers. Then there comes the way in which the warder staffs are organised. It does not even follow that if a musuem decides to impose the cut, or part of the cut, on warder staff, it must close gallery space. In fact, one musuem—the Imperial War Museum—has reduced its warder staff by one and has opened a further additional 1,600 sq. ft. of gallery space. Both the National Gallery and the London Museum, who have reduced their warder staff by two, have maintained all the rooms that were open before the reductions took effect.

Mr. Wyatt: Mr. Wyattrose——

Mr. Boyd-Carpenter: Perhaps the hon. Member, who has sought to make enough mischief already this evening, would contain himself. I have very little time.
That, as I have said, clearly indicates that the action that the Government have taken has not made closure necessary. As I have said in answer to Parliamentary Questions, it has been a matter for decision by the musueum authorities whether to apply the cuts in a way which involves closure. I reject entirely the suggestion that a cut of this nature inevitably involves the closure of public gallery space.
Let me come now to the Public Record Office, which I indicated I wished to deal with separately because this is a Department of State with statutory functions. That body has suffered a cut of five in its non-industrial staff. Even then it has a staff of 154 compared with 127 before the war. Those figures speak for themselves.
My hon. and gallant Friend in his helpful and constructive speech, said that there were various methods which could be adopted. There was the question of imposing charges. Whether that is desirable or not, it would involve legislation in the case of some of the major institutions, notably the British Museum. But this is a matter which would be open to certain objections. It would be wrong to seek to apportion staff cuts among museums on the basis that some could make charges and some could not.
Where there have been closures arrangements have been made for students to view rooms which are closed to the public. The question of the transfer of articles from rooms which are closed to others which remain open is a matter which is within the authority of the trustees concerned. These articles are vested in the trustees, and it is up to them to decide where they shall be displayed. You, Mr. Speaker, are a trustee of one of the greatest institutions. Therefore, I have a particular reason for not wishing to trespass upon the functions of those august functionaries.
I think that this debate will have done good if only it indicates—and here I agree with the hon. Member for Aston for once —that hon. Members in all quarters of the House regret the closing of any gallery or opportunity for seeing any national


treasures. I very much hope that those who are responsible for the executive decisions in this field will take note of what has been said this evening. I think it will be clear, from the figures which I have given, that there is a certain scope, or tolerance, within the administrative discretion of those concerned to seek to alleviate, at any rate, the effect of these cuts.
I know that all economies are disagreeable and are apt to be resented. My hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Belfast, North suggested that there ought to be further economies in the Central Office for Information. We have cut that Department by something like 40 per cent, on last year's estimates, and not long ago I had to stand at this Box to defend those cuts against an onslaught from the benches opposite.
These cuts are all part of a general scheme for the reduction of numbers employed in the public service. This general scheme has resulted in the first reduction of the strength of the public services which this country has seen for some considerable time. I realise, of course, that any cut of this sort does impose problems, and very real problems upon those responsible for administering these great institutions. But I would say they are problems very similar to those which face other people concerned with other activities through the whole vast sphere of our administrative system.
I am sure that they will face the difficulties caused to them by the imposition of these cuts in the spirit in which other people and their organisations have

faced similar problems imposed by similar cuts—that is, on the basis that they must try to secure that the public suffer as little as possible from the cuts imposed by this Government as a result of a situation which as all hon. Members know this Government did not create. It is that spirit which will be of the greatest assistance in the carrying on of our public places in this country in perhaps a wider sphere even than the great institutions we have been discussing this evening.
It will, I think, be clear to them that, despite attempts to make party political capital by such hon. Members as the hon. Member for Aston, they should exercise their ingenuity and sagacity to secure that the public is given the greatest possible access—even perhaps at the cost of adjustments and simpler standards in other directions—to the treasures which, in the ultimate resort, belong to the public. I very much hope that the effect of this debate, so admirably raised by my hon. and gallant Friend, will be to convey to them this message: that we appreciate their problems and hope that they will be able so to adjust the cuts imposed upon them as to limit to the greatest extent possible interference with the rights of the public in this respect.

The Question having been proposed after Ten o'clock and the debate having continued for half an hour,Mr. SPEAKER adjourned the House without Question put, pursuant to the Standing Order.

Adjourned at Nineteen Minutes to Twelve o'Clock.